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INTRODUCTION
During its 1992 term, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit considered a broad range of patent-related subjects ranging
from its appellate jurisdiction to equity-based factors affecting pat-
ent enforceability. For the most part, the court preserved the status
quo and continued to apply well-established patent law principles in
reaching its decisions. However, there have been a number of inter-
esting cases that have served to clarify for the practitioner various
principles of patent law, such as the laches and equitable estoppel
defenses to patent infringement. The court has also confronted new
issues involving exemptions to patent infringement. Finally, the
court's effort to grapple with certain jurisdictional and claim inter-
pretation issues demonstrates that there will be more interesting de-
cisions to come in succeeding years.
This Article provides an overview of the 1992 Federal Circuit de-
cisions in the area of patent law, highlighting the more significant
aspects of those cases. For the purpose of discussion, the Article is
divided into six major sections. Section I focuses on Federal Circuit
decisions pertaining to its appellate jurisdiction, as well as practice
before the court. In Section II, the discussion summarizes the Fed-
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eral Circuit decisions relating to patentability and validity issues.
Section III deals with interference practice and the effect of interfer-
encejudgements. Section IV presents selected aspects of 1992 Fed-
eral Circuit patent infringement decisions. Section V discusses the
court's rulings on remedies for patent infringement. Finally, in Sec-
tion VI, we conclude with a discussion of various Federal Circuit
rulings involving application of equitable defenses to patent
infringement.
I. JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE
A. Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit
1. The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from
a final decision' or certain interlocutory orders or decrees2 of a dis-
trict court if the jurisdiction of the district court was based, in whole
or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.3 During the past year, the Federal
Circuit announced no significant doctrinal shifts concerning its ap-
pellate jurisdiction in patent cases. The Federal Circuit decisions
show an acute awareness of the critical role § 1338 plays in its appel-
late jurisdiction. Indeed, the Federal Circuit decisions suggest that
the court will continue to review the basis for its appellate jurisdic-
tion in accordance with established paradigms in ascertaining
whether the district court from which an appeal is taken had juris-
diction under § 1338.
In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc. ,4 the Fed-
eral Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to enforce a patent infringe-
ment settlement agreement because the district court retained
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) over the consent decree that
concluded an earlier infringement action.5 The events leading to
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988) (providing that "Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgement of a district court... if the jurisdiction of that
court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338").
2. Id. § 1292(c)(1) ("Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from
an interlocutory order or decree over which ... the court would have jurisdiction of appeal
under § 1295 .. "); id. § 1292(c)(2) ("Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an
appeal from a judgement in a civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be
appealable ... and is final except from an accounting.").
3. Id § 1338(a) (1988) ("District courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states .... ).
4. 958 F.2d 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 247-55
and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to judicial estoppel issue).
5. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc., 958 F.2d 355, 356, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's enforcement of un-
executed settlement agreement concerning patent infringement).
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the Federal Circuit's involvement in Wang began with Wang Labora-
tories, Inc.'s 1986 patent infringement action against Applied Com-
puter Sciences (ACS), which Wang settled with a consent decree
and a limited license to ACS to practice the patent. 6 Subsequently,
Wang filed a second complaint against ACS in the district court that
alleged breach of the license and filed a motion to hold ACS in con-
tempt of court for violating the consent decree. 7 The district court
consolidated the motion for contempt and the breach of contract
claim.8 Before the scheduled trial date, the parties again agreed to
settle9 and prepared a draft settlement agreement, which neither
party signed.' 0 At the request of the parties, the district court en-
tered a conditional order of dismissal, which did not incorporate the
unexecuted settlement agreement.1' After unsuccessful attempts to
conclude their settlement discussions, Wang was granted a motion
to vacate the dismissal and enforce the unexecuted draft settlement
agreement.' 2 ACS appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, but that court remanded and directed that any subse-
quent notice of appeal be filed with the Federal Circuit. 13
The jurisdictional issue in Wang focused specifically on the "trans-
fer" of ACS's appeal by the First Circuit,' 4 and whether the case was
properly before the Federal Circuit because the district court's juris-
diction to enforce the parties' settlement was based, in whole or in
part, on § 1338. The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting
that while the law of the regional circuit in which the district court
sits will apply in some matters, such deference is inappropriate in
matters of the court's appellate jurisdiction. 15 The Federal Circuit
6. See id (describing consent judgment entered by district court that held Wang's pat-
ent valid and infringed by ACS). The consent decree enjoined ACS from engaging in further
infringing activity and granted ACS a license on Wang's patent. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id at 357, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
9. See id (reporting that parties agreed to settle dispute during meetings held Thursday
and Friday, which immediately preceded Monday trial).
10. Id
11. See id. at 356-57, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056-57 (detailing dismissal order, which
provided that action could be reopened by May 26, 1988, without prejudice for good cause
shown if settlement was not consummated).
12. See id at 357, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (indicating that district court granted
Wang's motion to vacate conditional order of dismissal despite fact that Wang filed motion
after deadline specified in dismissal order for reopening of action).
13. See id (describing ACS's appeal of district court decision to First Circuit, which re-
manded case to district court for compliance with rule 58 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as to proper entry ofjudgment).
14. Wang Lab. v. Applied Computer Sciences, 926 F.2d 92, 94-95, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1935,
1936-37 (1st Cir. 1991)(emphasizing district court consolidated Wang's actions, concluding
appellate jurisdiction was in Federal Circuit, and remanding with direction to file future ap-
peals with Federal Circuit).
15. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, 958 F.2d 355, 357,22 U.S.P.Q.2d
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recognized that it was unclear whether the district court retained
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 to enforce a settlement agree-
ment that was not incorporated into the final judgment. 15 The court
reviewed various circuit court decisions and concluded that the re-
gional circuit courts differ as to the basis upon which a district court
has jurisdiction to enforce such a settlement agreement.1 7
The First Circuit, which originally heard ACS's appeal, however,
held that the district court had inherent jurisdiction and had re-
tained jurisdiction under § 1338 over the consolidated actions for
contempt to enforce the injunction and to enforce the settlement
agreement.' The Federal Circuit characterized the First Circuit's
decision as having adopted the rule set forth in Aro Corporation v.
Allied Witan Co. ,19 which stated that the district court may retain ju-
risdiction to enforce settlement agreements entered into by parties
to an action before the court.20 Adhering to the principle that "if
the transferee court can find the transfer jurisdiction plausible, its
jurisdictional inquiry is at an end,"' 2 1 the Federal Circuit concluded
that there was no reason to disturb the First Circuit's decision and
upheld its jurisdiction to hear ACS's appeal.22
(BNA) 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (recognizing that Federal Circuit may nonetheless look for
guidance to relevant regional circuit court decisions).
16. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) (providing that district courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action arising under patent laws).
17. Wang, 958 F.2d at 357-58, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057. The apparent rationale for
the requirement of an independent basis for a district court's jurisdiction over a settlement
agreement is that given a district court's limited jurisdiction, it is a fair presumption that a
claim is not within the court's jurisdiction until the contrary is demonstrated. Turner v. Bank
of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7, 10 (1799). The burden of establishing jurisdiction over each
claim is on the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936). Compare Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. Fairfax
County, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir.) (requiring independent basis for jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978) with Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371-72, 190
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 394 (6th Cir.) (holding that district court retains jurisdiction from origi-
nal action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) and Kulka v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 483
F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973) (recognizing that settlement of litigation is always preferable to
proceedings before district court as means to resolve initial litigation and avoid further litiga-
tion) and Cia Anon Venezoluna De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967)
(favoring settlement as means to resolve litigation) and All States Investors, Inc. v. Bankers
Bond Co., 343 F.2d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding settlement to be favored means of end-
ing or avoiding litigation).
18. Wang, 958 F.2d at 357, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
19. 531 F.2d 1368, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
20. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, 958 F.2d 355, 357, 22 U.S.P.Q02d
(BNA) 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368,
1371-72, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976)).
21. Id. at 358, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
22. Id. When a transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, the jurisdic-
tional inquiry is at an end. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819
(1989). Uncertainty over the Federal Circuit's future application of Wang presents difficulties
for practitioners. In particular, it is unclear whether the court will decide jurisdiction over
actions to enforce settlement agreements on an ad hoc basis depending on the ruling of an-
other circuit court of appeals.
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In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Integrated Network Corp. ,23
the Federal Circuit interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) as not confer-
ring federal subject matter jurisdiction over a case involving breach
of an employment contract, even though the central issue was a pat-
ent question regarding whether an employee "made or conceived"
an invention during the course of employment. 24 American Tele-
phone and Telegraph (AT&T) brought an action in a New Jersey
state court against Integrated Network Corporation (INC) and four
of AT&T's former employees who were working for INC. 25 AT&T
alleged that the former employees had breached their employment
contracts by assigning to INC an invention that the former employ-
ees had "made or conceived" while working for AT&T.26 INC re-
moved the case to federal district court based on § 1338(a), 27 and
the district court denied AT&T's motion to remand the case back to
state court.28
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's denial of AT&T's
motion, instructing that the case be transferred back to state court.29
The Federal Circuit cited Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp. 30 for the proposition that a claim supported by alternate theo-
ries of recovery may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction
unless patent law is essential to each theory.3' Although AT&T's
complaint presented four separate counts, each count was based on
the breach of the affirmative agreement between AT&T and its four
23. 972 F.2d 1321, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
24. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1323-26, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918, 1919-21 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (provid-
ing that district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action aris-
ing under patent laws).
25. American TeL, 972 F.2d at 1321-22, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
26. See id. (reporting AT&T's four-count complaint for breach of contract, breach of fi-
duciary duty, misuse and misappropriation of proprietary information, and inducing breach of
contract and misappropriation of proprietary information). The employment contract, which
the former employees had signed, required the assignation to AT&T of all rights to inven-
tions that the employee made or conceived, solely or jointly with others, during the course of
employment with AT&T. IdL at 1323, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
27. See id (finding that interpretation of employment contract, and in particular, term
"conception" as used in contract, would necessarily involve questions related to patent law).
28. See id (describing district court statement that for AT&T to recover, AT&T would
have to prove that substantial question of federal patent law existed when invention was con-
ceived). In response to AT&T's motion for reconsideration, the district court affirmed its
denial and added two bases for the decision. Id The first additional basis was that the grant-
ing of AT&T's motion would have the effect of circumventing federal jurisdiction by the mere
addition of a nonpatent count. IE The second additional basis was that the term "conceived"
in the contract must be given its narrow, technical, patent law meaning, rather than its
broader general meaning used in nonpatent law. Id
29. Id at 1322, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
30. 468 U.S. 800 (1988).
31. American TeL, 972 F.2d at 1323, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (citing Christianson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 468 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
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former employees.3 2 The court, therefore, reasoned that even if the
interpretation of the employment contract term "conceived" would
involve a substantial question of patent law, AT&T's action was not
entitled to federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a) because substantial
questions of patent law were not necessary elements to each of the
theories presented in the well-pleaded claims of AT&T's com-
plaint.3 3 Interpretation of the patent law meaning of contract terms
thus became an ancillary issue that could not itself sustain jurisdic-
tion under § 1338(a).3 4
In In re Regents of the University of California,35 the Federal Circuit
affirmed its jurisdiction to entertain a mandamus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 1651 to review a transfer order of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPMDL) that consolidated five patent in-
fringement cases for pretrial purposes.3 6 According to the court,
"[w]ith the formation of the Federal Circuit... this court acquired
the authority of § 1651 and the responsibility of 35 U.S.C.
§ 1407(e)." 3 7 The Federal Circuit noted that the appellants errone-
ously relied on Wood v. United States38 for the proposition that the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the transferee district
32. Id at 1324, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
33. See id. (recognizing that because contract terms "conceived" and "invention" have
meaning in both patent law and general law, AT&T could rely on theories that would not
involve interpretation of patent law meaning of contract terms).
34. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that its holding was not remarkable because it previ-
ously held that statutory limitations on the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit in conjunction
with the well-pleaded complaint rule may result in a state court resolving a patent issue. Id.
(citing Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 913, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1641 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
35. 964 F.2d 1128, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 234-
40 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to law of case doctrine); infra notes
288-98 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to sovereign immunity and Elev-
enth Amendment issues).
36. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1130, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1748, 1750 (consolidating two cases from U.S. District Court for Northern District of Califor-
nia and three cases from U.S. District Court for Southern District of Indiana). The University
of California is an instrumentality of the State of California. BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los
Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421, 1422 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1090 (1989). The University of California, Eli Lilly, and Genentech were parties to the
litigation, which centered around patents pertaining to recombinant DNA technology and its
use in the production of human insulin and human growth hormone. Regents, 964 F.2d at
1130, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. The five cases presented numerous issues relating to
these patents that included validity, infringement, breach of licensing agreements, and alleged
antitrust violations. Id.
37. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1130, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750; see Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 37, 37-39 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)) (establishing Federal Circuit); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988) (provid-
ing that federal courts can issue all writs necessary or appropriate to secure their respective
jurisdiction); 35 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (1988) (prescribing rules for transfer and consolidation of
federal cases that bar review of order ofJPMDL except as required by extraordinary writ).
38. 961 F.2d 195 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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court.3 9 In Wood, the Federal Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(e) it did not have jurisdiction over the transferee district
court because the action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which precludes appeals to the Federal Circuit.40 In Regents,
however, the Federal Circuit had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 to review the final judgment of the trans-
feree district court because the district court's jurisdiction arose
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.41 Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295,
1407, and 1651, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to review the
writ of mandamus challenging the transfer order.42
The Federal Circuit subsequently denied the petition for ex-
traordinary writ, holding that consolidation was neither a clear
abuse of discretion nor usurpation of judicial authority, nor was it
contrary to law.43 The court held that there were sufficient common
questions of fact to justify consolidating the actions for pretrial pur-
poses.44 These common questions included the existence of at least
thirty-five deposition witnesses common to all five actions, common
activities that gave rise to the suits in two different jurisdictions, a
settlement agreement common to two cases, and the same grounds
upon which the validity of various patents was challenged in several
different courts. 45 The Federal Circuit also concluded that the
JPMDL did not exceed its discretionary authority in selecting the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana as the appro-
39. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1130, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (citing Wood v. United
States, 961 F.2d 195 (Fed. Cir. 1992), which held that petitions for extraordinary writ to re-
view order to transfer must be filed only in court of appeals havingjurisdiction over transferee
district).
40. Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195, 198-99 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1988) (assigning district courts original jurisdic-
tion over tort claims, with appeals to regional circuits).
41. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1130, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295
(West Supp. 1992) (setting forth Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases that arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1338).
42. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1130, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
43. ia at 1136, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755. The Federal Circuit noted that orders,
reviewable by extraordinary writ, may only be overturned when there has been clear abuse of
discretion or usurpation ofjudicial authority. See id. at 1135, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754
(citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953), which held that
supplementary review power over writ is meant to be used only in exceptional cases). Fur-
thermore, a petitioner has the burden of establishing that its right to the issuance of the writ is
clear and indisputable. Ia (citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967), which held
that party must convince court that "exceptional circumstances" make its right to reversal of
writ "clear and indisputable"); see also In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1086, 231
U.S.P.Q . (BNA) 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that petitioner failed to show "exceptional
circumstances" to satisfy burden of proof required under Will).
44. See Regents, 964 F.2d at 1135-36, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754-55 (noting that
JPMDL was presented evidence of overlapping documents and witnesses in these five cases).
45. See id. (holding that posture of each case, respective state of advancement toward
trial, and degree of overlap and separateness should also be considered when consolidating
cases).
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priate forum because many factors supported the appropriateness
of the Indiana forum.46 Specifically, the court cited the following
factors: the broader-based action was filed in Indiana; the first suit
was brought in that state; more suits were pending in Indiana; the
Indiana district court was familiar with the issues; Indiana was a cen-
trally located forum for witnesses and counsel; and the only party
common to all five actions had its headquarters and many of its doc-
uments in Indiana.47
In another case involving an appellate transfer order and jurisdic-
tion over the transferred appeal, the Federal Circuit held in Franchi
v. Manbeck 48 that it had appellate jurisdiction to determine whether
the district court properly had jurisdiction under an act of Congress
which related to patents within the meaning of § 1338(a).49 In
Franchi, the plaintiff challenged the grading of his examination for
registration to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) by filing an action against the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut, which promptly dismissed the action.50 Franchi first appealed
to the Second Circuit, which transferred the appeal to the Federal
Circuit while leaving unanswered the question of whether the claim
should have been brought in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia under 35 U.S.C. § 32.51 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
noted that it had appellate jurisdiction to review a refusal of regis-
46. See id. at 1136, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (finding that petitioner failed to demon-
strate clear and indisputable right to selection of U.S. District Court for Northern District of
California as transfer forum).
47. Id. But see id. (stating factors that instead favored California forum, including that
two of three parties were in California and that California had less congested docket). The
appropriateness of the forum based on the location of the first suit filed-the first-to-file
rule-is not subject to rigid application. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969,
971-72, 976-78 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that first-to-file rule is not mandate directing automatic
application without regard to rare or extraordinary circumstances, bad faith, or forum shop-
ping), aff'd, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng'g, Inc., 819 F,2d
746, 749-50, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1934 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that mere fact that
alleged infringer filed action four days before trademark registrant filed infringement action
did not give alleged infringer right to select forum); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. M/V W.D.
Cargill, 751 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.) (finding that suit may be dismissed where evidence indi-
cates its filing was in anticipation of later suit and intended as forum-controlling maneuver),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); Ven-Fuel, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 673 F.2d 1194,
1195 (11 th Cir. 1982) (ruling that district court may decline to entertain declaratory judgment
action filed in apparent anticipation of proceeding in another court that would fully resolve
controversy).
48. 972 F.2d 1283, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
49. Franchi v. Manbeck, 972 F.2d 1283, 1285, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1850 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
50. Id Franchi had appealed to the Second Circuit, but the Second Circuit transferred
the appeal to the Federal Circuit. Id.
51. Id- at 1285, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (explaining that Second Circuit did not
decide whether claim should have been brought originally in U.S. District Court for District of
Columbia or Connecticut).
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tration to practice under 35 U.S.C. § 32, which is an act of Congress
pertaining to patents within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 52
Contrary to appellant's argument, the Federal Circuit explained that
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, not the Con-
necticut District Court, is the appropriate forum for actions brought
under 35 U.S.C. § 32 and affirmed the dismissal.53
2. Perfection of Federal Circuit jurisdiction-Rule 54(b)
Under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an ap-
peal can be taken from an individual claim that has been finally adju-
dicated, even though other issues remain unadjudicated. 54 In W.L.
Gore & Associates v. International Medical Prosthetics Research Associates,55
the Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review a district
court's certification under rule 54(b).56 W.L. Gore sued Interna-
tional Medical Prosthetics Research Associates (IMPRA) for patent
infringement to which IMPRA raised several affirmative defenses,
including patent misuse, and filed antitrust counterclaims. 57 The
district court bifurcated the patent misuse and antitrust counter-
claims and held that IMPRA did not infringe W.L. Gore's patent.58
The district court then certified its judgment pursuant to rule 54(b),
leaving IMPRA's patent misuse defense and antitrust counterclaim
52. Ia at 1287, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (citing Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents
& Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934, 935-37, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 918, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see
35 U.S.C. § 32 (1988) (authorizing Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to suspend or
exclude from practice any party engaging in certain misconduct); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)
(providing that district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil ac-
tion arising under patent laws).
53. See Franchi, 972 F.2d at 1288, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852 (explaining that U.S.
District Court for District of Columbia is exclusive forum for judicial review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 32).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action .... or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
Id
55. 975 F.2d 858, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs., 975 F.2d
858, 865, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit recognized
that the Supreme Court has provided adequate guidance to resolve the issue of whether the
district court's rule 54(b) certification was proper. Id. at 864, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197
(citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980), which held that even
where issues overlap, court may be justified in certifying appeal of single claim). Because
Supreme Court precedent controlled, the respective interpretations of rule 54(b) by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and by the Federal Circuit were irrelevant. See id
(indicating absence of need to address choice of law issue because of existing Supreme Court
case law).
57. Id. at 860, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
58. Id.
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unadjudicated.5 9
The Federal Circuit noted that rule 54(b) permits a district court
to sever an individual claim that is final and separable from the
other claims for relief, thus allowing immediate appeal of the indi-
vidual claim without waiting for a final decision on all claims. 60 The
court also noted that when one defense is sustained, rule 54(b) does
not require that all other defenses be certified. 61 Rule 54(b) explic-
itly allows certification only of one or more, but not all, claims or
parties to a dispute.62 Therefore, a defense could only be consid-
ered implicitly and indirectly with the claim against which the de-
fense was raised. 63
The Federal Circuit held that the infringement judgment was "fi-
nal" and that rule 54(b) certification was proper.64 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that there was insufficient evidence of
factual overlap between infringement and the unadjudicated misuse
defense and the antitrust counterclaims to show that the district
court abused its discretion in certifying its infringement judgment.65
According to the Federal Circuit, the certified judgment was final
because Gore's infringement claim was finally adjudicated when the
district court held Gore's patent valid and not infringed, which was
the only claim for relief.66 Moreover, the district court's bifurcation
of the misuse defense did not and could not have an impact on the
finality of its noninfringement judgment.67
59. Id.
60. See id. at 861-62, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198 (observing that principal issues in
determining severability are finality ofjudgment and separateness of claims for relief).
61. Id. at 863, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (explaining basis for declining to certify
patent misuse defense). IMPRA argued that because the district court did not certify the
unadjudicated patent misuse defense, the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over W.L.
Gore's entire cause of action. Id.
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing text of rule 54(b) and explaining
its application).
63. International Medical, 975 F.2d at 863, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (explaining that
practical effect of claim certification under rule 54(b), which authorizes certification for appeal
of claims, and not defenses, amounts to certification of defenses raised against those claims).
64. Id. at 863-65, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199-1201 (finding no abuse of discretion in
district court's certification notwithstanding absence of findings justifying certification). Fi-
nality occurs when the judgment ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court
to do but execute thejudgment. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (outlin-
ing limits of issues eligible for appellate review). Because the finality requirement is a statu-
tory mandate and not a matter of discretion, an appellate court should review the finality of
the judgement de novo in order to ensure itself that it has jurisdiction. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956) (holding that district court has no discretion to treat
as final that which is not final within statute's meaning).
65. See International Medical, 975 F.2d at 864-65, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200 (holding
that factual overlap of only tangential issues or "one aspect" of counterclaim does not pro-
hibit certification).
66. Id. at 863, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
67. Id.
1993] 1992 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS 921
The Federal Circuit also held that the antitrust and infringement
issues were separate claims for relief.68 The court noted that at least
two factors are generally considered to determine whether claims
are separate: first, the factual relatedness of the claims; and second,
whether the appellate court would have to decide the same issues
more than once if there were subsequent appeals. 69 The Federal
Circuit dismissed IMPRA's conclusory assertions of a factual overlap
between the counterclaims and Gore's infringement claim, noting
that a factual overlap on tangential issues is inadequate to show an
abuse of discretion. 70 Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the dis-
trict court's failure to set forth explicit reasons underlying the certi-
fication was not an abuse of discretion because the case posture and
factors justifying the judgment were easily ascertainable from the
briefs and materials of record. 71
B. Declaratory Judgments
The Declaratory Judgment Act 72 provides federal district courts
with the discretion to declare the rights of an interested party to an
actual case or controversy.73 An actual controversy exists, for exam-
ple, when a declaratory judgment plaintiff proves that a patentee-
defendant's conduct created a reasonable apprehension that the de-
fendant would initiate suit should the plaintiff commence or con-
tinue the allegedly infringing activity. 74 In 1992, the Federal Circuit
68. Id. at 864, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. Separateness of claims is required so that
the appellate court is not duplicating its efforts in separate appeals relating to the same issue
or factual subject matter. Unlike the finality requirement, a separateness determination will
only be overturned if the district court abused its discretion in holding the claims separate.
See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (discussing district court's
need to weigh administrative interests and equities involved in deciding whether to separate
claims); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452 (1956)
(holding that district court is free to sever claims arising out of same transaction or occur-
rence if circumstances justify certification of less than all claims together).
69. International Medical, 975 F.2d at 864, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200 (citing Curtiss-
Wright, 446 U.S. at 8; Cold Metal Process, 351 U.S. at 452).
70. Id.
71. lId at 865, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200 (rejecting IMPRA's argument, which relied
on Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), that rule 54(b) re-
quires district court to make specific findings setting forth reasons for its order).
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988).
73. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937) (acknowledging
court's discretion pursuant to Declaratory Judgment Act to decide concrete issues of legal
rights). The standard of proof for establishing an actual controversy is a preponderance of
the evidence. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1399, 22 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 934, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
74. See Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
845, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that conduct creating reasonable apprehension of suit
satisfies controversy requirement for declaratory judgment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986);
see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1310, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (presenting two-part test requiring (1) reasonable appre-
hension, and (2) that party seeking declaratory judgment have either actually produced device
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addressed the actual controversy requirement issue in three cases,
two of which focused on reasonable apprehension. 75
In Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp.,76 the Federal Circuit held that
Amoco's statements during licensing negotiations with Shell were
not threats to sue when considered in context and thus did not cre-
ate a reasonable apprehension of litigation. 77 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court recognized that an express charge of infringement
is not required to establish reasonable apprehension. 78 Rather, the
conduct of the parties alone, when considered in context with the
totality of the circumstances, may give rise to a reasonable appre-
hension of litigation. 79 During licensing negotiations, Amoco re-
ferred to a composition that Shell planned to produce as "falling
within" and "covered" by Amoco's patent.8 0 The Federal Circuit
characterized this as a statement of a negotiating position rather
than an express charge of infringement that could create a reason-
able apprehension of litigation.81 The court noted that Amoco's
statement of intent to enforce its patent arose in response to Shell's
inquiry at the end of unsuccessful negotiations.8 2 Based on the to-
tality of the circumstances, the court accepted Amoco's assertion
that this statement was "mere jawboning," typical of licensing nego-
or prepared to produce that device to determine existence of case or controversy in declara-
tory judgment action).
75. West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1297-98, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that statements made to plaintiff
by party not representing patentee could not have given rise to reasonable apprehension of
suit by patentee); Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1627, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding patentee's statements were not threats to sue when con-
sidered in context and thus did not create reasonable apprehension on part of plaintiff).
76. 970 F.2d 885, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1627 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
77. See Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 887-89, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1629-31 (discussing test for
reasonable apprehension of litigation and finding that Amoco's statements hinting at Shell's
apparent violation of Amoco's patent did not constitute cognizable threat that Amoco might
sue).
78. See id at 888, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630 (citing Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953,956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1987), which
argued against such narrow interpretation of actual controversy requirement of Declaratory
Judgment Act).
79. Id. (citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which held that test for actual controversy in
declaratory judgment complaints in patent cases is whether, in totality of circumstances, de-
fendant's conduct creates reasonable apprehension in plaintiff that suit will be filed if plaintiff
continues its allegedly infringing conduct and has either produced or is preparing to produce
device in question). Shell unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the district court erroneously
required the presence of related litigation on the part of the patentee to establish reasonable
apprehension. Id. The Federal Circuit did not find that the district court had actually re-
quired such evidence from Shell. Id
80. Id. at 886-87, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
81. Id. at 889, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.
82. See id. (finding that passive response in affirmative to question of whether Amoco
would enforce its patent could not equate with active threat to bring suit against Shell).
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tiations.8 3 The court concluded that Amoco's reply was "reflective
and obligatory."8 4 Answering in the negative would have poten-
tially given Shell free reign to infringe Amoco's patent.85
In West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc. ,86 decided after
Shell Oil, the Federal Circuit also held that there was no actual con-
troversy to support a declaratory judgment action.87 The court's
holding reflected its conclusion that Call Interactive, the party that
made remarks alleged to cause West Interactive to have a reason-
able apprehension of suit, did not represent the patentee, First
Data.88 During a meeting between Call Interactive and Semper, a
potential customer, Call Interactive informed Semper that Semper
and West Interactive were infringing First Data's patents.8 9 After-
ward, Semper informed West Interactive of the remarks made by
Call Interactive during the meeting.90 Upon learning of other litiga-
tion brought by First Data on the same patents, West Interactive
filed a declaratory judgment action against First Data.91
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that First
Data's conduct did not cause West Interactive to have a reasonable
apprehension of litigation.92 In doing so, the court noted that no
representative of First Data or West Interactive attended the meet-
ing and that Call Interactive was not authorized to speak for First
Data.93 Furthermore, relying on Shell Oil, the court characterized
83. Id. (noting that certain charges of infringement do not give rise to reasonable fear of
litigation as such "jawboning" is common in licensing negotiations).
84. Id.
85. Id. The court explained that the intent of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to protect
truly threatened parties. Id. The Declaratory Judgment Act should not be used to allow a
potential infringer to bring into court a nonthreatening patentee that has merely protected its
own interests during discussions by asserting its best arguments. Id.
86. 972 F.2d 885, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1627 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
87. See West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1298, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that conduct by defendant, First Data,
did not rise to level of threat to satisfy actual controversy requirement).
88. See id. (noting that Call Interactive's conduct could not be attributed to First Data,
even though Call Interactive was nonexclusive licensee of First Data and joint venture of First
Data's subsidiary).
89. See id at 1296, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928 (recounting conversation between Ron-
ald Katz, inventor of patents in suit and employee of Call Interactive, and Andrew Batkin,
employee of Semper). Call Interactive was a joint venture between AT&T and First Data
Resources Interactive Technologies Corporation, which itself was a nonexclusive licensee of
First Data. Id. Semper was unrelated to either party to the litigation. Id. Call Interactive
initiated the meeting with Semper to attempt to gain Semper as a customer. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (reporting district court's dismissal of declaratory judgment action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in absence of actual controversy because there was no contact di-
rectly or indirectly between West Interactive and First Data, and there was no evidence that
First Data intended to bring suit).
92. See id. at 1297-98, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929-30 (finding that Katz's oral state-
ment in course of negotiations did not give West Interactive reason to fear lawsuit).
93. See id. at 1297, 23 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1929 (noting that Katz was not officer of Call
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the meeting between Call Interactive and Semper as negotiations
that involved "jawboning," not threats of litigation.94
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. ,95 the Federal Cir-
cuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing a declaratory judgment action for lack of actual controversy
at the time the complaint was filed. 96 Telectronics sought a declara-
tion that Ventritex's device, upon Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval, would infringe Telectronics' patents.97 The Fed-
eral Circuit agreed that future potential infringement can satisfy the
actual controversy requirement, but only if the patentee shows the
existence of an immediacy and reality of conflict at the time the
complaint is filed.98 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding of a lack of immediacy or reality at the time of filing, how-
ever, because Ventritex was still years away from potential FDA ap-
proval and because Ventritex could modify its device in the
interim.9 9
C. Standing and Mootness
In 1992, the Federal Circuit addressed mootness issues in a series
of cases. Prudential and jurisdictional mootness questions arose in
Interactive nor owner, officer, agent, or even employee of First Data). But see id. at 1299, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (stating that Katz was "no small fry" as he
was inventor of patents in suit and employee of patent licensee, Call Interactive). Judge Lou-
rie found it inconceivable that Katz was not "acting with the knowledge and authority of the
patentee." Id.
94. See id at 1298, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (emphasizing that vagueness of discus-
sion and nonstructured nature of negotiation setting supported finding of mere jawboning).
In dissent, Judge Lourie argued that the totality of the circumstances supported the existence
of a reasonable apprehension of litigation. See id. at 1300, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (not-
ing that West Interactive was aware of other lawsuits brought by First Data against parties
similarly situated and that West Interactive was told by potential customer, Semper, that Call
Interactive believed West Interactive to be infringing).
95. 982 F.2d 1520, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1523, 25 U.S.P.,Q2d
(BNA) 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
97. Id. at 1520, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197. The original complaint sought a declara-
tory judgment, alleging that after expiration of the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) clinical testing ex-
emption period, Ventritex's activities would constitute infringement of Telectronics' patents.
Id. Ventritex moved to dismiss on the ground that the declaratory judgment counts sought an
advisory opinion and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. In response,
Telectronics amended its complaint to include five counts of patent infringement, alleging
that Ventritex engaged in activities that were not exempt under § 271(e)(1). Id.
98. Id. at 1523, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201 (citing Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply
Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
99. Id. The Federal Circuit also noted that the exercise of the district court's jurisdiction
over a declaratory judgment action is discretionary. Id. Based on the record in this case,
there was no abuse of the district court's discretion. Id. The Federal Circuit further deter-
mined that, contrary to Telectronics' assertions, the failure of the district court to explicitly
set forth findings and conclusions supporting its grant of summary judgment did not warrant
reversal. Id- at 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-02.
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several contexts, which included a settlement during the pendency
of an appeal,' 00 a settlement of infringement issues while cross-ap-
pealing issues under 35 U.S.C. § 291,101 and a vacating of a district
court's judgment of invalidity upon affirmance of its noninfringe-
ment judgment.1 0 2
District court judgments are often vacated as moot under the
Munsingwear doctrine, 103 which provides that judgments should be
vacated when the case becomes moot. 0 4 In U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp.,105 the Federal Circuit, while noting exceptions to
this general rule, held the district court decision became moot when
all parties to the appeal reached a settlement. 10 6 The Federal Cir-
cuit also held that a nonappealing defendant lacked standing to op-
pose a motion to dismiss an appeal, even though the defendant was
100. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1709, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (addressing propriety of vacatur ofjudgment at trial where par-
ties have settled dispute); see also infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text (discussing Philips
in detail).
101. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 914, 23
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that relief may still be granted on
noninfringement issues after settlement of infringement dispute); see also infra notes 128-38
and accompanying text (discussing Kimberly-Clark in detail).
102. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 952, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1231, 1235 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that because district court's ruling of noninfringement
was affirmed, appellate court need not address question of validity and therefore must vacate
holding of invalidity), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); see also infra notes 139-67 and accom-
panying text (discussing Morton in detail).
103. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). Under the Mun-
singwear doctrine, the established practice in dealing with a federal civil case that becomes
moot on its way up the ladder of court review is to reverse or vacate the lower court judgment
and remand with directions to dismiss. Id.
104. See id. at 39 (relating that where mootness has been determined, established
Supreme Court practice is to reverse or vacate decision below and remand with direction to
dismiss); see also Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 (1936) (observing
that appellate court has duty to remand case for dismissal where controversy has become
entirely moot); Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 93-94 (1979) (applying Duke
Power and Munsingwear, and remanding with directions to have district court judgment vacated
and complaint dismissed); IB JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 548 n.34
(2d ed. 1993) (stating that more cases have followed vacation-and-remand practice of Mun-
singwear than have not). But see Center for Science in the Pub. Interest v. Regan, 727 F.2d
1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Munsingwear doctrine as inapplicable when parties
deliberately choose to forgo appeal); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa Co., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that settlement of appealed case does not give rise to vacatur of
district court's determination because, while parties may enter into contracts concerning par-
ties' private property, same is not true of judicial precedents that are public acts by public
officials, and which provide guidance to future judges and litigants).
105. 971 F.2d 728, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
106. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1709, 1711 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that where all parties have settled, parties to appeal are
"entitled" to vacatur). The court recognized exceptions to the general rule because of the
distinction that can be drawn between mootness occasioned by settlement and mootness
caused by changed circumstances or "happenstance," and also because such exceptions can
require court to weigh the basis of mootness in deciding whether to vacate action. Id.
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included in the official caption of the case. 10 7
Philips brought a patent infringement and unfair competition ac-
tion against Windmere and a contributory infringement action
against Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Izumi) in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.108 Windmere
counterclaimed, alleging unfair competition and antitrust viola-
tions.10 9 Although Windmere lost on the infringement issue at the
original trial, Windmere prevailed on its counterclaims against
Philips at retrial." 0 Philips and Windmere thereafter entered into a
settlement agreement and filed a joint motion to dismiss Philip's ap-
peal of the antitrust and unfair competition judgment, which the
court granted."' Izumi, however, opposed the motion to dismiss in
order to prevent vacatur of the antitrust and unfair competition
counterclaims judgment against Philips.' 1 2
Despite Izumi's name in the caption of the case, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that Izumi lacked standing to oppose the joint vacatur mo-
tion because Izumi was not a party to the appeal of the antitrust
judgment following the retrial." 3 The court noted that Izumi failed
to file an appearance or a certificate of interest at the appeal before
the Federal Circuit.'' 4 The court further stated that Izumi in fact
actively avoided being characterized or involved as a party in the
trial of the antitrust counts.' 15 Relying on the practice note to Fed-
eral Circuit rule 12, Izumi argued that it was a party to the appeal
based on its inclusion in the official caption." 6 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, stating that a "practice note does not confer status or
107. See id. at 730-31, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11 (explaining decision to deny
standing to defendant, Izumi, to intervene in order to preserve action).
108. See id at 729, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (noting that three parties actually in-
volved in suit as co-plaintiffs were U.S. Philips Corporation, North American Philips Corpora-
tion, and N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabriken, collectively referred to as "Philips"). Izumi
manufactured rotary electric shavers in Japan that were sold in the United States by
Windmere. Id.
109. Id
110. See id (describing original trial where district court entered directed verdict against
Windmere on antitrust claim). On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed and re-
manded for retrial. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 8 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1885 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nor. North Am. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 490
U.S. 1068 (1989).
111. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 731, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
112. Id. at 730, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
113. See id. at 730-31, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11 (describing Izumi's failure to inter-
vene in appeal in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
114. Id. at 730, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
115. Id.
116. See id. (reviewing Izumi's reliance on court rule regarding docketing of appeal and
filing of record); see also FED. CIR. R. 12 (practice note) (providing that "parties included in the
trial court title having an adverse interest to the appellant but not cross appealing shall be
deemed appellees").
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standing." 117
The Federal Circuit also rejected Izumi's argument that the dis-
trict court's decision should not be vacated for collateral estoppel
reasons.118 Izumi had successfully used the Florida district court's
reversal of the remanded unfair competition issue for collateral es-
toppel purposes in an analogous district court trial in Illinois."19
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected Izumi's argument that this
conferred standing to intervene in the vacatur motion, noting that
Izumi admittedly was not a party to the specific unfair competition
claims before the Illinois district court action.1 20 Despite Izumi's
challenge to the propriety of the vacatur, the Federal Circuit held
that vacatur was proper because the settlement between Philips and
Windmere included all the parties to the appeal. 12' The district
court's judgment was therefore mooted. 122 The court emphasized
that although vacatur is not automatic under all circumstances,
Philips and Windmere were entitled to the vacatur under Federal
Circuit precedent.' 23
The Federal Circuit's decision in Windmere will not be the last
117. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 730, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. The Federal Circuit also
rejected Izumi's argument that Izumi should be accorded standing based on its substantial
interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11. The
court stated that "despite Izumi's asserted interest as manufacturer of the accused product,
Izumi refrained from intervention at the trial... and did not seek to join the action." Id.
118. lid at 730-31, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
119. Id. at 731, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. Izumi was apparently concerned that vaca-
tur of the district court's antitrust and unfair competition judgment would permit Philips to
revive the unfair competition issue in the Illinois case. Id.
120. l-
121. Id.
122. Id. Vacating a judgment as moot may not end the controversy because the vacated
judgment may still, in certain situations, have a preclusive effect in other litigation on the
same issue involving parties not participating in the original suit. See Bates v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that when vacatur is granted as condition of
settlement without balancing interest in finality of judgments against right to relitigation of
unreviewed disputes, preclusive effect of vacated judgment remains to be determined by later
case involving same issue).
123. Id. The Munsingwear doctrine is not universally followed by the courts. Some re-
gional circuit courts have declined to vacate judgments after the parties settled their disputes.
See, e.g., Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that parties' settlement of dispute during pendency of appeal does not render case moot so as
to require vacatur); In re United States, 927 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding vacatur
inappropriate where mootness was due to parties' settlement of dispute); National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that where case gave rise
to separate litigation that might be precluded by judgment, settlement should not be used as
device by defendant to pursue other actions). The Federal Circuit distinguished such cases as
typically involving situations where settlement was a voluntary decision to forgo appeal rather
than involving happenstance that divested the parties of their right to appellate review. U.S.
Philips, 971 F.2d at 731, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. But see 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1992) (noting that grow-
ing number of courts of appeals do not automatically permit vacatur of district court decisions
at party's request because litigation is public event, not merely means of solving private dis-
putes, and district court opinion represents substantial investment of public resources).
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word on whether, district court judgments should be vacated when a
case settles during the pendency of an appeal. The Supreme Court
granted Izumi's petition for certiorari on the issue of whether U.S.
courts of appeals should routinely vacate district court final judg-
ments at the parties' request when cases are settled while on ap-
peal. 124 In its brief for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Izumi
challenged the Federal Circuit's approach to vacatur as conflicting
with that of other U.S. courts of appeals 125 and a misinterpretation
of United States v. Munsingwear Inc.' 26 Philips and Windmere, in their
joint brief in opposition to Izumi's certiorari petition, disputed
Izumi's argument that the Federal Circuit misinterpreted Munsing-
wear.'27 They also pointed out that there is no clear split between
the circuits with respect to vacatur because no court has as yet
adopted an inflexible rule on vacatur after settlement.
In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 128 the
Federal Circuit held that where parties to an infringement action
settled the infringement dispute but conceded that their patents in-
terfered, the partial settlement did not moot the issues of validity,
priority, and enforceability.' 29 Kimberly-Clark (K-C) brought a pat-
ent infringement suit against Proctor & Gamble (P&G).130 The dis-
trict court held that K-C's patent was valid but not infringed and had
priority over P&G's patent.' 3 ' The district court accordingly invali-
dated certain claims in P&G's patent.'3 2 Before the Federal Circuit
124. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (U.S.
1993) (granting certiorari). Izumi characterized the Federal Circuit's vacatur practice as per-
mitting unsuccessful litigants to avoid the preclusive effects of a final judgment, thus trans-
forming the federal courts into a tool for furthering the agenda of private parties.
125. See Supreme Court: Court Will Consider Vacatur ofJudgments After Settlement, 45 Pat., Trade-
mark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 341, 341 (Feb. 25, 1993) [hereinafter Vacatur ofJudgments] (discuss-
ing arguments in briefs in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113
S. Ct. (U.S. 1993). Izumi pointed out that the Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have forcefully rejected the Munsingwear doctrine. Id.
126. 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Izumi argued that the Federal Circuit erroneously relied on City
Gas Co. of Fla. v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla., 111 S. Ct. 1300 (1991), because City Gas did
not expressly or implicitly endorse the vacatur practice followed by the Federal Circuit. See
Vacatur ofJudgments, supra note 125, at 341 (discussing Izumi's brief).
127. Vacatur ofJudgments, supra note 125, at 341. Philips and Windmere contended that
Izumi's view of Munsingwear, as only being applicable when the case becomes moot due to
happenstance, cannot be reconciled with the judgments in City Gas and Deakins v. Monaghan,
484 U.S. 193 (1988), where a party mooted appeal by withdrawing its claims. Id.
128. 973 F.2d 911, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 632-45
and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to joint inventorship issue); infra notes
1344-48 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to inequitable conduct issue).
129. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 914, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that court had jurisdiction to grant
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considered the parties' cross-appeals, K-C and P&G settled their in-
fringement claims.133 The parties, however, asserted that the ap-
peal should proceed because the partial settlement did not moot the
priority issues under 35 U.S.C. § 291.134
The Federal Circuit stated that "there are situations 'in which one
issue in a case has become moot, but the case as a whole remains
alive because other issues have not become moot.' "135 The court
held that the partial settlement did not moot the priority issues, not-
ing that § 291 provides a means for resolving priority issues without
requiring the owner of an interfering patent to accuse the owner of
another of infringement. 136 Instead, § 291 gives patent owners a
separate and distinct statutory basis for a claim for relief where two
patents interfere. 137 The Federal Circuit concluded that "the 're-
lief' provided by the statute is not limited to infringement 'relief,'
but includes resolution of priority issues between owners of inter-
fering patents, even when, by agreement or otherwise, there is no
infringement issue between the parties."'138
In Morton International, Inc. v. Cardinal Chemical Co., 139 the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court judgment of noninfringement but
declined to review and vacated as moot the district court's judgment
of invalidity.' 40 In vacating the invalidity judgment, the Federal Cir-
cuit without further analysis relied on the oft-criticized practice, first
set forth in Vieau v. Japax Inc.,14 of vacating an invalidity finding
133. See idL (noting that P&G and K-C agreed on mutual immunity from infringement suits
against one another based on patent at issue).
134. Id; see also 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (authorizing civil suit against owner of interfering
patent).
135. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 914, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 (quoting University of
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981), which pointed out that case as whole can
remain very much alive notwithstanding mootness of one issue, as in situation where issue of
damages remains despite mootness of injunctive relief issue).
136. See id (holding that validity and priority issues have statutory basis distinct from that
of infringement action). As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdic-
tion because two patent owners are entitled to relief under 35 U.S.C. § 291, even though they
once accused each other of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. Id Moreover, because the
PTO issued two patents on the same invention, each patentee suffered a serious impediment
to the enjoyment of the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling their inven-
tions. Id The court stated that "[n]either patent owner knows if its patent is valid in light of
the other's patent, the presumption of validity ... having been eroded by the grant of an
'interfering' patent." Id.
137. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (authorizing civil suit against owner of interfering
patent).
138. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 915, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
139. 959 F.2d 948, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992); see also infra notes 307-10 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to frivo-
lous appeals issue); infra notes 929-39 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to
evidentiary considerations issue); infra notes 1101-02 and accompanying text (discussing case
with regard to attorney's fees issue).
140. Id. at 952, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
141. 823 F.2d 1510, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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when on appeal it is held that there was no infringement. 142 Morton
International involved a suit brought by Morton International, Inc.
(Morton) against Cardinal Chemical Co. (Cardinal) for infringement
of two of Morton's patents to which Cardinal counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity of those patents. 143 Following a
trial, the district court held Morton's patents invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 112 because the claims were indefinite and not supported
by an enabling disclosure in the patent specifications. 144 The dis-
trict court further held that Cardinal's accused products infringed
neither patent, but it declined to award Cardinal attorney's fees.145
Morton appealed the noninfringement and validity rulings, and Car-
dinal cross-appealed the denial of attorney's fees. 146
A concurring opinion in Morton expressed agreement with the ma-
jority's decision to affirm the district court's noninfringementjudg-
ment but objected to the majority's confining appellate review to
only that judgment. 147 The concurring opinion observed that the
Federal Circuit is neither compelled to address both invalidity and
noninfringement nor to address them in any order, and "[t]he
power to choose one or the other is ... a matter of discretion."' 148
The Federal Circuit should not automatically apply the Vieau doc-
trine, according to this view, but rather should be guided by prag-
matic considerations.' 49 In appropriate cases, the Federal Circuit
"should review an invalidity judgment first, and if [the court] af-
firm[s], then vacate or simply not rule on the infringement issue." ' 50
The multiple validity suits involving the patents at issue in Morton
142. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 952, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1231, 1235 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). In Vieau, the Federal Circuit held
that disposition of the infringement issue mooted the patentee's appeal of an adverse directed
verdict on the issues of damages and willful infringement. Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d
1510, 1517, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court also reasoned that
Japax's cross-appeal of the district court's failure to grant JNOV on the issue of obviousness
was confined to the litigated claims and the accused devices found noninfringing. Id. The
court accordingly dismissed the cross appeal as moot, and vacated the district court judgment
with respect to the mooted issues. Id.
143. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 967 F.2d 1571, 1571,23 U.S.P.Q02d (BNA)
1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc of Morton
Int'l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992)).
144. Morton, 959 F.2d at 950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233; see supra notes 929-39 (dis-
cussing evidentiary considerations at issue in Morton).
145. Morton, 959 F.2d at 950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 952, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (Lourie,J., concurring).
148. Id. at 952-53, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-36. The Supreme Court addressed the
validity issue prior to the infringement issue in United Carbon Co. v. Binney Co., 317 U.S.
228 (1942) (finding against patentee as to validity and thus not deciding infringement issue).
149. Morton, 959 F.2d at 952-54, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-37.
150. Id. at 952, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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were pointed to as evidence that rigid following of Vieau results in a
misallocation of judicial resources. 5 1 Moreover, "[a]ll parties are
entitled to a decision affirming or reversing the trial court's holding
of invalidity of these patents so that they can plan their future affairs
accordingly."'152 The concurring opinion also pointed out that the
rationale underlying the Vieau doctrine is dubious because the Fed-
eral Circuit is "not a court of last resort... [and] a holding of either
invalidity or noninfringement by our court does not render the case
moot because it is not over."153
The Federal Circuit denied Cardinal's petition for a rehearing in
banc. 15 4 Two judges dissented without opinion. Another judge
wrote a dissenting opinion that questioned the reasoning underly-
ing the Vieau doctrine. 55 According to the dissenting opinion, the
Supreme Court's decision in Altvater v. Freeman,' 56 on which the
Vieau doctrine is based, is no longer germane because it involved a
licensee's counterclaim for invalidity. 157 In the Altvater era, a licen-
see had to prove that the dispute was beyond the scope of the paten-
tee's complaint to avoid the licensee estoppel doctrine. 58 The
dissent thus argued that Altvater should be viewed in this historical
context, stating that "[tlo interpret Altvater broadly as requiring an
accused infringer who is not a licensee to prove its counterclaim for
invalidity goes beyond the scope of the patentee's complaint in or-
151. Id. at 954, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. Prior to the suit with Cardinal Chemical,
Morton had sued another company for infringement of the same patent claims. Id. at 950, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1233. The trial court in that action held the patents invalid and not infringed,
but the Federal Circuit, after affirming the noninfringement finding, vacated the invalidity
finding in accordance with the Vieau doctrine. Id. Thus, following the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in the Cardinal litigation, Morton's patent claims had gone through two bench trials, had
been twice invalidated, only to have the Federal Circuit vacate each of those invalidity judg-
ments. In addition, Morton had filed a third action against a third company asserting in-
fringement of the twice-invalidated patent, which means that a third court would be faced with
deciding the validity of the patents all over again. Id. at 950 n.2, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233
n.2.
152. Id. at 954, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
153. Id. at 953, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. A decision of the Federal Circuit could of
course be overturned by the United States Supreme Court.
154. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 967 F.2d 1571, 1571-78, 23 U.S.P.q.2d
(BNA) 1362, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
155. See id. (Nies, C.J., dissenting).
156. 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
157. Morton, 967 F.2d at 1572-73, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (Nies, CJ., dissenting).
158. See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 361 (1943) (acknowledging licensee estoppel
rule). The Supreme Court later overruled the licensee estoppel doctrine. See Lear v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 668-71 (1969) (holding that because technical requirements of contract doc-
trine must yield to public interests in patent licensing, licensee estoppel rule is overruled).
Neither the licensee estoppel doctrine nor the legal fiction to avoid it has been relevant since
the Supreme Court's decision in Lear. Id at 688-71 (overruling case or controversy analysis
underlying Altvater).
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der to establish a case or controversy has never been warranted."'159
The dissent also argued that the "one-size-fits-all" approach' 60 to
appellate review of validity judgments is inappropriate. 161 Distin-
guishing between jurisdictional mootness and prudential moot-
ness, 162 the dissent concluded that the holding of noninfringement
in a declaratory judgment action is not jurisdictionally or pruden-
tially mooted by a holding of noninfiingement. 163 The dissent con-
cluded that because the patentee cannot raise noninfringement as
an affirmative defense, noninfringement cannot be an alternative
ground for ajudgment on an action for a declaration of invalidity.' 64
The dissent therefore argued that it is not redundant for a district
court to decide a declaratory invalidity counterclaim. 165
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
Federal Circuit should vacate declaratory judgments that hold an
asserted patent invalid merely because the court affirmed on the
ground of noninfringement. 166 The petition presented to the
159. Id. (asserting further that Altvater should be "assigned to the graveyard" with respect
to case or controversy analysis).
160. See id at 1574, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365 (arguing for separate analyses depend-
ing on outcome of various issues in patent suit in lower court). Under the "one-size-fits-all"
approach, the court may always dismiss and vacate the judgment below once it concludes the
patent claims at issue are not infringed. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id at 1575-76, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365-67. Jurisdictional mootness results
when the dispute between the parties, or at least an issue in the case, no longer exists. Id. at
1574, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365. Prudential mootness results when a court, having de-
cided one dispositive issue, chooses not to address the other. Id Jurisdictional mootness is
not appropriate in a declaratory judgment action because only an unconditional guarantee by
the patentee that the alleged infringer is safe from suit would moot the claim. Id. at 1575, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365. Prudential mootness is not appropriate because a court's consid-
eration of a declaratoryjudgment is discretionary in the first place. Id. at 1576, 23 U.S.P.OQ2d
(BNA) at 1365-67. Under the dissent's reasoning, having chosen to hear the action, a court
could not rule that a case is mooted by a ruling on an infringement issue. Id.
163. Il at 1576, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366-67.
164. Id
165. Id. at 1576-77, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
166. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (granting certiorari).
The Federal Circuit's disposition of appeals both before and after Vieau has varied and may
suggest an intracircuit conflict amenable to resolution by the Supreme Court. Prior to Vieau,
the Federal Circuit addressed invalidity holdings, regardless of any infringement determina-
tion. See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 740, 230 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that because invalidity decision by district court was af-
firmed, appellate court need not decide issue of infringement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033
(1987); Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 790 F.2d 874, 880, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668,
672 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's holding of invalidity and noninfringement);
Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453, 227 U.S.P.Q0 (BNA) 293,
296 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that patent claim was apparently invalid and that even if claim
was valid, it was nevertheless not infringed). After Vieau, the Federal Circuit affirmed a nonin-
fringement holding but reversed an invalidity holding in Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma
Produckt-Und Mktg. GmBH, 495 F.2d 1546, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and
affirmed, rather than vacated, an invalidity holding in Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Su-
tron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1989). As a result, the
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Supreme Court tracks the views espoused by the concurring and
dissenting Federal Circuit opinions.' 67 However, the parties dis-
agreed under what circumstances validity should be considered on
appeal. 1 68 Cardinal asserts that validity need not be considered by
the Federal Circuit if it was raised only as an affirmative defense,
because an affirmative defense relies on the plaintiff's claim.' 69 If
the plaintiff's claim is dropped, for example where the district court
determines there was no infringement, the Federal Circuit should
have the discretion to drop the affirmative defense as well.' 70 Mor-
ton, however, argued that validity should be addressed on appeal
whether it was raised as an affirmative defense or as a
counterclaim. 171
In 1992 the Federal Circuit also considered a standing issue, not
in the context of whether a party had standing to participate in an
appeal, but whether the party had standing to enforce the asserted
patent rights under 35 U.S.C. § 28 1.172 In a decision that may be of
interest to practitioners involved with patent rights and government
diverging line of decisions between Vieau, and Tol-O-Matic and Environmental Instruments, awaits
the Supreme Court's resolution.
167. See Morton, 967 F.2d at 1576-77, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (addressing question
of how finding of noninfringement relates to finding of patent invalidity); supra notes 147-53
and accompanying text (describing in detail Judge Lourie's concurring opinion in Morton);
supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text (relating in detail Chief Judge Nies' dissenting
opinion in denial of in banc rehearing of Morton). Both parties questioned whether the Federal
Circuit's vacatur practice was consistent with the doctrine of Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that once a
patent has been held invalid, it is invalid as to all potential infringers, so long as the patentee
had a fair opportunity to pursue the patent claim. Supreme Court: Arguments Heard in Case Con-
sidering Federal Circuit's "Vieau" Policy, 45 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 378-79 (Mar.
4, 1993) [hereinafter Arguments]. The parties pointed out that the Federal Circuit's vacatur
practice does not allow future accused infringers to defend themselves based on the earlier
invalidity holding. Id. Instead, this nondiscretionary vacatur practice "reinstates" the validity
of the patent, allowing the patentee to bring an action against other potential infringers on
the same previously invalidated patent, which was a concern of the Supreme Court in Blonder-
Tongue. Id.
168. See Arguments, supra note 167, at 378-79 (discussing oral arguments before Supreme
Court).
169. Arguments, supra note 167, at 378-79.
170. Arguments, supra note 167, at 378-79.
171. Arguments, supra note 167, at 378-79.
172. See FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1550, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that Filmtec cannot maintain suit when title to patent was
vested in United States). It is well-established that title to a patent is required in order to have
standing to sue for infringement of that patent. See, e.g., Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., 939
F.2d 1574, 1579, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that to recover
damages one must have legal title to patent during infringement); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1569, 1573, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (revers-
ing preliminary injunction because it was not clear that FilmTec has title to patent, and thus
standing to sue for patent infringement); Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1481, 16
U.P.S.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that it is well-settled that non-exclu-
sive licensee lacks standing to sue for patent infringement).
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contracts, the Federal Circuit in FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics 173 held
that an accused infringer in a patent infringement action can raise
the defense that the Federal Government, and not the plaintiff,
holds equitable claim of title to the patent at issue.' 74 The Federal
Circuit held that resolving issues of title requires a focus on the
terms of the government contract and the act authorizing the agency
to enter into the contract.' 75
In FilmTec, the Department of the Interior entered into a contract
under the Saline Water Conversion Act of 1971176 with the North
Star Division of Midwest Research Institute (MRI), a nonprofit re-
search organization.' 77 The contract required MRI to perform re-
search and development on polymer membranes for desalinating
seawater by reverse osmosis. 178 Both the contract and the federal
law that authorized the contract vested title in the United States for
any invention made (i.e., actually reduced to practice) or conceived
during the course of the contract. 179 After securing the contract,
173. 982 F.2d 1546, 25 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
174. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1550-55, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283,
1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 1551, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88 (noting that district court erred when it
resolved issue of title according to patent claims instead of terms of contract and act under
which contract was created).
176. Id. at 1547-48, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284-85.
177. Id.
178. Id at 1547, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284-85. The scope of work under the contract
with MRI was to develop polymer membranes consisting of a thin polymer desalinizing layer
on a porous support. Id. at 1547 n.1, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 n.1. High pressure causes
reverse osmosis polymer membranes to retain the salt in the seawater, thus creating purified
water. Id. at 1547, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
179. Id (reprinting language of contract, which stated that MRI "does hereby grant to the
Government the full and entire domestic right, title and interest in 'any invention... (con-
ceived or first actually reduced to practice] in the course of or under this contract or any
subcontract' "); see also Saline Water Conversion Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 94-316, § 3,
90 Stat. 694, 694 (1976) (providing that title to inventions resulting from contracts made
pursuant to Saline Water Conversion Act are governed by Federal Nonnuclear Energy, Re-
search, and Development Act (FNERDA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 9, 88 Stat. 1878,
1887-88 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5908 (1988)), which states that title in any invention con-
ceived pursuant to contract shall vest in United States). When an invention is made (actually
reduced to practice) or conceived in the performance of or under a government contract, it is
typically referred to as a "subject invention." See FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1548, 25 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1285 (observing that contract between Government and MRI identified any inven-
tion conceived or reduced to practice under contract as "a Subject Invention"). Whether the
government agency retains title to a patent claiming that invention generally hinges on (1)
whether the invention is a "subject invention"; and (2) whether any agency-specific legislation
dictates a title retention policy. See RALPH C. NASH, JR. & LEONARD RAWICZ, PATENTS AND
TECHNICAL DATA 162-212 (1983) (discussing determination of ownership of patents under
government contracts); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(e), (g) (1988) (defining "subject invention"
as "any invention of the contract or conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the
performance of work under a funding agreement" and defining "made" as "conception or
first actual reduction to practice" of any invention). The patent statutes encourage title reten-
tion by the government contractor when it is a small business or nonprofit organization. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1988) (comprising chapter 18 of title 35, which deals with patent rights
in inventions made with federal assistance; one of Congress' objectives under chapter 18,
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MRI hired Cadotte, the inventor of the patents at issue, to carry out
the reverse osmosis membrane research contemplated by the con-
tract.180 Cadotte subsequently developed three composite poly-
amide membranes capable of desalinating seawater.'8 1 Cadotte
then left MRI to co-found FilmTec, a self-described spin-off of
MRI. 182 At FilmTec, Cadotte performed experiments that essen-
tially duplicated the MRI experiments, ultimately developing two
composite reverse osmosis membranes capable of desalinating sea-
water.18 3 Approximately one year later, Cadotte filed a patent appli-
cation for the reverse osmosis membrane and assigned the patent to
FilmTec.184
FilmTec later sued Hydranautics for infringement, alleging that
the membranes manufactured by Hydranautics used the same com-
positions as the claimed invention.' 8 5 Hydranautics raised the de-
fense that FilmTec lacked standing to sue because the United States,
and not FilmTec, had title to the patent at issue because Cadotte
conceived or actually reduced to practice the invention during the
performance of or under MRI's government contract.' 8 6 The dis-
trict court held that FilmTec had legal title to the patent at issue,
and thus standing to sue, because Cadotte did not invent the
claimed membranes until after leaving MRI. 187 The district court
reasoned that because the MRI experiments did not result in a
membrane having the performance characteristics claimed in the
according to § 200, is "to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small
business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise"). On Febru-
ary 18, 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued a Memorandum on Government Patent Policy
establishing that the title retention policy as applied to small business firms and nonprofit
organizations shall extend to all recipients of Government contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements, except as provided in 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). Memorandum on Government Patent
Policy, PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983); see Patents, Temporary Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg.
16,254 (1983) (discussing February 18, 1983 presidential memorandum).
180. FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1548, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
181. See id (noting that Cadotte reported formation of polyamide membranes in his MRI
laboratory notebook on November 17, 1977, and that his contract period extended fromJuly
15, 1976 to January 15, 1978).
182. Idt at 1549, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (observing that during summer of 1977,
Cadotte and other MRI employees discussed forming FilmTec to research and develop new
reverse osmosis polymer membrane technologies and that Cadotte left MRI to join FilmTec
on December 31, 1977). Shortly before he left MRI, Cadotte and a FilmTec cofounder pro-
posed to the Department of Interior's Office of Water Research and Technology that FilmTec
continue the research begun under the Government's contract with MRI. Id.
183. Id. (noting that FilmTec experiments used same compositions, proportions, and re-
actions as MRI experiments and in fact sole difference was that lower drying temperature was




187. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, No. 90-563 GT (M), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13495, at
*27-28 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1991), rev'd, 982 F.2d 1546, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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patent at issue, Cadotte did not invent the claimed membranes while
at MRI. l88
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that Hydranautics could
raise the Government's equitable claim of title as a defense.' 89
FilmTec argued that Hydranautics could not raise a third party's
claim of title as a defense, citing Dofr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States.' 90
The Court of Claims in Dor-Oliver stated that "[i]n patent litigation
between private parties, equitable rights of ownership of strangers
cannot be raised as defenses against the legal titleholder of a pat-
ent."19' The Federal Circuit determined, however, that "Dorr-Oliver
in fact supports, rather than undermines, Hydranautics' position...
since the [court] in Don--Oliver applied a federal statute to preclude
the record title-holder from asserting a patent infringement
claim."' 92 The court also expressly based its decision that FilmTec
could not maintain the present suit on the fact that Hydranautics
was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the Govern-
ment and MRI.193 Section 6(d) of the contract's authorizing statute,
the Saline Water Conversion Act, states that all patents resulting
from research made pursuant to contract under the act shall be
available to the general public.194 The court reasoned that because
Hydranautics was a member of the general public, "it would be con-
trary to the intent of Congress to permit FilmTec to preclude
Hydranautics from practicing such an invention."' 95
After concluding that Hydranautics could raise the Government's
equitable claim of title as a defense, the court considered whether
188. Id. at *29 (discussing differences between experiments Cadotte performed at MRI
and those performed at FilmTec and finding that differences were great enough that MRI
experiments did not embody claimed invention).
189. FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1550-51, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286-87.
190. 432 F.2d 447, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (involving private party record
title holder who sued United States for infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, and govern-
ment defense on ground that plaintiff was not "owner" because plaintiff's employer had supe-
rior claim of title pursuant to employment contract).
191. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 447, 451, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517, 519
(Ct. Cl. 1970) (noting nonetheless that federal statute affecting ownership of patent raised
additional issues "not present in private litigation").
192. FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1550, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. The court in Dorr-Oliver
permitted the defendant Government to raise a third party's claim of title as a defense be-
cause a federal anti-assignment statute prohibited any assignment of claims for patent in-
fringement (i.e., from the employer to the present plaintiff), and the court reasoned if a third
party was the lawful title holder, then the present plaintiff could not recover from the Govern-
ment. Dorf-Oliver, 432 F.2d at 451, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 519.
193. FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1550, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
194. See Saline Water Conversion Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-60, § 6(d), 85 Stat. 159, 162
(stating that "[a]lI research... contracted for, sponsored, cosponsored, or authorized under
authority of this Act... will ... be available to the general public"), repealed by Water Research
and Development Act of 1978, § 410(a), 92 Stat. 1305, 1316.
195. FilmTec, 982 F.2d at 1551, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
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title to the invention actually vested in the United States. 96 Review-
ing the conception issue de novo, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court erroneously resolved the ownership/conception issue
according to only the claims of the patent at issue rather than ac-
cording to the terms of the government contract. 97 Under the con-
tract, the Government obtained title to inventions that Cadotte
conceived of or actually reduced to practice and that were within the
field of funded research under MRI's contract. The resolution of
this issue turned on whether the invention was conceived while the
inventor was at MRI.' 98 The court held that Cadotte's experiments
at MRI resulted in conception because the key limitations in the
claims that distinguished the present invention from the prior art
were combined while Cadotte was at MRI, and the results of the
experiments were sufficient to show that the invention went beyond
the minimum requirements of operability. 99 The court rejected
FilmTec's arguments that the claimed invention included narrow
performance limitations that were not present during the experi-
ments at MRI, and therefore there was no conception while Cadotte
was at MRI.200 The court specifically dismissed this argument with
the observation that the claim limitations Cadotte relied on during
patent prosecution to distinguish prior art were present in the mem-
brane he developed under the contract while at MRI. 20 ' The Fed-
eral Circuit stated that "[t]he fact that the materials may not have
met the performance recitations of the claims is ... not conclusive.
The membranes were surely within the structural scope of the
claims."' 20 2 The court therefore held that title vested with the
United States and that FilmTec lacked standing to sue on the patent
at issue.203
D. General Civil Procedure Issues
In 1992, the Federal Circuit continued to identify those proce-
dural issues that are not peculiar to substantive patent law. 20 4 The
196. Id. at 1550-51, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
197. Id. at 1551, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
198. Id. at 1551-54, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288-90.
199. Id. at 1552, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
200. Id. at 1551-54, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288-90.
201. Id. at 1552, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
202. Id. The court noted that the inclusion of performance limitations removing the
claimed invention from the operation of the contract would defeat a finding that the parties
had the intent to contract. Id.
203. See id. at 1554, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (rejecting FilmTec's argument that
Cadotte was not bound by contract and pointing out that "[u]nder the FNERDA, title to in-
ventions made by an employee hired to perform that research automatically vested in the
United States").
204. In resolving procedural issues of general applicability and not particular to patent
1993]
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Federal Circuit held, for example, that questions regarding the ap-
plicability of judicial estoppel, inconsistent jury findings, modifica-
tion of consent decrees, and delays in amending a complaint were
procedural issues not unique to patent law.2 0 5
1. Waiver of inconsistent jury findings
In Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Marketing Corp.,206 a district court de-
nied a motion by Arachnid for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict (JNOV) to overturn jury findings that the defendant, Medalist,
was not liable under the Washington Consumer Protection Act
(WCPA).20 7 Arachnid did not challenge the JNOV under rule 49(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at that time before the dis-
trict court in any post-trial motions.208 In its Federal Circuit appeal,
however, Arachnid did challenge the denial of its JNOV motion
under rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 9 Rule
49(b) allows a district court to grant JNOV when there are certain
inconsistencies between a jury's general verdict and the jury's an-
swers to special interrogatories.2 10 Relying on Nordstrom, Inc. v.
law, the Federal Circuit typically refers to the law of the applicable regional circuit court of
appeals. See Woodward v. Sage Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d 841, 844, 2 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1649,
1651 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (acknowledging propriety of Federal Circuit's deference to circuit in
which district court is located on some matters of procedural and substantive law); cf supra
note 15 and accompanying text (stating that while law of regional circuit in which district
court sits will apply in some matters of procedure, such deference is inappropriate in matters
of court's appellate jurisdiction).
205. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 5513, 561 n.3, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1453 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that application of rule
60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should follow forum law, as Federal Circuit does not
have exclusive jurisdiction); Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1304, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB
Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1550, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1989))
(holding that because issue of inconsistent jury findings is procedural matter not unique to
patent law, discemable law of forum is applicable); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 962 F.2d
1043, 1045, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Kalman v. Berlyn Corp.,
916 F.2d 1473, 1480, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (finding that deci-
sion whether to permit party to amend complaint after long delay should be made according
to law of forum); Wang Lab., Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc., 958 F.2d 355, 358, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg.
Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (holding that ques-
tion of applicability ofjudicial estoppel should be resolved according to applicable regional
circuit law).
206. 972 F.2d 1300, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also mnfra notes 241-
46 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to general-verdict-multiple-defense
issue); infra notes 856-61 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to prosecution
history and estoppel issue).
207. Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1301, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1947, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
208. Id. at 1300, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1301, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
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Tampourlos,211 Arachnid asserted that rule 49(b) required the district
court to grant its motion for JNOV because the jury's general ver-
dict in favor of Medalist on the WPCA claim was inconsistent with
the special interrogatory answers that each supported Arachnid's
trademark claim.212
The Federal Circuit, however, following case law of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that Arachnid waived its
right to challenge the jury verdict on appeal when it failed to pres-
ent its rule 49(b) argument to the district court.213 According to the
Federal Circuit, appellate review of a jury trial is limited when no
post-trial motions have been made.214 The court recited the well-
established principle that an appellant may not present arguments
to an appellate court that the appellant did not properly raise in the
court below. 215
2. Amending a complaint
A plaintiff is generally permitted under rule 15(a) and rule 21 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its complaint to add a
party.2 16 The grant or denial of leave to amend, however, is within
the discretion of the district court.217 While leave to amend is gen-
erally "freely given," it may be denied where amending the com-
plaint to add a party would result in undue delay, is in bad faith or a
result of a dilatory motive on the movant's part, or would cause un-
due prejudice to the opposing party.218
In Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc. ,219 the Federal Circuit relied on
211. 733 P.2d 208, 210 (Wash. 1987) (discussing extent of overlap between trade name
infringement and WCPA).
212. Arachnid, 972 F.2d at 1304, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
213. See id (observing that, normally, party may not raise argument on appeal that was not
properly raised in court below).
214. Ia (citingJohnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 54 (1952), which held
that party failing to move for JNOV following verdict is entitled only to new trial, not to
judgment in its favor; also citing Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 574 (1948),
which held that JNOV decision should be made by judge who presided over case because
transcript alone cannot import sufficient feel for case to enable appellate judge to render
sound decision).
215. Id. (citing Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1975)).
216. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing that leave to amend shall be freely granted as
justice requires); FED. R. Civ. P. 21 (authorizing court to add or drop parties to action on
motion or on its own motion).
217. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (observ-
ing that settled law gives trial court ability to grant or refuse permission to amend pleadings).
218. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (enumerating acceptable bases for de-
nial of leave to amend pleadings as including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, re-
peated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
opposing party, and futility of amendment, and holding that trial court's refusal to grant leave
without reason constitutes abuse of discretion).
219. 962 F.2d 1043, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the "undue delay" exception to the otherwise liberal standard of
rule 15 and affirmed a district court's denial of a plaintiff's motion
for leave to amend. 220 In an effort to find a solvent defendant,
Datascope sought leave to amend its complaint to add Peter Schiff,
the president and principal stockholder of SMEC, as a defendant in
its patent infringement suit against SMEC. 221 Datascope, however,
did not make its motion until almost nine years after first filing its
complaint, after the trial on the merits had taken place, and after
Datascope obtained a damages award in excess of four million dol-
lars. 2 22 The Federal Circuit noted that Datascope was aware for a
number of years that Schiff played a predominant role in SMEC. 223
The court upheld the undue delay finding in adding Schiff at such a
late date because Datascope must have known from the outset of the
litigation that if it recovered lost profits, the damages would exceed
SMEC's ability to pay.224
The Federal Circuit rejected Datascope's contention that there
was no undue delay in adding Schiff.225 Datascope asserted that
part way through the litigation it became aware of a letter of intent
from a third party to purchase SMEC's entire product line, and that
substantial funds secured the purchase. 226 Datascope asserted that
it was therefore justified in concluding that SMEC's assets would be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment.227 The Federal Circuit, however,
observed that Datascope had no reason to assume that SMEC would
retain the funds and not distribute them as dividends to its stock-
holders. 228 In further support of its argument, Datascope cited
Fromson v. Cityplate, Inc.,229 which permitted a plaintiff to amend the
220. See Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 962 F.2d 1043, 1045,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (agreeing with district court that plaintiff neglected timely opportunities
to move to amend complaint).
221. Id at 1044, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
222. See id. (noting that Datascope sought to add Schiff because 10 days after judgment
was entered, SMEC filed petition under chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Act). Datascope alleged
that SMEC "was truly a one man show, founded, controlled, managed, and operated by Peter
Schiff." Id.
223. See id. at 1045, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575 (reporting Datascope's admission in its
motion to amend of its awareness based on pretrial discovery of Schiff's significant role in
managing and running SMEC).
224. Id. at 1046, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. In 1984, two years after the suit was filed,
SMEC's net worth was valued at $793,201.14, which dropped to $487,891.53 by 1985. Id.
The court also observed that Datascope had previously successfully appealed a $113,000
damages award on the ground that those damages were inadequate. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. (arguing that recent sale of business similar to SMEC for $8 million also justi-
fied reliance on SMEC's financial integrity).
227. Id.
228. IdL
229. 886 F.2d 1300, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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complaint to add defendants after trial.2 0 The Federal Circuit,
however, chose to distinguish Fromson in ultimately ruling against
Datascope, explaining that in Fromson the district court permitted
amendment after trial when it was discovered that the corporate de-
fendant's prior assertion that it was financially secure was false.23'
The court in Fromson did not consider the propriety of the amend-
ment, but rather whether the amendment to the complaint related
back to the original complaint in compliance with rule 15(C).232 The
Federal Circuit therefore held that the district court in Datascope did
not abuse its discretion in denying the belated motion to amend the
complaint. 233
3. Law of the case doctrine
In In re Regents of the University of California,234 the Federal Circuit
held that the law of the case doctrine did not bar pretrial coordina-
tion in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1407.235 The California district
court denied a motion to transfer two related patent cases pending
before it to an Indiana district court where three additional patent
cases were pending. 23 6 The Federal Circuit rejected the assertion
that the California district court's denial of a motion to transfer to
Indiana became the law of the case and as such would be violated if
consolidation proceeded pursuant to theJPMDL's consolidation or-
der.237 The court observed that in ruling on the transfer motion,
the California district court did not reach the question of whether
discovery in the California actions should be coordinated with the
230. See Fromson v. Cityplate, Inc., 886 F.2d 1300, 1303-04, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
plaintiff to amend complaint to add defendant after trial when initial request before trial was
denied based on defendant's misrepresentation that it was in sound financial condition).
231. Datascope, 962 F.2d at 1047, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
232. Id.
233. Id The Federal Circuit also distinguished Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473,
1480, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which held that a district court
abused its discretion in refusing to permit a plaintiff to amend its complaint to add a co-
plaintiff corporation in which plaintiff and his brother were each 50%y stockholders. Id Ac-
cording to the Federal Circuit, the facts in Kalman were so different from Datascope that Kalman
provided no support for Datascope's claim that the district court abused its discretion in re-
fusing to permit amendment. Id.
234. 964 F.2d 1128, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
235. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1131-33, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1748, 1751-53 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reviewing decisions relating to law of case doctrine and find-
ing that none of decisions treated question that was before multidistrict panel in this case).
236. See id. at 1133, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (noting that California district court
deemed transfer inappropriate because California law governed contract and trade secret is-
sues and because two of three parties involved, as well as many witnesses, were located in
California); supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (considering petition by University of
California to Federal Circuit for extraordinary writ to vacate JPMDL order, which consoli-
dated five pending lawsuits in U.S. District Court for Southern District of Indiana).
237. Id. at 1133, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
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Indiana cases.238 Moreover, the court pointed out that the consider-
ations pertinent to a motion to transfer are not the same as those
pertinent to coordination of pretrial proceedings in multiple cases
involving common parties.23 9 Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the University of California's concerns that coordination would
offer Genentech and Lilly, the opponents of the University's petition
for extraordinary writ, an opportunity to reopen various matters al-
ready decided in California were insufficient to invoke the law of the
case doctrine and justify reversal of the consolidation order.2 40
4. Timeliness of general-verdict-multiple-defense argument
In Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Marketing Corp.,241 the First Circuit held
that Arachnid was precluded from raising a "general-verdict-multi-
ple-defense" argument to support its patent infringement claim be-
cause Arachnid waited until five months after filing its post-trial
motions before raising that defense.2 42 The Federal Circuit refused
to extend the holding of Roy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 243 to
allow Arachnid to raise the defense at such a late date.24-1 Arachnid
first filed its motion for a new trial in a footnote to its motion for
JNOV.245 According to the court, Roy should not be read to require
a district court to consider as timely arguments raised by Arachnid
five months after its original new trial motion, which seem to be
raised as an afterthought.246
E. Judicial Estoppel and Settlement Estoppel
In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc. ,247 follow-
ing First Circuit law, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
238. Id
239. Id. (citingIn re American Fin. Corp. Litig., 434 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (J.P.M.L. 1977)).
The Federal Circuit also noted that this view was in accord with the congressional intent be-
hind § 1407. IdL (citing H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900).
240. See id. (stating that possibility that Genentech and Lilly would reopen various matters
that had already been decided could not be evaluated in abstract).
241. 972 F.2d 1300, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
242. Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302-03, 23 U.S.P.0,2d
(BNA) 1947, 1949-50 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that under general-verdict-multiple-de-
fense argument, even if most of possible grounds for invalidity/unenforceability verdict are
supported by substantial evidence, new trial must be ordered on invalidity issue if any one of
possible grounds is unsupported by substantial evidence).
243. 781 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1985).
244. Arachnid, 973 F.2d at 1303, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949; cf Roy v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 781 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial judge may grant new
trial based on documents that elaborate on grounds stated in new trial motion, even if those
documents are submitted after 10-day time limit for filing new motions).
245. Arachnid, 973 F.2d at 1303, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
246. Id.
247. 958 F.2d 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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holding that ACS was judicially estopped from asserting that the
parties had not consummated settlement of a consolidated con-
tempt and breach of license action.248 The court explained that in
order to be subject to judicial estoppel, the party "having obtained a
litigation benefit, must have attempted to invoke the authority of
one tribunal to override a bargain with another." 249 The court held
that ACS did not obtain a litigation benefit by the dismissal of the
consolidated action nor was ACS attempting to invoke the authority
of one tribunal to override a bargain made with another,250 because
by informing the district court of the parties' agreement to settle,
ACS intended to benefit both the parties and the district court, not
to advantage one party over another.25 1 There was therefore no ba-
sis for judicial estoppel.
The Federal Circuit also held that the district court erred in en-
forcing the unexecuted settlement agreement.252 The Federal Cir-
cuit found it inconceivable that ACS and Wang intended the
unexecuted agreement to be a binding contract, especially since
both corporations were sophisticated in contractual matters and had
engaged in extended negotiations over a multipage draft of the set-
tlement agreement. 253 The court thus concluded that the execution
by an authorized representative must have been critical to the par-
ties because counsel had advised the district court on three separate
occasions that the draft agreement had not been executed and was
not final. 254 Because Wang and ACS never in fact reached final
agreement on the terms and conditions of a settlement, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court erred in enforcing the unexecuted
draft settlement agreement.255
248. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc., 958 F.2d 355, 359, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text
(discussing facts of Wang).
249. Id. at 358, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (citing United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d
786, 793 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988)). The court, citing Davis v. Wakelee, 156
U.S. 680, 689 (1895), explained that as a general proposition, judicial estoppel means that
"where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding . . .he [or she] may not
thereafter, simply because his [or her] interests have changed, assume a contrary position."
Id.
250. See id. at 359, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059 (stating that doctrine ofjudicial estoppel
is intended to protect integrity ofjudicial process and that ACS's representation of intent to
settle was fair and not offensive to doctrine ofjudicial estoppel).
251. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (concluding that "[bly informing the clerk's
office that it intended to settle the litigation, ACS was not playing 'fast and loose' with the
court").
252. Id. at 359-60, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 359-60, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
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F. Standard of Review for Rule 50(b) Motions
In a series of 1992 decisions, the Federal Circuit continued to ap-
ply the two-prong test set forth in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision
Corp. 2 56 to determine whether a motion forJNOV should have been
granted by the district court.2 57 The first prong requires that the
party opposing the jury verdict show that the jury's express or pre-
sumed findings pertaining to disputed material factual issues are not
supported by substantial evidence. 258 Generally, a finding of fact
must stand unless the appellant shows that on the entirety of the
evidence of record, and taking into account the quantum of proof,
no reasonable juror could have made such a finding.2 - 9 Under the
second prong of the Perkin-Elmer test, the party opposing the verdict
must show that the legal conclusion implied from the jury's verdict
cannot be supported by the jury's findings.2 60 This prong requires
that the court review the issues of law that are necessary to the ver-
dict and determine whether the jury's conclusion is supported by
applicable law.2 61
G. Jury Trials-Seventh Amendment
In Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck,262 the Federal Circuit reaf-
firmed its holding in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff263 in light of two re-
256. 732 F.2d 888, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
257. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893, 221 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 669, 673 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc) (setting forth two-prong requirement, at least one prong
of which party must satisfy in order to overturn jury verdict), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
For examples of the Federal Circuit's continuation of the Perkin-Elmer test, see In re Hayes
Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1528-31, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1243-47
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's denial ofJNOV based on analysis of Perkin-Elmer
test); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 819-20, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121,
1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming in part and reversing in part district court's denial of appel-
lant's motion forJNOV under first prong of Perkin-Elmer test); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970
F.2d 816, 825, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's
denial of appellant's motion forJNOV because under first prong of Perkin-Elmer test, substan-
tial evidence did not support jury's verdict of infringement under correct legal standard);
Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1207-08, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that appellant was entitled to JNOV because under first prong of
Perkin-Elmer test there was not substantial evidence to support jury's verdict).
258. Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 893, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 673.
259. See Read, 970 F.2d at 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431 (noting that entirety of rec-
ord includes consideration of evidence that detracts from weight of favorable evidence).
260. Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 893, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 673.
261. See Braun, 975 F.2d at 978 n.4, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 n.4 (observing that
there is no difference between reviewing district court's denial ofJNOV motion and reviewingjury determinations themselves because same standard is applicable to both).
262. 959 F.2d 226, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 90
(1992).
263. 758 F.2d 594, 604, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 250, modified on reh'g, 771 F.2d 480, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 985 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that even when applied retroactively, reexami-
nation statute does not violate Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial, or Article III of U.S. Constitution).
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cent Supreme Court cases, Granfinanciera v. Nordberg264 and Tull v.
United States.265 Joy Technologies challenged the vitality of the Patlex
decision in its appeal from a district court's holding that the reexam-
ination statute did not unconstitutionally deprive a patentee of a
jury trial. 26 6 In Patlex, the Federal Circuit held that the issuance of a
valid patent primarily involves "public rights," which can only be
conferred by the Government despite the fact that validity is often
brought into question in disputes between private parties.26 7 Upon
reviewing Patlex in light of Granfinanciera, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision in the Joy Technologies dis-
pute.268 The Federal Circuit found nothing in Granfinanciera that
casted doubt on the court's holding in Patlex that issuing a valid pat-
ent involves public rights.2 69 In fact, the Federal Circuit noted that
Granfinanciera affirmed the basic underpinning of Patlex, namely that
as a "public right" case, patentability issues can be adjudicated by
legislative courts and administrative agencies without violating the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.270 The Federal Circuit in
Manbeck also held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tull did not
disturb the Patlex holding.27' In Tull, the Supreme Court held that
the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to ajury trial in actions
analogous to "suits at common law." 272 The Federal Circuit held
that because a reexamination proceeding is not an action analogous
to a "suit at common law," there is no right to a jury trial in an
appeal to a district court from an adverse agency decision in a reex-
264. 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1988) (holding that parties who had not submitted claim against
bankruptcy estate had right to jury trial when sued by trustee in bankruptcy to recover alleg-
edly fraudulent monetary transfer notwithstanding congressional delegation of fraudulent
conveyance actions as core proceedings).
265. 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (holding that Seventh Amendment guarantees jury trial to
determine liability in actions by Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under
Clean Air Act).
266. SeeJoy Technologies, Inc. v. Quigg, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112, 1114 (D.D.C. 1989)
(reporting that Joy originally filed complaint against Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks demandingjury trial). Joy took exception to the allowance of a reexamination initiated
by National Mine Service, Inc., with whom Joy previously settled an infringement action. Id.
Joy also contested a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 made during reexamination that invali-
dated nearly half of Joy's original claims. Id.
267. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 250,
modified on reh 'g, 771 F.2d 480, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 985 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that thresh-
old question usually is whether PrO, within its congressionally granted authority, properly
issued patent, which is right that can only be conferred by Government).
268. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 227, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153,
1156 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 90 (1992).
269. Id. at 228-29, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
270. Id. at 228, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
271. Id. at 229, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
417-25 (1987)).
272. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
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amination proceeding;273
H. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects certain communications be-
tween a client and the client's attorney when those communications
are made in the context of legal representation with an expectation
of confidentiality and when the privilege has not been waived.2 74 In
Shearing v. lab Corp.,275 the Federal Circuit held that statements
made by a third-party witness to an attorney, for whose client the
witness had testified in an earlier legal proceeding, did not consti-
tute attorney-client privileged communications because the witness
did not have an attorney-client relationship with the attorney at the
time the statements were made.276
In his breach of license suit against Iolab, the plaintiff, Dr. Shear-
ing, sought to discredit Dr. Simcoe, a defense witness.27 7 Dr.
Simcoe had testified that the Shearing patent was invalid because
Dr. Simcoe had invented and practiced the claimed process prior to
Dr. Shearing.2 78 To discredit Dr. Simcoe, an attorney testified that
Dr. Simcoe had not in fact conducted the claimed process prior to
Dr. Shearing's invention.2 79 The attorney based his testimony
about Dr. Simcoe's activities on his interviews with Dr. Simcoe in a
prior legal proceeding in which Dr. Simcoe appeared as a witness
for the attorney's corporate client.2 80 At the time, the attorney did
not represent Dr. Simcoe.28 l
Despite Iolab's arguments to the contrary, the Federal Circuit
held that the attorney's testimony about Dr. Simcoe's prior inconsis-
tent statements was not protected by the attorney-client privilege
because at the time Dr. Simcoe made the statements he was not the
273. See Manbeck, 959 F.2d at 229, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155-56 (arguing that reexami-
nation proceeding should be construed as most like declaratory judgment action begun by
PTO, where PTO is seeking determination thatJoy's patent is invalid). Joy, however, admit-
ted that such a suit could never be brought. Id. at 229, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
274. See 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60[2] (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing scope of attorney-client privilege limitation on discovery); 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (1961) (describing attorney-client privilege evidentiary
limitation).
275. 975 F.2d 1541, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 440-
47 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to jury findings with respect to patent
validity issue); infra notes 595-608 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to
best-mode issue).
276. Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1546, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1138
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
277. Id. at 1544, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36.
278. Id. at 1543-44, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
279. Id. at 1544, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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attorney's client.282 Therefore, Iolab could not invoke the attorney-
client privilege to bar the attorney's testimony.283 The Federal Cir-
cuit also held that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable be-
cause Iolab failed to object to the attorney as a witness when Dr.
Shearing identified him on his witness list two years prior to the
trial. 28 4 Moreover, Iolab had itself listed the attorney as a potential
witness and did not object to the testimony until two days after it
was given.28 5 According to the Federal Circuit, "[t]he absence of
prompt objection undercuts Iolab's assertion of an attorney-client
privilege." 286
L Sovereign Immunity-Eleventh Amendment
In a ruling now largely of historical interest following a change in
law,287 the Federal Circuit in In re Regents of the University of Califor-
nia 288 held that a consolidation order of the JPMDL did not violate
the Eleventh Amendment.289 The court explained that the "Elev-
enth Amendment is not designed to give procedural advantage to
State litigants, but to shield States from unconsented actions against
them. '290 The consolidation order merely coordinated in one
court, before one judge, the pretrial procedures of existing actions
in the interest of efficiency. 291 It did not require the State of Cali-
fornia, indirectly through the University, to appear in actions to
282. Id at 1547, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
283. Id at 1546, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
284. Id at 1547, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
285. lId
286. Id
287. This case may only be important for its historical significance because recently
passed legislation specifically abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
for infringement. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (to be codified at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (putting
end to immunity for states under Patent Act, Plant Variety Protection Act, and Lanham Act).
288. 964 F.2d 1128, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
289. In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1133-34, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1748, 1753-54 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The University of California had appealed the consolidation
order, arguing that the order violated the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
at 1134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing that "the
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State"). The Federal Circuit stated that the
Eleventh Amendment "embodies principles of sovereign immunity, implementing the princi-
ples of federalism underlying the Constitutional plan." Regents, 964 F.2d at 1134, 22
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) at 1754 (citing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 486 (1987)); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)).
These principles thus prohibit federal courts from entertaining suits brought by private par-
ties against one of the United States without that State's consent. Id. (citing Ex parte State of
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)).
290. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754.
291. Id. The Federal Circuit previously held that Congress had not abrogated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity by giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over such suits.
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which it was not a party, nor did it require the University of Califor-
nia to defend against claims to which it was not otherwise subject. 292
Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that coordinating trials for pre-
trial purposes avoids inconsistent and duplicative demands on the
parties, witnesses, and judges and does not enlarge California's lia-
bility or involve the federal judicial power beyond that already
sought by California. 293
On the issue of waiver of sovereign immunity, the Federal Circuit
held that the University of California could not limit the waiver to
only the venue of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California. 294 Having initiated suits in federal court, the University
of California became subject to the Federal Rules, including the
procedural efficiencies administered by the JPMDL. 295 To support
its limited waiver theory, the University of California relied on the
Supreme Court decision of Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Fee-
ney, 2 96 in which the Supreme Court recognized that sovereign im-
munity encompasses not only whether a State may be sued, but also
where it may be sued.297 The Federal Circuit, however, found Port
Authority inapplicable because the suits brought by the University of
California were not suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States" as stated in the Eleventh Amendment.298
J. Frivolous Appeals Under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure
Cambridge Products, Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc. 299 is yet another deci-
Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 335-36, 13 U.S.P.Q:2d (BNA) 1393, 1395-96 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990).
292. See Regents, 964 F.2d at 1134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (describing University of
California's argument that consolidation order violated Eleventh Amendment by forcing Uni-
versity, and hence State of California, to participate in trials in Indiana to which it had not
consented); see also supra note 12 (stating that University is instrumentality of State of
California).
293. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
294. See id. (reporting University of California's argument that initiation of action only in
Northern District of California limited its waiver of sovereign immunity to that venue, and
transfer of even part of action would thus violate Eleventh Amendment).
295. Id. at 1135, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1754.
296. 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
297. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 307 (1990) (holding
that issues of venue are closely related to those concerning sovereign immunity).
298. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1135, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754 (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XI). Instead, these suits were brought by the State of California, indirectly through
the University, in order to seek adjudication by the court. Id. The Federal Circuit concluded
that "[h]aving invoked the jurisdiction of the court.., the state accepted the authority of the
court." Il (citing State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Rd. Oils, Inc., 409 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th
Cir. 1969)).
299. 962 F.2d 1048, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra note 1102
and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to attorney's fees issue).
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sion in which the Federal Circuit reconfirmed its practice of vigor-
ously enforcing sanctions under rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure against frivolously prosecuted appeals, indicat-
ing its distaste for "satellite litigation" that clogs the judicial sys-
tem.300 In Cambridge, the district court granted a motion by the
patent holder, Cambridge, for a voluntary dismissal with preju-
dice.30 ' A month later, Penn filed a motion for sanctions under rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.302 Penn appealed the district court's denial of its motion,303
and Cambridge responded that Penn's appeal was frivolous under
appellate rule 38.304
The Federal Circuit found that arguments by Penn's counsel ma-
terially misrepresented the record, misrepresented the district
court's order from which the appeal was taken, contained marked
inconsistencies, and hardly illustrated the plaintiff's professed
"scrupulous care" in presenting the record to the court.305 Not sur-
prisingly, the Federal Circuit held that Penn's counsel willfully
abused the judicial process by filing an appeal that was "frivolous as
argued," and thus invoked its inherent power to hold Penn's coun-
300. Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1052, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also FED. R. App. P. 38 (stating that "[i]f a court of
appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee").
301. See Cambridge, 962 F.2d at 1049, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (indicating that Penn-
sylvania district court entered unpublished order on February 28, 1990 that granted motion
and dismissed action with prejudice).
302. Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 464,465 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (prescribing sanctions for filing of pleadings, motions, and other
papers that are not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or good faith argu-
ment for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988) (permit-
ting court award of reasonable attorney's fees in exceptional cases).
303. See Cambridge, 962 F.2d at 1050-51, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (reporting Federal
Circuit's conclusion that Cambridge met its obligations under rule 11 by conducting reason-
able prelawsuit investigation to determine whether Penn infringed patented method). Penn's
naked assertion that this case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 was insufficient without
additional proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Cambridge pursued the
litigation in bad faith. Id. at 1051, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court's denial of rule 11 sanctions against the
defendant in In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1528, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1241, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where the plaintiff sought reimbursement under rule 11
for the cost of having a witness testify against an unfounded affirmative defense. The district
court denied the request on the grounds that the witness was important to the plaintiff for
other reasons and that the attorney's conduct did not meet the threshold for imposition of
rule 11 sanctions. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 818, 828, 20
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1836, 1844 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aft'd, 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit stated that although it deplored the defendant's
unfounded accusations, the district court's denial of rule 11 sanctions was not an abuse of
discretion. Hayes, 982 F.2d at 1537-38, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56.
304. Cambridge, 962 F.2d at 1051-52, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
305. Id.
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sel personally liable.30 6
In contrast to Cambridge, the Federal Circuit in Morton International,
Inc. v. Cardinal Chemical Co. 30 7 refused to sanction Morton or find
that its appeal was frivolous. 3 0 8 Morton argued unsuccessfully on
appeal that the district court misconstrued its patent claims by re-
stricting the type of evidence Morton could use to prove the exist-
ence of the claimed compound in Cardinal's accused composi-
tion.30 9 Although the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
that Cardinal did not infringe Morton's patent, the court held that
Morton had a new argument on appeal that Morton was apparently
unable to raise in earlier litigation and that Morton's appeal was,
therefore, not frivolous.3 10
K. Modifying Consent Decrees
Courts are generally reluctant to grant motions modifying con-
sent decrees because such decrees embody a deliberate choice by
the parties to end litigation.31' Courts can, and do, modify consent
decrees under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
where appropriate exceptional circumstances exist, such as, for ex-
ample, "where absent such relief an extreme and unexpected hard-
ship will result."3 1 2 In W.L. Gore & Associates v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 3 1s
C.R. Bard sought to modify a consent decree because of a change in
the statutory law regarding the definition of infringement. 314 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the requested
modifications.3 1 5 In 1984, W.L. Gore sued C.R. Bard for patent in-
306. Id. Even though an appeal presents appealable issues, an "appellant's misconduct in
arguing the appeal may be such as tojustify holding the appeal to be 'frivolous as argued.' "
Id. at 1051, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (quoting Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d
1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
307. 959 F.2d 948, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992).
308. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 950, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1231, 1234 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
309. Id at 952, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (reporting that court also did not find case
"exceptional" under 35 U.S.C. § 285). Appellate review of district court decisions regarding
"exceptional cases" under 35 U.S.C. § 285 proceeds under a clearly erroneous standard. Id.
310. See id (indicating that Morton was unable to raise argument previously because pat-
ent in suit had been subject of earlier litigation in which invalidity judgment was vacated).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (stating that party
seeking relief from consent decree bears heavy burden of showing circumstances so changed
that "dangers, once substantial, have attenuated to a shadow"); Mayberry v. Maroney, 558
F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that although language of rule 60(b) is broad, it does
not present court with standardless residual discretionary power to set aside judgments).
312. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119 (1932); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (prescribing relief from
judgment or order).
313. 977 F.2d 558, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
314. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 560, 24 U.S.P.Q02d (BNA)
1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
315. Id. at 563, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
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fringement after C.R. Bard admitted to the FDA that its vascular
prosthesis, which was made of porous polytetrafluoroethylene, was
"substantially equivalent" to W.L. Gore's patented prosthesis.3 16
W.L. Gore and C.R. Bard avoided a trial and settled their differ-
ences, and on April 12, 1984, the district court entered a consent
decree that enjoined C.R. Bard from infringing or inducing in-
fringement of W.L. Gore's patent.3 17
In September 1984, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) which
was later amended in 1988 to include nonbiotechnology-based
animal drugs and veterinary biological products.3 18  Section
271(e)(1) now provides that the making, using, or selling of a pat-
ented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a federal law that
regulates the making, using, or selling of a drug are within a statu-
tory experimental use exception to infringement. In 1990, the
Supreme Court in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. ,19 interpreted 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to include medical devices.3 20
After the Supreme Court's Medtronic decision, C.R. Bard moved to
amend the consent decree under rule 60(b) to permit it to engage in
activities exempt from infringement liability by virtue of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), 321 but the district court denied C.R. Bard's motion. 322
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision, holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to modify the consent decree and properly balanced the equities of
granting modification with the need for finality of judgments. 323
The court noted that because C.R. Bard deliberately chose to settle
the suit, its burden of proof to justify the rule 60(b) modification of
316. Ia at 559, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452 (observing that C.R. Bard made this admis-
sion for purpose of obtaining FDA approval of its prosthesis, knowing that FDA had previ-
ously approved W.L. Gore's prosthesis).
317. Id
318. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1988). Section 271(e) was enacted by Congress in response to
the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984), which held that the experimental use exception to
patent infringement did not exculpate Bolar's making, using, and selling of the patented in-
vention to comply with the Food and Drug Administration's approval requirements. Roche,
733 F.2d at 863-64, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 941.
319. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
320. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1990) (interpreting
§ 271(e)(1) as applicable to medical devices that are regulated by Federal laws that also gov-
ern drug approval).
321. W.L. Gore &Assocs. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 376, 378, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1621, 1633 (D.NJ. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 558, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
322. See id. (stating that so long as continuation of challenged provision in consent decree
is neither illegal nor against public policy, agreement should be upheld notwithstanding sub-
sequent changes in law).
323. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 559-63, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1451, 1451-55 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1993]
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the consent decree was particularly heavy, " 'perhaps even more for-
midable than had [it], litigated and lost.' ",24 The court stated that
to modify a consent decree, not only must the circumstances have
changed, but unexpected hardship and inequity must have resulted
from the changes.32 5 Compliance with these conditions ensures the
enforcement of policies encouraging finality of judgments and end-
ing of litigation.3 26 The Federal Circuit also analogized the settle-
ment agreement to a contract, noting that there is no basis for a
court to intervene in a voluntary contract merely because the con-
tract turns out to be less or more favorable to one of the parties.3 27
In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Circuit stated that an inter-
vening change in the law is but one factor to be considered in the
exercise of a court's discretion in deciding whether to modify a con-
sent decree.3 28 In a prelude to its conclusion, the Federal Circuit
distinguished several cases, including Supreme Court cases, that
permitted a party to modify a consent decree.3 29 The Federal Cir-
cuit categorized these decisions as "institutional reform" cases in-
volving public or service institutions that had been affected by a
change of law relating to the institutions.33 0 According to the Fed-
eral Circuit, the institutional reform cases involved consent decrees
that imposed or restrained action without regard to the persons in-
volved and that presented considerations not found in consent de-
crees that settle commercial disputes.33 ' Institutional reform
situations must, therefore, "'be open to adaptation when unfore-
seen obstacles present themselves, to improvement when a better
understanding of the problem emerges, and to accommodation of a
wider constellation of interests that is presented in the ... court-
room.' "1332 In contrast, commercial decrees affect only those par-
324. Id. at 561, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (quoting Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org.




328. Id. at 562, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
329. See, e.g., System Fed'n No. 91 Ry. Employees Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 653(1961) (allowing modification of decree forbidding railroads and unions from discriminating
against employees on basis of their refusal to join union, due to change in law making "union
shops" legal); Williams v. Butz, 843 F.2d 1335, 1339 (11 th Cir.) (holding that change in regu-
lations allowed Farmer's Home Administration to act in manner inconsistent with existing
consent decree), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956 (1988); Williams v. Atkins, 786 F.2d 457, 463 (1st
Cir. 1986) (stating that change in law pertaining to state welfare agency allowed agency to act
in manner conflicting with existing consent decree);Jordan v. School Dist., 548 F.2d 117, 122
(3d Cir. 1977) (holding that intervening Supreme Court decision allowed modification of pro-
cedures set out in consent decree).
330. C.R. Bard, 977 F.2d at 562, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
331. Id.
332. Id. (quoting New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d
956, 970 n.17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983)).
952 [Vol. 42:909
1993] 1992 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS 953
ties to the particular suit.3s3
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by C.R. Bard's additional
argument that it would be at a competitive disadvantage compared
to W.L. Gore's other competitors upon expiration of W.L. Gore's
patent in April 1993.33 4 The court explained that the district court
considered this possibility in denying C.R. Bard's motion to modify
the consent decree and balanced it against the public policy consid-
erations favoring finality of judgments.33 5 The district court also
observed that the settlement was negotiated, that C.R. Bard ob-
tained a substantial reduction in the damages asserted by W.L.
Gore, and that each side agreed to various actions.33 6 The Federal
Circuit therefore held that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion by declining to undo the agreed upon consent decree.33 7
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Patentable Subject Matter-35 U.S.C. § 101
In Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp. ,338 the Fed-
eral Circuit clarified the application of the two-step Freeman-Walter-
Abele test339 for patentability of claims that involve mathematical al-
gorithms.3 40 The court stated that this test is satisfied when an
333. Id. In his concurring opinion, Judge Rader emphasized that the Federal Circuit can-
not disregard Supreme Court precedent, and thus the court's attempt to "limit strictly" the
Supreme Court's decision in Wright is mere dicta. Id- at 564, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56
(Rader, J., concurring) (citing Wright, 364 U.S. at 647). Judge Rader took exception to the
court's attempt to set a different standard for "public or service institutions" from commercial
cases because both W.L. Gore and C.R. Bard undoubtedly consider themselves "service insti-
tutions" in the same sense that the private entities in Wright (a railroad and a union) are
considered "service institutions." Id. at 564, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
334. Id- at 562-63, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. Bard argued that the change in law
made it unnecessary to show hardship in order to modify a consent decree under rule 60(b).
Id. at 563, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. The Federal Circuit found no discernable support




338. 958 F.2d 1053, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
339. The Freeman-Walter-Abele test derives its name from In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982), In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682
(C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Under this test, the court first determines "whether a mathematical algorithm is recited di-
rectly or indirectly in the claim." Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
If a mathematical algorithm is involved in the claim, the court next determines "whether the
claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself; that is whether the claim is
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to or limited by physical elements or
process steps." Id. If so, the claim is nonstatutory subject matter. Id. The court further
pointed out that "when the mathematical algorithm is applied in one or more steps of an
otherwise statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory appara-
tus claim, the requirements of section 101 are met." Id.
340. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059, 22
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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otherwise statutory process or apparatus claim includes mathemati-
cal procedures applied to physical process steps. 34 1 Arrhythmia
owned a patent for monitoring and analyzing electrocardiographic
signals from a heart attack victim.3 42 The patent included method
claims3 43 and apparatus claims, the apparatus claims being de-
scribed exclusively using "means-plus-function" limitations accord-
ing to 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.34 4 Arrhythmia sued Corazonix for
patent infringement.3 45 The district court granted Corazonix's
summary judgment motion and held Arrhythmia's patent did not
claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.346
After reviewing the history of the patentability of mathematical
algorithms, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Freeman-Walter-
341. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
342. Id. at 1054, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034 (indicating Arrhythmia's ownership of U.S.
Patent No. 4,422,459). The invention is useful in detecting those heart attack victims who are
at high risk for ventricular tachycardia. Id. at 1055, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. With the
aid of a computer, electrocardiographic signals are converted to digital values that are aver-
aged to form a composite digital representation. Id. A high pass filter processes the compos-
ite representation in reverse time order and the root mean square of the reverse time filtered
signal is then calculated and compared to a predetermined level. Id. If the output is less than
the predetermined value, a higher risk of ventricular tachycardia is present. Id.
343. Id Claim 1 reads:
A method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the presence or
absence of a predetermined level of high frequency energy in the late QRS signal,
comprising the steps of:
converting a series of QRS signals to time segments, each segment having a digital
value equivalent to the analog value of said signals at said time;
applying a portion of said time segments in reverse time order to high pass filter
means;
determining an arithmetic value of the amplitude of the output of said filter; and
comparing said value with said predetermined level.
Id
344. See id (reporting apparatus claim contained in claim 7 of patent). Claim 7 reads:
Apparatus for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the level of high
frequency energy in the late QRS signal comprising:
means for converting X, Y. and Z lead electrocardiographic input signals to digital
valued time segments;
means for examining said X, Y, and Z digital valued time segments and selecting
therefrom the QRS waveform portions thereof;
means for signal averaging a multiplicity of said selected QRS waveforms for each
of said X, Y, and Z inputs and providing composite, digital X, Y, and Z QRS
waveforms;
high pass filter means;
means for applying to said filter means, in reverse time order, the anterior portion
of each said digital X, Y, and Z waveform; and
means for comparing the output of said filter means with a predetermined level to
obtain an indication of the presence of a high frequency, low level, energy compo-
nent in the filter output of said anterior portions.
Id
345. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., No. CA 3-8-1745-AJ
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 1990) (unpublished opinion), rev'd and remanded, 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
346. Id
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Abele test separately to the method and apparatus claims.3 47 The
Federal Circuit held that the claimed method met the first step of
the test by assuming that a mathematical algorithm was included in
the patentable subject matter of the method claim based on the fact
that some claimed steps were described in the specification by math-
ematical formulae.3 48 Turning to the second step, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that the claimed process was properly viewed as a method
of analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine specific heart
activity rather than a mere manipulation of numbers.3 49 The court
stated that "the view that there is nothing necessarily physical about
the 'signals' is incorrect."350 Indeed, the court recognized that the
electrocardiograph input signals are not abstractions but are inte-
grally related to a patient's heart function,35' and "[t]he resultant
output number is not an abstract number but is a signal related to
the patient's heart activity."3 52 Moreover, the court noted that the
claimed steps of "converting," "applying," "determining," and
"comparing" were "physical process steps that transform one physi-
cal, electrical signal into another."3 53 In short, the second step of
the Freeman- Walter-Abele test was satisfied because the steps of the
claimed method "comprise an otherwise statutory process whose
mathematical procedures are applied to physical process steps."3 54
Furthermore, the claims did not encompass subject matter beyond
what the inventor actually invented.3 55
The Federal Circuit also held that the apparatus claims consti-
tuted statutory subject matter under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.3 5 6
The court noted that because the apparatus claim elements were in
"means-plus-function" form, the scope of the claim should be de-
termined by reference to the structure in the specifications, as re-
347. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055-58, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035-37. Although the
court emphasized that Freeman-Walter- Abele was not the only test for statutory subject matter,
it concluded that the test was best suited to analyze the patent in dispute. Id. (citing In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
348. Id at 1058-59, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037-38 (citing In reJohnson, 589 F.2d 1070,
1078, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 199, 208 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
349. Id at 1059, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.





354. Id. The court also analogized this case to Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187
(1981), to conclude that the applicants did not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but
rather sought to prevent others from using that formula in conjunction with all of the other
steps in their claimed process. Id at 1059-60, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
355. Id at 1059, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1038.
356. Id. at 1060, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
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quired by 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112.35 7 Noting that the specification
described specific physical devices as the various means set forth in
the apparatus claim, the court concluded that" '[t]he claimed inven-
tion ... converts one physical thing into another physical thing just
as any other electrical circuitry would do.' "35 Furthermore, the
mere use of mathematical representations to describe the structure
and operation of an apparatus does not necessarily make the appa-
ratus nonstatutory. 359 According to the court, "[w]hen mathemati-
cal formulae are the standard way of expressing certain functions or
apparatus, it is appropriate that mathematical terms be used."160
Finally, the Federal Circuit was unpersuaded by Corazonix's argu-
ment that there was insufficient postsolution activity to render the
claim patentable.3 61 The court noted that the number obtained was
not a mathematical abstraction, but rather a measure in microvolts
of a specified heart activity that indicated the patient's risk of heart
disease.3 62 The court stressed that whether the claim is directed to
statutory subject matter does not depend on whether the product
obtained is numerical.3 63 Moreover, the so-called "negative rules"
of patentability "were not intended to be separate tests for deter-
mining whether a claim recites statutory subject matter." 364
Seeking to avoid reliance on the Freeman- Walter-Abele test because
of its inherent difficulty of application, the concurring opinion con-
cluded that the Arrhythmia patent did claim patentable subject mat-
ter on an analysis of the language of the patent statute.3 65 "[IT]he
Act, by its terms, extends patent protection to 'any' machine or pro-
357. Id, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
358. Ida, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038-39 (quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819,
204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 546 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981)); see also id.
(noting that specification described means for converting electrocardiograph signals to digital
form as conventional analog-to-digital converter and minicomputer as means of calculating
composite digital time segments of QRS waveform).
359. Id. (citing In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1911-12
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
360. Id. at 1060, 22 U.S.R.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039 (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Gar-
lock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303,315 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 851 (1984); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399, 163 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 611, 616
(C.C.P.A. 1969)).
361. Id. at 1060-61, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. If the output of a device is a number,
the device is not patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590-92 (1978) (holding that to
be patentable, postsolution activity limitations are required such that number is no longer
final product of claimed invention); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68-73 (1972) (holding
that computerized process for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numbers is not patentable).
362. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1039.
363. Id. at 1060-61, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1039 (citing In re Meyer, 699 F.2d 789, 796
n.4, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
364. Id. (quoting Meyer, 699 F.2d at 796 n.4, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198 n.4).
365. Id. at 1061-66, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039-44 (Rader, J., concurring); see also id. at
1063, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (stating that term "mathematical algorithm" in first step
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cess which satisfies the other conditions of patentability. '3 66 The
concurrence reasoned that the patent claims, rather than disclosing
mere abstract ideas, instead delineated a practical and potentially
life-saving process, the steps of which satisfy § 101 regardless of
whether the steps are performed by computer.3 67
B. Anticipation-35 U.S.C. § 102
1. Public use and on-sale bars
A statutory bar to patentability exists under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) to
preclude an applicant from obtaining a patent on any invention
which was in public use or was on sale in the United States more
than one year prior to the United States' filing date of the applica-
tion.3 68 An exception to the on-sale statutory bar, however, is the
sale or offer for sale of the invention for purely experimental pur-
poses.3 69 In 1992, the Federal Circuit addressed the applicability of
the on-sale bar and the experimental use exception. In Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,370 the defendant raised an on-sale
bar to challenge the validity of the plaintiff's patent.3 71 In Sinskey v.
Pharmacia Ophthalmics Inc.372 and LaBounty Manufacturing, Inc. v.
United States International Trade Commission,373 the patentees sought to
avoid an on-sale bar by relying on the experimental use
exception.3 74
In Atlantic Thermoplastics, Faytex, the defendant, unsuccessfully
raised an on-sale bar defense to the validity of Atlantic's patent
is vague and obscure, and second step of test does not suggest how many physical steps must
be present in claim to escape fatal "mathematical algorithm" category).
366. Id. at 1062, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
367. Id. at 1066, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
368. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
369. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133-37 (1878)
(stating that use of invention by inventor solely for experimental purposes does not constitute
public use of invention within meaning of patent law); Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740
F.2d 1573, 1580, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at
137) (stating that use or sale is experimental for purposes of § 102(b) if it represents bona
fide effort to perfect invention or to ascertain whether invention will answer its intended pur-
pose); In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v.
Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 266 (1887)) (holding that experiment to improve and perfect inven-
tion does not constitute public use if such experimental use is real purpose and is not merely
incidental and subsidiary).
370. 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
371. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
372. 982 F.2d 494, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
373. 958 F.2d 1066, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
374. Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 496, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1992); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958
F.2d 1066, 1071, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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before the district court 3 75 Without providing any findings of fact
or analysis for its conclusion, the district court found that Atlantic
had not made an offer to sell before the critical date.3 76 The Federal
Circuit vacated the district court's judgment that there was no on-
sale bar and remanded the case 377 because the district court failed
to set forth findings of fact upon which it could have relied to justify
its judgment.378 Without findings of fact or analysis, there was no
basis under rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the Federal Circuit to determine whether the district court properly
considered the evidence presented and applied the correct legal
standard.3 79 The court therefore remanded the case "for a proper
on-sale analysis."3 80
In LaBounty, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC) that commercial activities of the
patentee, LaBounty, more than one year before the filing of its pat-
ent application for shears, were not within the experimental use ex-
ception to an on-sale bar provision.38 1 The ITC held that the
LaBounty patent was unenforceable for inequitable conduct be-
cause LaBounty had intentionally withheld material prior art from
the PTO by failing to disclose that it had placed the claimed shears
on sale more than one year before filing its application.38 2 On ap-
peal, LaBounty based its argument that it was not guilty of withhold-
ing material prior art on its assertion that the sale of the claimed
shears was not prior art for patentability purposes because the sale
was for experimental purposes only.38 3
375. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 836-37, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
376. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., No. 88-0210-H, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20050, at *15-16 (D. Mass. July 27, 1990), vacated, 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1481
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
377. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 835, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. An on-sale bar
determination is a question of law and requires de novo review by the appellate court. Id. at
836,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (citing U.S. Envtl. Prods. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 715, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). The factual findings underlying the on-sale
bar determination must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. (citing
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1591
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Moleculon Research v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266, 229 U.S.P.QJ (BNA)
805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987)).
378. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 837, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1483.
379. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring court, in all actions tried on facts withoutjury, to find facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon).
380. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 837, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
381. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1074, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
382. Id. at 1071, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 (discussing standard for finding of inequi-
table conduct, which would render patent unenforceable).
383. See id at 1069-71, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28 (indicating that activities at issue
consisted of use of Adamo/Dodge shears by John Adamo at Dodge plant in Michigan, and
delivery of Adamo/Dodge shear to United Scrap, Ace shear to Ace Demolition Plant in Penn-
sylvania, and Ace shear to Laro Coal).
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The Federal Circuit began its analysis by summarizing the experi-
mental use exception as follows:
"[A] use or sale is experimental for purposes of section 102(b) if it
represents a bona fide effort to perfect the invention or to ascer-
tain whether it will answer its intended purpose. ... If any com-
mercial exploitation does occur, it must be merely incidental to
the primary purpose of experimentation to perfect the
invention."3 84
The court emphasized that an inventor's subjective intent to experi-
ment is irrelevant, especially when expressed for the first time dur-
ing litigation.385 When sales occur in a commercial setting, and the
inventor surrenders control over the goods, an inventor's secret
subjective intent concerning experimentation is unavailing without
objective evidence to support the contention.38 6 Furthermore, to
establish experimental use in such a case, at a minimum, the cus-
tomer or user must be made aware of the experimental nature of the
device.387 The court then extensively quoted the administrative law
judge's (ALJ) findings of fact, which summarized the commercial na-
ture of LaBounty's activities, and agreed with the ITC's conclusion
that all of the activities in question resembled ordinary commercial-
type transactions and not transactions for experimental purposes.
3 88
A persuasive factor weighing against LaBounty's assertion of ex-
perimental use was that the sales were not for the benefit of the
inventor, but rather were for the benefit of potential customers in
determining whether to purchase large quantities of the LaBounty
shears.38 9 In no instance did LaBounty follow procedures relevant
to testing or experimentation aimed at perfecting the invention.
390
LaBounty imposed no strictures of secrecy or confidentiality on its
384. IL at 1071, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740
F.2d 1573, 1580-81, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
385. Id. at 1071-72, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (citing In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103,
1108, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988,991 (Fed. Cir. 1986); TP Lab. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,
724 F.2d 965, 972, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984);
Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1481 n.3, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364,
1366 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
386. Id. (citing In re Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108, 229 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 991).
387. Id. (citing In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1401, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593, 599 (C.C.P.A.
1975)).
388. Id at 1072-74, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029-3 1.
389. Id. at 1071, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
390. Id. The Federal Circuit emphasized that LaBounty kept no records of the sales, did
not inform its customers that the devices were experimental, did not keep the devices secret,
and made them available for viewing by others in the industry. Id. at 1074, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1031. Furthermore, the court found LaBounty's argument that "testing" of the
device occurred, albeit in the facilities of others, irrelevant because LaBounty did not set up
any testing arrangement with its customers. Id.
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customers regarding their use of the shears.39 ' Nevertheless,
LaBounty argued that the on-sale bar was inapplicable because the
customers found the shears unsatisfactory for some uses and be-
cause LaBounty offered a "money back guarantee."3 92 The Federal
Circuit rejected these arguments, stressing that testing by a cus-
tomer before deciding whether to purchase a product constitutes
commercial activity that is not within the experiment-1 use excep-
tion and that a "money back guarantee" is an everyday commercial
marketing ploy.393 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ITC's determination of a § 102(b) "public use and on-sale" bar to
the patentability of the LaBounty shears.3 94
In Sinskey, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's holding
that a plaintiff was not entitled to an experimental use exception to a
patent-invalidating public use bar.3 95 Dr. Sinskey owned a U.S. pat-
ent directed to an interocular lens for the human eye, the applica-
tion for which was filed on February 24, 1981.3 9 6 In its defense to
Dr. Sinskey's infringement allegation, Pharmacia moved for a sum-
mary judgment that Dr. Sinskey's patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) because Dr. Sinskey publicly used the claimed interocular
lens prior to the critical date of February 24, 1980.39 7 In response,
Dr. Sinskey argued that the activity at issue constituted experimental
use and thus was an exception to the statutory bar of § 102(b). 398
Prior to February 24, 1980, Iolab produced a sterile Model 103J
lens based on Dr. Sinskey's design.3 99 Dr. Sinskey purchased at
least three 103J lenses and ordered other lenses from Iolab before
the critical date.400 In addition, Dr. Sinskey successfully implanted a
total of eleven 103J lenses under normal hospital procedures prior
to February 24, 1980.401 The district court held that Dr. Sinskey
had raised no genuine issue of material fact to support a defense of
experimental use and issued a summary judgment in favor of
Pharmacia.40 2





395. Sinskey v. Pharmacia Opthalmics Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 496, 25 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1290, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
396. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
397. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
398. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 497, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
401. Id.
402. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
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that once an alleged infringer has established a prima facie case of
public use under § 102(b), the patentee must respond with evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.403 The patentee cannot merely rest
on the presumption of patent validity. The Federal Circuit rejected
Dr. Sinskey's arguments that his declaration-that the public uses
were for experimental purposes-raised a genuine issue of material
fact because, by itself, after-the-fact testimony of an inventor's sub-
jective "experimental intent" is entitled to little weight.40 4
The Federal Circuit held that the objective evidence of record did
not support Dr. Sinskey's assertions that the public uses were for
experimental purposes.40 5 Dr. Sinskey charged his usual surgical
fee for each implant, did not inform the patients that they were be-
ing treated with an experimental lens, and did not obtain any kind of
secrecy agreement with the patients or hospital staff where the im-
plants took place.406 Furthermore, none of the hospital records re-
ferred to the 103J lens as "experimental." 40 7 Indeed, Dr. Sinskey's
lens was described in an application for FDA approval as equivalent
in design, use, and function to an existing lens.408 Finally, the court
did not find corroborating evidence of experimentation contempo-
raneous with the implantations, the presence of which the court
concluded would be likely if the lens implants had in fact been for
experimental purposes. 40 9
403. Il at 498, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (citing Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg.
Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1480, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
404. Id. at 499,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (citing In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The court noted that Dr. Sinskey's declaration
directly conflicted with the deposition testimony he gave under oath. Id. at 499, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. During Dr. Sinskey's deposition, he testified that no testing of the
103J lens was necessary. Id. at 497, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. In his declaration, how-
ever, he stated that the first 11 implants in question were experimental. Id. at 498, 25
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) at 1293. According to the court, "[a] party cannot create an issue of fact by
supplying an affidavit contradicting his [or her] prior deposition testimony, without .. .at-
tempting to resolve the disparity." Id. at 498, 25 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1292; see also Chore-
Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 779, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 676
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that no legitimate issue of fact was created by affidavits contradicting





409. Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 499, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. Whether a use is experimen-
tal is a very fact-specific inquiry, and the court's determinations of experimental use are not
altogether predictable. For example, the Federal Circuit has held that three uses of an ortho-
dontic appliance were experimental even though the dentist charged the regular fee and no
secrecy arrangement was made with the patients. See TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners,
Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971-73, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 582-84 (Fed. Cir.) (basing public use
analysis on entirety of evidence presented), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
1993]
962 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:909
2. Prior printed publication
In In re Schoenwald,410 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the well-
known principle that a reference need not disclose a utility of a com-
pound to be an effective anticipatory reference under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). 411 A reference is anticipatory so long as it satisfies the
date requirement of § 102(b), and both identically and enablingly
describes the claimed invention.41 2 Therefore, the court held that
Schoenwald's claims to old chemical compounds, which were de-
scribed in prior printed publications, were unpatentable despite the
fact that he had discovered an unknown use for the old com-
pounds. 413 Schoenwald argued that the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences incorrectly relied on statements from In re
Hafner4 14 that at best were mere dicta. 415 The Federal Circuit was
unpersuaded by Schoenwald's arguments, however, and affirmed
the judgment that Schoenwald's compound claims were not
novel.416
3. Identity of invention and claim interpretation
To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the claimed in-
vention must be disclosed in a single prior art reference or event;4 17
this is commonly referred to as identity of invention.418 In Minnesota
410. 964 F.2d 1122, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
411. In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir.
1992); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (providing in pertinent part that "[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless ... (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publi-
cation in this or a foreign country . . .more than one year prior to the date of the
application").
412. Schoenwald, 964 F.2d at 1124, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 (citing In re Hafner, 410
F.2d 1403, 1408, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783, 785 (C.C.P.A. 1969), which held that prior art that
does not disclose utility but otherwise describes claimed invention can still anticipate).
413. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that Schoenwald had already received a method patent
for the method of use. Id "Their contribution was finding a use for the compound itself.
Therefore they are being rewarded fully for their contribution; any more would be gratuity."
Id
414. 410 F.2d 1403, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
415. Schoenwald, 964 F.2d at 1123-24, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. Schoenwald argued
that the statements in Hafner that were contrary to its position were mere dicta, that Hafner
dealt with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 and not 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and that Hafner was simply wrong.
Id. at 1123, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
416. Id. at 1123-24, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. According to the court, "it is beyond
argument that no utility need be disclosed for a reference to be anticipatory of a claim to an
old compound." Id. at 1124, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
417. See Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771, 218 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) 781,
789 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (observing that "one who seeks such a finding must show that each
element of the claim in issue is found, either expressly described or under principles of inher-
ency, in a single prior art reference, or that the claimed invention was previously known or
embodied in a single prior art reference or device"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
418. See Tyler Refrig. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 777 F.2d 687, 690, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 845,
847 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that identity of invention is question of fact, reviewable under
clearly erroneous standard).
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Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc. ,419
the Federal Circuit resolved an identity of invention issue by apply-
ing the traditional two-step analysis for establishing identity of in-
vention, 420 and affirmed the district court's holding that the claims
of the Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) patents were not
anticipated. 42' 3M sued Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics (JJO) for
infringement of four patents422 pertaining to synthetic casting tapes
designed to replace plaster of paris casts.423 The district court
adopted the findings of a special master and held that the 3M pat-
ents were valid and infringed by JJO.4 24 In particular, the master
held that the 3M patent labeled the "Scholz patent" was not antici-
pated by the prior art.425 JJO had argued that the prior art antici-
419. 976 F.2d 1559, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 836-
43 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to defining claim terms based on spec-
ification issue); infra notes 912-28 and accompanying notes (discussing case with regard to
evidentiary considerations issue); infra notes 1077-95 and accompanying text (discussing case
with regard to lost profits issue); infra notes 1131-43 and accompanying text (discussing case
with regard to willful infringement and increased damages issues).
420. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1565-69, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326-30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (providing that in first
step, claims are interpreted, and in second step, claims are compared with prior art).
421. Id. at 1569, 1572, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328, 1330. The Federal Circuit affirmed
a judgment of "noninvalidity" under 35 U.S.C. § 102 for the patents labeled the "Scholz
patent" and the "Garwood patent." The reasons for the latter affirmance were rather per-
functory because the allegedly anticipatory reference did not sufficiently describe the Gar-
wood patent's claimed invention. Id at 1564, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
422. The four patents at issue were the Garwood, Reed, Scholz, and Scholz II patents. Id
at 1563, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. Each patent is named after its respective inventor. Id
at 1564, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-26.
423. Id at 1563, 24 U.S.P..2d (BNA) at 1325. These tapes were resin-based casting
tapes that were designed to be lighter, water resistant, easy to work with, and porous, allowing
the skin to breathe. See id. at 1563-64, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1325-26 (discussing character-
istics of four 3M patents).
424. Id. (citing master's decision in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson &Johnson
Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 4-86-359, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11451, 14823 (D. Minn. Apr. 30,
1991)).
425. Minnesota Mining, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1405 (D. Minn. 1991); see also Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565, 24
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (referring to U.S. Patent No. 4,667,661 issued
to Scholz and owned by 3M). JJO argued that claims 12 and 17 of the Scholz patent were
anticipated by a number of prior art commercial casting tape products in the United States
andJapan. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1565, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. Claims 12 and
17 in the Scholz patent read:
12. An article comprising a curable resin-coated sheet having a lubricant at a ma-
jor surface of the coated sheet, wherein said lubricant comprises an additive which is
a mixture of any of the compositions selected from the group consisting of a
surfactant, a polymer comprised of a plurality of hydrophilic groups, and a polysilox-
ane, and wherein said lubricant is present in an amount such that the kinetic coeffi-
cient of friction of the coated surface of the sheet material is less than about 1.2 ....
17. An article comprising a pre-lubricated curable resin-coated sheet wherein the
curable resin is a water-curable isocyanate-functional prepolymer which is a deriva-
tive of an aromatic polyisocyanate and wherein a major surface of the sheet exhibits a
kinetic coefficient of friction of less than about 1.2.
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pated the Scholz patent because the prior art casts contained the
known lubricants silicon and polyethylene and the Scholz patent
claimed the use of lubricants. 426 The master disagreed, however,
finding no anticipation because the Scholz patent disclosed the use
of a lubricant in a curable resin coat that required some degree of
slipperiness, whereas the prior art disclosed a tacky, and not a slip-
pery, curable resin-coated material.427
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that there was no clear error
in interpreting "lubricant" and "pre-lubricated" in the Scholz pat-
ent claims to mean "slippery," even though the latter term was not
expressly stated in the claims.428 In the court's view, when read in
conjunction with the specification, the respective meanings of "lu-
bricant" and "pre-lubricated" in claims 12 and 17 supported the
master's claim interpretation.429 Indeed, the goal of the Scholz in-
vention was the production of a nontacky but curable resin coat-
ing.43 0 The Federal Circuit disagreed with JJO's assertion that this
interpretation rendered the claims indefinite because the amount of
slipperiness was not specified in the patent.43 1 According to the
Federal Circuit, the master merely interpreted the claim term "lu-
bricated" to mean "slippery" enough to achieve the fimdamental
purpose of the invention and therefore the claim was not indefi-
nite.43 2 The court further remarked that this construction was read-
ily ascertainable from the Scholz patent specification. 433 Therefore,
it was not clearly erroneous to interpret "lubricant" or "pre-lubrica-
ted" as meaning a slippery feel or slippery surface. 43 4
The Scholz patent claims also required a certain kinetic coefficient
of friction (KCOF) value.43 5 JO argued that the master erroneously
426. Id.
427. Minnesota Mining, No. 4-86-359, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11451, at * 198.
428. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1567, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
429. Id-
430. Id. The Federal Circuit referred to the background section of the specification to
show that slipperiness was an element of the Scholz patent. Id. at 1566, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1327. In the background, the disadvantages of tacky resin coating were discussed. Id The
specification went on to state that the problems associated with tacky resin coats were solved
by using a resin that became slippery when contacted with water. Id. at 1566-67, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327-28.
431. Id.
432. See id. (recognizing that fundamental purpose of invention is "the ability to smooth
and rub the casting materials during molding without the resin and tape sticking to the appli-
cator's hands"). The court also pointed out that theJJO's argument was improperly firamed
because the term "slippery" was not used in the claims.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See H.J. GAY & ALAN IsAAcs, A NEw DEFINIoN OF PHYsics 224 (1975) (explaining
that KCOF is function of tackiness or roughness of surface of substrate or resin that forms
part of cast).
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required a standard substrate in calculating the KCOF.436 The Fed-
eral Circuit noted that contrary to JJO's assertions, the master did
not require that the KCOF be determined on a particular substrate
in order to find infringement or anticipation. 437 The master's com-
ments cited by JJO pertained instead to inequitable conduct, and
JJO had taken the comments out of context. 438 After affirming the
district court's and the master's interpretation of the Scholz patent
claims, the Federal Circuit then compared the claims to the prior art
and upheld the findings below that the prior art lubricants did not
anticipate the Scholz patent because in the prior art, the alleged lu-
bricants were either used in the wrong form or in too small an
amount to function as lubricants in the manner required by the
claims.439
4. Jury findings with respect to patent validity
In Shearing v. Iolab Corp.,440 the Federal Circuit considered
whether substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that
Iolab did not overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the
Shearing patent.44 1 After considering the evidence supporting the
jury's verdict, the Federal Circuit held that there was substantial evi-
dence in the record to show that a reasonable jury could have found
Dr. Shearing invented the lens implantation process and that a jury
could have reasonably resolved the credibility issues against Io-
lab.442 Iolab offered testimony that Dr. Simcoe's work predated the
Shearing patent.443 In addition, a witness testified to seeing a
home-movie at a meeting of the American Academy of Ophthalmol-
ogy that allegedly showed Dr. Simcoe performing the implantation
technique taught by the Shearing patent.444
The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the
jury verdict because, for example, no such movie was introduced as
evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses brought the movie's
436. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1567-68, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29.
437. IA
438. See id at 1568, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (stating that master merely used KCOF
to compare relative slipperiness of resins, which master then used to address question of
whether 3M was guilty of inequitable conduct).
439. See id., at 1569, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (indicating that allegedly anticipatory
resins were not in same form and did not function or act as lubricants in those forms, and that
amount of silicon lubricant needed to serve as antifoaming agent was insufficient to allow it to
function also as lubricant).
440. 975 F.2d 1541, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
441. Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1544-45, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1136-
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date and contents into question.445 The reasonableness of Iolab's
reliance on two hospital medical records to establish that Dr.
Simcoe performed lens implantation before Dr. Shearing filed his
patent was questionable because of inconsistencies in the hospital
records. 446 Moreover, many of Iolab's witnesses suffered from cred-
ibility problems, with some witnesses adding details in their trial tes-
timony that had not been previously mentioned in their depositions,
and with other witnesses who were originally portrayed as disinter-
ested being in fact personally or financially tied to Dr. Simcoe. 447
5. Foreign patents as prior art
In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit in In re Carson,448
held that a German design patent was a "foreign patent" under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) and thus a valid prior art reference in an obvi-
ousness rejection.449 During a reexamination of Carlson's design
patent for a dual compartment bottle, a German Geschmacksmuster
(GM) was cited to the patent examiner as previously unconsidered
prior art.450 Both the examiner and the Board rejected Carlson's
claims as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the GM in view of two
other previously unconsidered references. 451 Carlson challenged
the legal characterization of the GM as a foreign patent under
§ 102(a)4 52 despite a prior Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
decision holding that a GM was a foreign patent under § 102(d).4 53
To distinguish this prior precedent, Carlson argued that what con-
stitutes a foreign patent under § 102(a) is different than that under
445. Id at 1545, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
446. See id (reporting inconsistencies such as notations made in different ink than that
used in Dr. Simcoe's signature, records describing implantation in pupil of eye rather than
proper implant location in posterior chamber of eye, and discovery upon exhumation that
deceased patient had not in fact received Dr. Simcoe's implants).
447. Id.
448. 983 F.2d 1032, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1992), amended on reh'g, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 1665 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 1993); see also infra notes 450-60 and accompanying
text (discussing case with regard to design patent issue).
449. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir.
1992), amended on reh'g, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1665 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 1993).
450. Id. at 1035, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208. A GM is a German design registration
that is obtained by filing with a local courthouse an application that includes a drawing, photo-
graph, or sample of the patented product. Id. A Federal Gazette publishes certain particulars
of each registration, but one can only obtain all the details of a particular design by getting a
certified copy of the GM from the courthouse where it was filed. Id. at 1034, 25 U.S.P.QJ2d
(BNA) at 1208-09.
451. Id. at 1035, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209.
452. Id.
453. See In re Talbott, 443 F.2d 1397, 1398-99, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 282 (C.C.P.A.
1971) (finding that registration under German law satisfies recognized foreign patent require-
ments under § 102(d)).
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§ 102(d).454 While recognizing the different purposes of § 102(a)
and § 102(d), the Federal Circuit did not agree with Carlson that
this distinction necessarily disqualified a GM from being a foreign
patent under § 102(a).4 55
Carlson also argued that the GM, even if a "foreign patent," was
not prior art under § 102(a) because it was not disclosed in a "read-
ily accessible fashion. ' 456 The court disagreed and held that the
GM protected design need only be available to the public to be con-
sidered prior art under § 102(a). 45 7 In the court's view, "the pro-
tected design [was] completely 'available to the public' through the
certified copy of the Geschmacksmuster. ' '458 Although the Federal
Circuit recognized that its holding creates a burden on potential
patentees to discover what is registered under German law, the
court noted nonetheless that "[s]uch a burden.., is by law imposed
upon the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art who is
charged with knowledge of all the contents of the relevant prior
art."' 459 Moreover, actual knowledge of the GM was not necessary
for it to be considered prior art because "a hypothetical person is
presumed to know all the pertinent prior art."'460
C. Obviousness-35 U.S.C. § 103
1. Analogous prior art
In two 1992 decisions, the Federal Circuit reversed obviousness
determinations by the Board because the references cited by the
Board were not analogous prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103.461 In
both cases, the Federal Circuit held that prior art is analogous only
454. Carson, 983 F.2d at 1036-37, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
455. Id at 1037, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210-11 (holding that there is no reason to
distinguish between §§ 102(a) and 102(d) in determining what constitutes foreign patent).
456. Id. Carlson argued that the GM did not disclose the invention in a widely dissemi-
nated medium. Id Carlson further argued that because the Federal Gazette entry at issue did
not explicitly refer to a dual compartment container, it did not provide adequate notice of the
GM cited against his invention. Id
457. Id (citing In re Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 324-25, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 349, 351, 353
(C.C.P.A. 1958) (stating that "inventions protected by secret/private patents do not qualifiy
as patented abroad under U.S. law")); see also In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 227, 210 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 790, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that Australian patent application available on
microfiche in Australian Patent Office was available to public).
458. Carlson, 982 F.2d at 1037, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. The court also noted that
the Federal Gazette alerted the public to the dual compartment design because it referred to a
single package incorporating multiple bottles. Id
459. Id.
460. Id. at 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 (citing In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403,
7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1502 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
461. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445-46, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1445-46 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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if the reference is from the same field of endeavor or is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem that the inventor is attempting
to solve.4 6 2
In In re Clay, 463 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's finding
that Clay's invention for storing refined liquid hydrocarbon product
in a storage tank having a dead volume between the tank bottom
and its outlet port was obvious in light of two prior art references.464
The first reference, the Hetherington patent, disclosed an apparatus
for displacing liquid in the dead volume of a storage tank using im-
pervious bladders.465 Even though the Hetherington reference was
clearly analogous art, it did not, standing alone, obviate Clay's in-
vention because it described a different method for displacing dead
volume.466
The second reference, the Sydansk patent, disclosed a process for
reducing the permeability of hydrocarbon-bearing formations using
a gel similar to that used in Clay's invention.467 The Federal Circuit
held that this reference was not analogous art from the same field of
endeavor.468 Furthermore, the Sydansk patent was not analogous
prior art reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which
Clay was involved. 469 Hence, the court concluded that the Sydansk
patent was improperly considered by the Board in its obviousness
determination.470
462. See Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1447, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445-46 (citing, in support of
holding, In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In
re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 171, 174 (C.C.P.A. 1979)); Clay, 966 F.2d
at 658-59, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (same).
463. 966 F.2d 656, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
464. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 657, 660, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1059, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
1992). In Clay's invention, a gelation solution is placed in the dead volume that sets to pro-
duce a rigid gel substantially filling the dead volume. Id. at 657-58, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1059. The gel and the hydrocarbon product do not mix. Id. at 658, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at
1059. To remove the gel from the tank a gel-degrading agent such as hydrogen peroxide may
be added to the gel to convert it to a flowing solution.
465. See id (describing U.S. Patent No. 4,664,294 issued to Hetherington).
466. Id.
467. See id. at 658, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (describing U.S. Patent No. 4,683,949
issued to Sydansk). Sydansk's gel fills anomalies in underground formations, forcing en-
trained petroleum to flow in a desired direction. Id. at 659-60, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
The Sydansk process operates at high temperatures and pressures. Id.
468. Id at 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (noting that second reference "cannot be
considered to be within Clay's field of endeavor merely because both relate to the petroleum
industry" because "Clay's field of endeavor is the storage of refined.., hydrocarbons" while
"field of endeavor of Sydansk's invention is the extraction of crude petroleum").
469. Id. at 659-60, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 (stating that "the purposes of both the
invention and the prior art are important in determining whether the reference is reasonably
pertinent to the problem the invention attempts to solve" and that "[a] person having ordi-
nary skill in the art would not reasonably have expected to solve the problem of dead volume
in tanks for storing refined petroleum by considering a reference dealing with plugging un-
derground formation anomalies").
470. Id. at 660, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
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The Federal Circuit also reversed the Board's decision in In re Oe-
tiker.471 As in Clay, the Board in Oetiker based its rejection on art that
the Federal Circuit later held to be nonanalogous. 472 Oetiker's in-
vention was an improvement for a metal hose clamp with a hook
that maintained the preassembly condition of the clamp and disen-
gaged automatically when the clamp was tightened.473 The prior art
cited by the Board to reject Oetiker's application was Oetiker's own
earlier issued patent that covered the basic clamp and a patent is-
sued to Lauro that described a plastic hook and eye fastener for use
in garments.474
Oetiker's earlier patent was clearly analogous prior art.4 75 The
Board held that although not within Oetiker's field of endeavor, the
Lauro reference was also analogous art because, like Oetiker's in-
vention, the Lauro reference related to a hooking problem.476 The
Federal Circuit, however, agreed with Oetiker that Lauro was not
analogous prior art because Lauro was not reasonably pertinent to
the particular problem with which Oetiker was concerned.47 7 The
court pointed out that while examination of patents necessarily re-
quires hindsight, a prima facie case of obviousness should not be
made using only the benefit of hindsight and the fact that the inven-
tion is relatively simple.47a The reality of the circumstances and
common sense must also be used to determine which fields a person
of ordinary skill would reasonably be expected to turn to for a solu-
tion to the problem.
2. Suggestion to combine or modify the prior art
The Federal Circuit continues to require that there be some sug-
gestion or motivation in the prior art to combine or modify refer-
ences for a finding of obviousness. Application of this concept has
471. 977 F.2d 1443, 1447, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
472. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Oetiker initially argued that a holding by the Board of prima facie obviousness was a
new rejection. Id. at 1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. Oetiker argued that he should
therefore be permitted to file evidence to rebut this finding, id., but the Federal Circuit re-
jected his argument. Id. at 1446, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. Although the Board's use of
the term "prima facie obvious" was imprecise, the Federal Circuit found it clear from the
record that the Board did not make a new rejection. Id.; see id. at 1448-49, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1447 (Plager, J., concurring) (addressing difficulties encountered by use of term
"prima facie obvious").
473. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1446, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
474. Id.
475. See id. at 1446, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445 (describing Oetiker's invention as im-
provement on his earlier patent, which was simply metal hose clamp without hook).
476. Id
477. Id. at 1447, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445-46.
478. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446 (stating that "[s]implicity is not inimical to
patentability").
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depended on the facts of a particular case and thus has varied
widely. In In re Fritch,479 the Federal Circuit held that the mere fact
that prior art may be modified to produce the claimed invention
does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art sug-
gested the desirability of the modification.480 Fritch invented a
landscaping edging device, which consisted of a flexible planar base
portion whose bottom surface was conformable to varying sloped
ground, for use as a retainer to separate unmowable landscape from
mowable lawn.481 The Board held that Fritch's invention was prima
facie obvious based on the combination of two prior art references,
the Wilson patent48 2 and the Hendrix patent. 48 3
The Federal Circuit noted that "under [35 U.S.C.] § 103, teach-
ings of references can be combined only if there is some suggestion
or incentive to do so."484 The court found no suggestion in either
reference to combine the attributes of each. 48 5 Although the exam-
iner couched the rejection in terms of an obvious modification, the
Federal Circuit held that the same logic applies to modifications as
to combinations of prior art references. 48 6 Nothing in Wilson sug-
gested flexibility over the length of the device and nothing in Hen-
drix suggested that its flexible features could be possible
modifications of Wilson. 48 7
In In re Gal,48 8 the Federal Circuit also reversed the Board's obvi-
ousness rejection, holding that general knowledge of the prior art
did not teach, suggest, or motivate someone to modify the prior art
to achieve Gal's claimed invention.48 9 Gal invented an improved
semiconductor chip in which minor logic errors could be easily cor-
rected.490 Semiconductor chips typically consist of cells patterned
479. 972 F.2d 1260, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
480. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(reversing Board's rejection of patent for obviousness).
481. Id at 1261, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
482. Id at 1263, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781 (citing as prior art U.S. Patent No.
3,485,449 issued to Wilson). Wilson teaches a grass edging and watering device with an
anchoring leg to secure the device to the ground. Id. at 1265, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
The anchoring leg prohibits flexibility and conformability over the length of the device. Id.
483. Id. at 1263, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782 (citing as prior art U.S. Patent No.
4,349,596 issued to Hendrix). Hendrix discloses a flexible retainer strip that is able to con-
form to the ground surface. Id.
484. Id. at 1266, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore
Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
485. Id. at 1266, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
486. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783-84 (noting that "[tihe mere fact that the prior art
may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification
obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification").
487. Id. at 1265-66, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
488. 980 F.2d 717, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
489. In re Gal, 980 F.2d 717, 718, 25 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1076, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
490. Id-
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in layers.491 In a standard logic cell, each cell layer is formed from a
mask and is capable of performing only a predetermined logic func-
tion. Therefore, correcting logic errors in a prototype semiconduc-
tor chip requires altering each mask.492 By interspersing fast
change logic cells among the standard logic cells in the chip, Gal
eliminated the need to alter each mask to correct minor logic er-
rors.493 In contrast to standard logic cells, which have uniquely tai-
lored layers to perform different logic functions, the fast change
logic cells described in the Gal patent possessed identical layers
from the middle layer down.494 The fast change cells thus provided
a logic function for correcting minor logic errors while altering only
the masks forming the upper layers of the chip.495
The prior art, the Matsumura patent, disclosed an integrated cir-
cuit chip made entirely of basic cells, which consisted of four transis-
tors capable of being connected in various patterns to achieve
different logic functions. 496 Each basic cell was identical in structure
up to a certain fabrication level, the layers above which contained
connections between the transistors that performed the different
logic functions.497 The Board recognized that the Gal invention and
the Matsumura patent disclosed similar means of correcting logical
errors without alteration of every mask in the chip.498 The Board
concluded that the structure of the Matsumura basic cell was a
building block for Gal's scheme of standard logic and fast change
logic cells and therefore held that Gal's standard logic cell and fast
change logic cell combination was obvious in view of the compre-
hensive teachings of Matsumura. 499
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision, summarily
stating that Gal's claimed invention and the prior art disclosed dif-
ferent structures that achieved different purposes.50 0 Whereas Gal's
claimed invention incorporated standard logic cells with a unique
pattern in each cell layer, Matsumura's basic cells had identical
structures up to at least the fabrication level. 50 The Commissioner
491. Id
492. Id.
493. See id (noting that correction of logic errors previously required changing all masks,
which are tailored to form each individual layer of semiconductor chip).
494. Id.
495. Id
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argued on appeal that Gal's claimed invention was obvious because
the operation of the functional circuits (e.g., NAND and OR func-
tions) were the same regardless of the shape of each layer of the
functional circuits. 502 The Federal Circuit pointed out, however,
that the Commissioner's reasoning "ignores the claimed structure
and the functions it performs."505 The court concluded that the
§ 103 rejection was improper because there was no motivation to
modify Matsumura's homogenous basic logic cell arrangement to
achieve Gal's invention. 504 Despite the absence of any reference in
the Gal application to the irregular shape of its standard logic cell in
claim 6, the Federal Circuit also reversed the Board's legal conclu-
sion that Gal's claimed invention was obvious in view of Mat-
sumura.50 5 Gal's claim 6 required all the transistors in the standard
logic cells to be interconnected within the cell, whereas admittedly
all the transistors in Matsumura's basic cell were not likely to be
connected.50 6
In contrast to the above cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed an ob-
viousness rejection in In re Beattie.50 7 Beattie's invention was a
marker intended to rest on the keys of a piano to facilitate the read-
ing and playing of music.5 0 8 The marker had a horizontal portion
with the traditional musical scale C D E F G A B on it and a vertical
portion with the numbers 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 on it to denote all
the tones of a scale including sharps and flats.50 9
The patent examiner rejected Beattie's application as obvious in
light of three prior art references for keyboard markers.510 The first
reference, the Barnes patent, disclosed a marker with the traditional
alphabetical notation on the horizontal part and the traditional let-
ters with attendant sharps and flats on the vertical portion.511 The
second reference, the Eschemann patent, disclosed a marker with
the traditional alphabetical notation on the horizontal part and the
numbers one through seven on the vertical part with the attendant
sharps and flats appearing as outlined numbers of the correspond-
502. Id
503. Id. at 720, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
504. See id. at 719, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078 (indicating that claim 6 of Gal application
provided that standard logic cells were prefabricated with desired logic function so as to
achieve maximum number of functions in given amount of space).
505. Id. at 720, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
506. Id.
507. 974 F.2d 1309, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
508. In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1310, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
509. IR
510. IdM at 1311, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
511. See id. (citing as prior art U.S. Patent No. 1,725,844 issued to Barnes).
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ing number keys of the octave.512 The third reference, the Guilford
patent, disclosed a system of musical notation with the numbers one
through twelve representing all tones of the scale including sharps
and flats.51 3
Beattie argued that there was no suggestion to combine
Guilford's teachings with those of Barnes and Eschemann and that
Guilford actually taught away from combining the traditional seven
letter scale with the twelve number numerical scale.5 14 The court
rejected this argument and agreed with the Board that these refer-
ences could be combined. 515 The court noted that as long as the
suggestion to combine the references is present in the art taken as a
whole, the law does not require that the reference be combined for
the reasons contemplated by the inventor. 51 6 In this case, the prior
art disclosure of the two numbering systems found in Beattie's ap-
plication and of the concept of combining two systems on one
marker rendered Beattie's invention obvious.5 17
While generally relevant to the suggestion to combine, In re
Jones5 18 also addressed a narrower issue of obviousness of particular
interest to chemical practitioners. 519 In Jones, the Federal Circuit re-
versed the Board's rejection of the claimed compound, which was a
novel salt of 2-methoxy-3,6-dichlorobenzoic acid commonly known
as "dicamba," as prima facie obvious merely because the claimed
compound was within the scope of a broadly disclosed genus.5 20 In
doing so, the court refused to endorse the Board's interpretation of
Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. 521 "that regardless of how
broad, a disclosure of a chemical genus renders obvious any species
that happens to fall within it. ' ' 522 In Merck, the claimed invention
covered a pharmaceutical composition for oral administration that
comprised the combination of amiloride hydrochloride and
hydrochlorothiazide in certain weight ratios.523 The prior art refer-
512. See id. (citing as prior art U.S. Patent No. 566,388 issued to Eschemann).
513. See id. (citing as prior art U.S. Patent No. 608,771 issued to Guilford, who noted that
traditional seven letter scale with sharps and flats was "perplexing and irrational").
514. Id. at 1312, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
515. Id. at 1312-13, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
516. Id
517. Id.
518. 958 F.2d 347, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
519. In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349-51, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941, 1942-44 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
520. Id. at 348, 351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44.
521. 874 F.2d 804, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975
(1989).
522. Jones, 958 F.2d at 350, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
523. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Lab., Inc., 874 F.2d 804,805-06, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843,
1844-45 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989).
9731993]
974 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW lyol. 42:909
ence disclosed the specific combination of amiloride and
hydrochlorothiazide as one of 1200 possible combinations of ingre-
dients.5 24 Therefore, in Merck, given the prior art disclosure, the
effort required to obtain the claimed combination of ingredients at
the particular weight ratios was well within the level of skill of a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art.525
In contrast, in Jones the claimed salt was not sufficiently similar in
chemical structure to the salts specifically disclosed in the primary
reference to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.5 26
Although some types of structural similarity have given rise to prima
facie obviousness, none of those types of structural similarities were
present in Jones.527 Moreover, the claimed salt was not specifically
disclosed as among the "potentially infinite genus of 'substituted
ammonium salts' of dicamba." 528s The PTO also sought to justify
combining the primary reference with secondary references on the
ground that the prior art genus in the primary reference would mo-
tivate one of ordinary skill in the art to use the amines in the secon-
dary references to obtain the claimed ammonium salt of dicamba.5 29
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the PTO's arguments by
finding no suggestion in the prior art to combine the references. 530
524. Id. at 806, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
525. Id at 807, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845-46 (noting that prior art patent instructed
person of ordinary skill in art that any of combinations would produce useful diuretic
formulation).
526. Jones, 958 F.2d at 350, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (stating that "[tihe lack of close
similarity of structure is not negated by the fact that the claimed salt is a member of the [prior
art reference's] broadly disclosed genus of substituted ammonium salts of dicamba").
527. Id.; see, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-94, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1900-02
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that similar properties of tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters in fuel
oil creates expectation that they will have similar chemical reactions), cert. &nied, 111 S. Ct.
1682 (1991); In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457, 460-61, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426, 429-30 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (holding obvious claim relating to single chemical compound useful as antidegradant in
rubber because evidence revealed no difference in properties between claimed compound and
prior art homologue); In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1343-44, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 406, 409
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding disclosure of ethyl ester and its usefulness in treatment of plant dis-
eases made structurally similar acid ester obvious when proposed for use as herbicide).
528. Id. at 350-51, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44 (stating that primary prior art refer-
ence cited against Jones did not specifically disclose claimed novel salt of dicamba but rather
disclosed genus of substituted ammonium salts of dicamba that encompassed claimed salt).
But see In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681-83, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 279-81 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
(involving potentially infinite prior art genus which, by preferences disclosed in that prior art,
narrowed to very limited class of only 20 compounds, including isomers, which anticipated
certain claims to compound within that narrowed class).
529. Jones, 958 F.2d at 351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. The cited prior art included an
article by Zorayan directed to shampoo additives, an article by Wideman teaching that the
amine used to make the claimed compounds is a byproduct of the production of morpholine,
and U.S. Patent No. 3,013,054 issued to Richter that disclosed the broad genus. Id. at 349, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
530. Id. at 351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944 (citing In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703, 705, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1257, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that "[tihe prior art must provide
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3. Secondary considerations
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Ortho-
paedics, Inc.,531 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the importance of
"secondary considerations" in determining whether an invention is
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.532 The court specifically cited long-
felt need, the failure of others to meet that need, and the commer-
cial success of the invention as objective evidence that a 3M patent
pertaining to an orthopaedic casting material formed by combining
a fiberglass substrate with a polyurethane resin was not obvious in
view of the prior art.533 JJO argued that the prior art disclosed the
resin and fiberglass substrate and that an article published in a trade
journal also suggested the resin-fiberglass substrate combination.53 4
The Federal Circuit dismissed the trade journal article as having
only disclosed in a "very general fashion" the use of fiberglass as a
possible substrate.53 5 The court then referred to secondary consid-
erations as persuasive evidence of the nonobviousness of the 3M
patent.53 6 First, the court concluded that there was a long-felt need
in the industry for a substitute to plaster-based casting systems,
which were slow to harden, heavy, nonporous, and which readily
broke down in water.5 7 Second, the major players in the casting
field had repeatedly attempted but failed to develop a fiberglass-
based cast substitute.5 8 Problems such as that of excessive foaming
were not solved until the 3M patent.55 9 Finally, JJO and others had
acknowledged market preference for 3M's patented fiberglass cast,
and evidence presented at trial established that 3M's fiberglass casts
were a commercial success even though they were more expensive
than competing plaster casts.540 The Federal Circuit held that these
one of ordinary skill in the art the motivation to make the proposed molecular modifications
needed to arrive at the claimed compound").
531. 976 F.2d 1559, 24 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
532. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1574-75, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also infra note 551
and accompanying text (giving example of Federal Circuit referring to secondary considera-
tion as supporting, at least in part, its holding).
533. See id. (discussing U.S. patent issued to Garwood and owned by 3M).
534. Id. at 1573, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
535. See id. (indicating court's view that "the article provides no guidance or detail as to
how to solve the problems overcome by the Garwood invention or how to construct a fiber-
glass cast with the beneficial properties achieved by the Garwood invention").
536. Id. at 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
537. Id. at 1574, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
538. Id. at 1563-64, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
539. See id. at 1563-64, 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325, 1334 (observing abandon-
ment by 3M's competitors of fiberglass as potential substrate because of inability to solve
problem of excessive foaming, which results during curing process, thereby clogging pores of
fiberglass).
540. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35.
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"real world" considerations of unsolved, long-felt need and com-
mercial success established that 3M's patent would not have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention. 54 1
4. Admissions as to obviousness
Courts may consider admissions made by an inventor either dur-
ing prosecution or at trial in determining whether a claimed inven-
tion was obvious over the prior art. In In re Hayes Microcomputer
Products,54 2 the Federal Circuit rejected the argument of the accused
infringer, Ven-Tel, that the inventor's trial testimony was an admis-
sion that the invention was obvious.543 The invention in question
pertained to a communication modem capable of switching opera-
tional modes upon receiving a specific escape code sequence. 544
The inventor, Heatherington, was asked at trial: "Is it: your testi-
mony ... that if you just tell somebody skilled in the art that you
wanted to have an escape sequence with a guardtime, it would be
obvious for them how to build it?" 545 Ven-Tel asserted that
Heatherington's affirmative reply to this question was an admission
of obviousness. 546 The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, con-
cluding that in the context of Heatherington's overall testimony, the
statement at issue was hardly an admission of obviousness.5 47 The
court also noted that Heatherington was addressing the adequacy of
the disclosure and was not admitting that the invention was
obvious. 548
As additional support for its nonobviousness conclusion, the
court made the following observations. First, Ven-Tel failed to
present evidence of similarities between the prior art and the claims
at issue. 549 Second, Ven-Tel did not cite any suggestions in the
prior art that modems be modified to detect the escape signal code
of the claimed invention. 550 Finally, the commercial success, the
541. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
542. 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
543. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1540, 25 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) 1241,
1250 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that inventor's testimony was "hardly an admission of
obviousness").
544. See id. at 1531-32, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243-44 (referring to U.S. Patent No.
4,549,302 owned by Hayes, and describing specific escape code sequence as consisting of one
second of guardtime, in which no data is sent, followed by escape code, and followed by
another second of guardtime).




549. Id. at 1540, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250-51.
550. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
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failure of others, and the fact that Hayes' escape code became the
industry standard suggested that the claimed invention was not
obvious. 551
5. Design patents
In In re Carlson,552 the Federal Circuit considered a design patent
for a symmetrical dual compartment bottle and held that the prior
art, which emphasized asymmetry, also encompassed symmetrically
designed dual compartment bottles and thus rendered the claimed
design obvious. 553 The first prior art reference showed a bottle de-
sign consisting of two attached containers divided by an asymmetri-
cal zig-zag line.554 A second reference showed a flask and drinking
glass holder combination contained within a smooth-walled
holder. 55 5 The second reference was asymmetrical in that the neck
heights of the flask and glass holder were different. 55 6 The Federal
Circuit rejected Carlson's argument that his symmetrical design was
nonobvious because the prior art stressed asymmetry. 557 The court
pointed out that since in this field of art bottles are deliberately
designed to be asymmetrical in order to create a distinctive, memo-
rable image, the "normal" or expected design is one of symme-
try.558 In short, the Federal Circuit remained unconvinced that the
difference in the design of a smooth-walled container and one with a
visible line of demarcation was a difference sufficient to establish the
unobviousness of Carlson's design as a whole.
D. Enablement, Written Description, Best Mode-35 U.S.C. § 112
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent spec-
ification contain a written description sufficient to enable a person
of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention. 559 The
specification must also disclose the best mode contemplated by the
inventor for carrying out the invention. 560 In 1992, the Federal Cir-
551. Id.
552. 983 F.2d 1032, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1992), amended on reh'g, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 1665 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 1993).
553. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1992), amended on reh'g, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1665 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 1993) (citing In re Cho,
813 F.2d 378, 382, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1663-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987) for proposition that
design patent application should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 when teachings of refer-
ences suggested overall appearance of claimed ornamental design).
554. Id at 1034, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209.
555. Id.
556. Id at 1035, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209.
557. Id at 1038-39, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
558. Id
559. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1988).
560. Id.
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cuit addressed these requirements, as well as their relationship to
6 of § 112.561
1. Written description
The Federal Circuit has stated that to satisfy the written descrip-
tion requirement a specification "must be sufficiently clear that per-
sons of skill in the art will recognize that [the patentee] made the
invention having [the claimed] limitations. ' 562 The Federal Circuit
held that the patentee satisfied this test in both In re Hayes Microcom-
puter Products563 and In re Spina.564
In Hayes, the patent at issue pertained to a communication modem
having an improved escape sequence recognition capability. 565 The
claims of the Hayes patent defined the modem as having a "timing
means for detecting each occurrence of a passage of a predeter-
mined period of time" and a "means, operative.., for detecting...
[a] predetermined sequence of... data signals and for causing said
modem to switch to said command mode. '56 6 The specification dis-
closed that a microprocessor was used in the modem and that the
escape sequence that caused the modem to switch between modes
of operation consisted of one full second of guardtime in which no
data is sent, followed by a predetermined escape command, fol-
lowed by another second of guardtime. 567 After Hayes sent the ac-
cused infringer, Ven-Tel, and other modem manufacturers a notice
of infringement of the Hayes patent, Ven-Tel filed a declaratory
judgment action for invalidity and noninfringement of the Hayes
patent.568 Hayes counterclaimed for infringement. 569 A jury re-
turned a verdict for Hayes, and the district court denied Ven-Tel's
motion forJNOV.570 Ven-Tel appealed the denial of its motion for
JNOV on the ground that the "timing means" and "means, opera-
tive" were not disclosed in the specification as required by 35 U.S.C.
561. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1988); see infra note 618 (relating text of § 112, 6).
562. Martin v. Mayer, 823 F.2d 500, 505, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 111 I,
1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (providing that whether written description requirement is met is
question of fact).
563. 982 F.2d 1527, 1536, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
that sufficient evidence exists to support conclusion that drawings were sufficient for skilled
artisan to understand subject matter of claimed invention).
564. 975 F.2d 854, 857, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1144-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
565. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1531,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,
1243 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
566. Id.
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§ 112, 1.57'
The Federal Circuit upheld the jury's verdict that the Hayes pat-
ent specification met the written description requirement of
§ 112.572 According to the court, substantial evidence (namely the
testimony of the inventor) supported the conclusion that one skilled
in the art would understand that the timing means was performed
by the microprocessor. 573 The court also rejected Ven-Tel's argu-
ment that to satisfy the written description requirement the specifi-
cation must list the actual program or firmware for implementing
the timing means. 574 The court observed that the specification suffi-
ciently disclosed the function of the firmware so that one of ordinary
skill in the art would know how to implement the microprocessor
timing means without the actual firmware listing.575 The Federal
Circuit also concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury's
conclusion that the "means, operative" limitation in the claims was
supported by the specification,5 76 based on the testimony of Hayes'
expert witness that the specification disclosed that a microprocessor
performs the "means, operative" function.577 In addition, a portion
of the specification discussed the microprocessor's programmed
functions. 578
In In re Spina,5 79 the Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in
interpreting claims drafted in means-plus-function form.580 During
prosecution, Spina copied a claim from the Barron patent to pro-
571. It at 1533, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. Ven-Tel also alleged that the "means,
operative" limitation did not satisfy § 112, 6, which requires means-plus-function claims to
have some structural support in the specification. Id.
572. IA-
573. See id at 1533-34, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245-46 (stating that "[d]isclosing a
microprocessor capable of performing certain functions is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of section 112, first paragraph, when one skilled in the art would understand what is intended
and know how to carry it out").
574. Id. at 1534, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245 (reporting Ven-Tel's argument that
microprocessor alone, without firmware, has no special functionality and thus does not suffi-
ciently describe invention).
575. Id Ven-Tel noted that the heart of the claimed invention was described in the speci-
fication in just 27 lines. Id The Federal Circuit dismissed Ven-Tel's implication, however,
noting that no length requirement exists for a disclosure because the adequacy of the descrip-
tion depends on its contents, not its length. Id.
576. Id at 1535, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (citingD.M.l., Inc. v. Deere &Co., 755 F.2d
1570, 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (holding that although some
structure for means-plus-function limitation must be disclosed in specification, inventor need
not disclose every means for implementing stated function).
577. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
578. Ia, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246-47.
579. 975 F.2d 854, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
580. In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 858, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Whether the specification contains a written description of the claimed invention is a question
of fact, subject to review under the clearly erroneous error standard. Id. at 857, 24
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1144 (citing Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1709, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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voke an interference proceeding. 58 The examiner and the Board
rejected Spina's claim on the ground that Spina's specification did
not sufficiently describe the additional structure necessary to sup-
port the "connecting means" limitation of the copied claim.58 2
Comparing Spina's disclosure of the "connecting means" with Bar-
ron's disclosure, the court concluded that the Barron patent's sup-
port for the means-plus-function limitation in question was not
significantly different from that in Spina's specification and that
Spina's disclosure was equivalent to Barron's "connecting
means." 58 3 The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board's find-
ing, noting that "[a] claim is not interpreted one way in light of the
specification in which it originally was granted, and another way in
light of the specification into which it is copied as a proposed inter-
ference count." 584
2. Enablement
To satisfy the § 112, 1 enablement requirement, the specifica-
tion must disclose enough information to allow "someone skilled in
the art to make and use" the claimed invention.5 85 In Brooktree Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. ,586 the defendant, Advanced Micro De-
vices (AMD), alleged that the Brooktree patent was invalid because
its disclosure was not enabling.58 7 AMD offered testimony from an
expert witness that the operation of the distributive capacitances
across the junctions of the transistor described in the specification
and shown in the figures of the Brooktree patent were "physically
impossible." 588 Brooktree's expert witness testified, however, that
although the figures depicted capacitors across the transistor's junc-
tions, no capacitors were actually present.589 Brooktree's expert ex-
plained that the capacitors were shown in the figures merely for the
purpose of presenting a model of the operation of the claimed cir-
cuit for two reasons, namely because a capacitance across the junc-
581. See id at 855, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143 (referring to U.S. Patent No. 4,844,252
issued to Barron).
582. Id. at 856, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
583. Id at 857-58, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
584. Id. at 858, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
585. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1988).
586. 977 F.2d 1555, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
587. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571-72, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (involving U.S. Patent No. 4,831,282, owned
by Brooktree, and pertaining to digital-to-analog conversion circuitry using P-type MOS
transistor).
588. Id. at 1571, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412. AMD also alleged that Brooktree's patent
lacked utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the patent was totally incapable of achieving a
useful result. Id.
589. Id at 1572-73, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
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tions was inherent in that type of transistor, and because it was
otherwise impossible to solve the circuit's operation mathemati-
cally.590 The jury returned a verdict that the specification was en-
abling.59' The Federal Circuit held that the issues of utility and
enablement in this case involved complex scientific principles that
should be determined by the trier of fact.592 Reviewing the testi-
mony of the respective expert witnesses and the totality of the evi-
dence presented, the court concluded that there was substantial
evidence on which a reasonable jury could have held the Brooktree
patent valid.593
3. Best mode
To establish that an inventor failed to disclose the best mode for
practicing an invention, the Federal Circuit requires a subjective de-
termination that the inventor contemplated a best mode of practic-
ing the invention at the time of patent application filing and an
objective determination that the specification concealed this best
mode.594 In 1992, the Federal Circuit in Shearing v. Iolab Corp.595
and In re Hayes Microcomputer Products596 considered whether there
was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that the patentee met the § 112 best mode requirement.
In Shearing, the patent pertained to a method of inserting into the
posterior chamber of the human eye an artificial lens equipped with
resilient curved strands (J-loops) for holding the lens in place be-
hind the pupil.597 Two methods were known for implanting an arti-
ficial lens into the eye, "inferior loop compression" and "superior
loop compression." 598 Iolab argued that Shearing concealed the
best mode for carrying out the claimed method by disclosing only
"inferior loop compression" and not the better method of "superior





594. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923, 927, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033,
1036 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that best mode disclosure is question of fact requiring consid-
eration of subjective and objective components).
595. 975 F.2d 1541, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
596. 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
597. Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1542, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1135
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
598. See id. at 1546, 24 U.S.P..2d (BNA) 1135 (defining "inferior loop compression" to
mean that only bottom (inferior) open-loops are bent in order to insert artificial lens into
recipient's eye, whereas "superior loop compression" means that top (superior) open-loops
as well as bottom open-loops are bent in order to insert artificial lens into eye).
599. Id.
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The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shearing, and the district
court denied Iolab's motion for JNOV.600
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Iolab's
JNOV motion, holding that the record contained substantial evi-
dence supporting the jury's verdict of no best mode violation.60 '
The court noted that Dr. Shearing's testimony established that he
had not conceived of a better way to practice the invention.60 2 Dr.
Shearing testified that when he filed the patent application he had
contemplated any method that would result in a correctly positioned
lens and did not consider one method better than any other.603 Dr.
Shearing also testified that he did not exclusively use superior loop
compression during the series of implantations prior to filing the
application.60 4 The Federal Circuit also noted that the specification
contained disclosure which suggested the superior loop compres-
sion method. 60 5 The court held that based on this evidence, a rea-
sonable jury could have found no best mode violation, thereby
justifying the district court's denial of Iolab's motion for JNOV.606
By concluding that a best mode attack may be blunted by showing
that the applicant did not know of or consider one method of prac-
ticing the invention better than any other,60 7 the court gave
credence to the proposition that an inventor's subjective intent can
play a critical role in the best mode analysis.608
Like its decision in Shearing, the Federal Circuit in Hayes indicated
that an inventor's subjective belief that one mode of practicing an
invention is no better than any other can be sufficient to rebut a best
mode attack. 60 9 In Hayes, the accused infringer, Ven-Tel, alleged
that the inventor, Heatherington, did not disclose the best way of
implementing the Hayes patent by failing to disclose the details of
the firmware.6 10 While the Federal Circuit agreed that Heather-







606. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
607. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
608. See id. (weighing heavily Shearing's testimony that he did not conceive that superior
loop compression was best mode of implementation).
609. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1537, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,
1248 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (relying on subjective inquiry into inventor's knowledge of best mode
of implementation).
610. Id. at 1536-37, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247-48 (indicating Ven-Tel's further allega-
tions that 11 features of commercial embodiment of Hayes patent were not disclosed in speci-
fication and were concealed as trade secrets).
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tion included storing a firmware code listing to run the
microprocessor, the court disagreed that disclosing the specific
firmware listing was necessary to satisfy the best mode require-
ment.6 1I Heatherington testified that he considered the best mode
of practicing the invention to be the storing of a firmware listing,
although not necessarily a listing of the instructions he actually
used, and that he did not consider one firmware program to be bet-
ter than any other program.612 Consequently, the court held that a
specific firmware listing was not needed to satisfy the best mode
requirement. 6' 3
Similarly, the court rejected Ven-Tel's argument that Heather-
ington failed to disclose the use of a software timer as the best mode
for implementing the timing means of the Hayes patent. 614 The
court noted that both hardware and software timers were disclosed
in the specification and that the inventor did not consider either
type of timer to be better than the other.615 Lastly, the court re-
jected Ven-Tel's argument that Heatherington's failure to disclose
the specific details of the escape command violated the best mode
requirement.6 16 The Federal Circuit found persuasive Heather-
ington's testimony that the specific details of the escape command,
such as the "-+ + +-" used to describe the escape code, were arbi-
trarily selected and therefore not considered part of the best
mode.6 17
4. Means-plus-function claims
Paragraph six of § 112 permits an element or limitation in a claim
to be expressed as a means for performing a function without recit-
ing the corresponding structure. 618 The interpretation of this para-
graph has sparked a conflict between the Federal Circuit and the
611. Id. at 1537-38, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49.
612. Id.
613. See id at 1537, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248 (citing In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809,
816-17, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 544 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981), which
stated that specific computer program need not be disclosed so long as specification reason-
ably outlines elements necessary to communicate concepts of particular program to one hav-
ing ordinary skill in art).
614. Id. at 1538, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
615. Id.
616. Id at 1538-39, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249-50.
617. Id.
618. Paragraph 6 of § 112 provides as follows:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112, T 6 (1988).
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PTO. In a recent series of cases involving appeals from the PTO,
the Federal Circuit has reversed the Board's interpretation of
means-plus-function clauses, holding that such claims cover the cor-
responding structure described in the specification and the
equivalents thereof.619 Notwithstanding Federal Circuit jurispru-
dence, the PTO asserts that, for patentability purposes, means-plus-
function clauses cover any structure capable of performing the
stated function.620
In 1992, two Federal Circuit opinions addressed § 112, 6, as it
applies to means-plus-function claims, but neither attempted to re-
solve the ongoing Federal Circuit-PTO conflict. In Arrhythmia Re-
search Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,621 the Federal Circuit
considered the patentability of "means for" claims containing math-
ematical algorithms and stated that "the statutory nature vel non of
[such] claims is determined with reference to the description [of the
invention] in the ... patent specification. ' 622 While the holding in
Arrhythmia is consistent with existing Federal Circuit case law,6 23 it
619. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (interpreting means-plus-function limitation to cover corresponding structure, mate-
rial, or acts described in specification and holding that Board failed to find that means of
petitioner's claim and means embodied in earlier device were structurally equivalent); In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1911-12 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding
that each means-plus-function claim is construed to cover corresponding structure and
equivalents thereof described in the specification). This is the same test the Federal Circuit
uses to determine the scope of means-plus-function claims for literal infringement purposes.
See, e.g., In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1540-41, 25 U.S.P.QJ2d 1241,
1251 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Literal infringement may be found when an accused device falls
within the asserted claims as properly construed."); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d
1570, 1575, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 236, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that sole question is
whether single means used is same as or equivalent of corresponding structure in patentee's
specification).
620. After the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bond, the PTO issued a directive making
clear that the Office interprets means clauses to cover any means for performing the recited
function, without regard to the structure disclosed in the specification. See Harry F. Manbeck,
Jr., Applicability of the Last Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to Patentability Determinations Before the
Patent and Trademark Office, 1134 TRADEMARKS OFFICIAL GAZETFE 633, 637-38 Uan. 7, 1992).
The Patent Office reasoned that despite In re Bond, the sixth paragraph of §i 112 does not
apply in proceeding before the Patent Office, and even if it does, it does not limit pending
claims to the specification and equivalents thereof, because the Patent Office is required to
give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation. Id. at 633.
621. 958 F.2d 1053, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
622. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1911-12 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
623. Compare Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060-61, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037-39 (reversing
invalidity of patent because use of mathematical formulae to describe structure and operation
of apparatus does not make it nonstatutory) with In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833, 15 U.S.P.Q02d
(BNA) 1566, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that statute requires that means-plus-function
limitation be construed to cover structure and equivalents) and In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370,
1375, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[E]ach means-plus-function defini-
tion shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure... and equivalents.").
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remains to be seen how the decision will influence current PTO
practice.
In a second case, In re Spina,624 the Federal Circuit considered the
interpretation of a means-plus-function claim copied to provoke an
interference, and reversed the Board's decision for failing to prop-
erly construe such a claim. 625 The Board had held that the claim
that Spina copied from the Barron patent to provoke an interference
was invalid because the claim was not supported by the specific
structure disclosed in Spina's specification. 626 Rather than over-
turning the Board for an overly broad interpretation of a means-
plus-function clause, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the
Board for an overly narrow interpretation of the means-plus-func-
tion claim at issue.627 The Federal Circuit held that because the
Board considered only the precise structures shown in the Spina
and Barron patents, the Board's interpretation of "connecting
means" was an improperly restrictive application of § 112, 6.628
The court concluded that the Board failed to consider structures
equivalent to those shown in Spina's application.629
The Federal Circuit has meanwhile agreed to in banc hearings in
two ex parte appeals from the PTO in which the interpretation of
§ 112, 6 for patentability purposes is at issue.630 It remains to be
seen whether these decisions will resolve the conflict between the
Federal Circuit and the PTO.63 1
624. 975 F.2d 854, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
625. In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854,856, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1144-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
626. Id The Board held that Spina's specification lacked structure supporting the "con-
necting means" limitation present in the copied claim. Ia In response, Spina argued that a
lip that was shown in the figures served as the connecting means that held the parts of the
apparatus together. Id
627. Ia, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
628. Id.
629. Ia
630. See In re Donaldson Co., 981 F.2d 1236, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (ordering hearing of
appeal from decision by Board); In re Alappat, 980 F.2d 1439, 1439-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (set-
ting issues to be addressed in rehearing involving interpretation of § 112, 6).
631. One commentator opines that the Federal Circuit might resolve the conflict by rec-
ognizing that different standards apply to means-plus-function claims depending on whether
the issue is patentability or infringement, similar to its approach to product-by-process claims
in Atlantic Thermoplastics. See Kenneth Adamo, The Double Standard-In re Bond, The Office, 35
U.S.C. § 112, f 6 and Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., 2 FED. Cm. BJ. 137, 179 (1992) (analyzing
application of Atlantic Thermoplastics' double standard to means-plus-function patentability ver-
sus validity claims). In an analogous manner, another Federal Circuit panel recently ex-
plained that "equivalency" under § 112, 6 is different than under the doctrine of
equivalence. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-43, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1993). According to the court in Valmont, "[iun the
context of section 112 .... an equivalent results from an insubstantial change which adds
nothing of significance to the structure, material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification."
Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. Equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents
involves the Graver Tank equitable tripartite function-way-result test in which equivalency re-
sults from an insubstantial change that adds nothing of significance to the claimed invention.
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E. Inventorship and Derivation-35 U.S.C § 116 and § 102(f)
1. Joint inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 116
In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co.,632 the
Federal Circuit interpreted joint inventorship under 35 U.S.C.
§ 116 to include a collaboration requirement. 63 3 Specifically, the
court held that the 1984 amendments to § 116 did not eliminate the
collaboration requirement in order for two or more individuals to
be considered joint inventors. 634 In Kimberly-Clark, P&G and K-C
each claimed priority of invention for the interfering claims in their
respective patents relating to disposable diapers. 635 P&G had
sought to antedate K-C's date of invention by arguing that the P&G
patent, originally attributed to Lawson, was in fact jointly invented
by Buell, Blevins, and Lawson, and thus entitled to an earlier inven-
tion date corresponding to Buell's work in March 1979 and Febru-
ary 1982.636 The district court, however, found that although
Lawson, Buell, and Blevins had all worked for P&G at that time,
Lawson worked alone and was unaware of the earlier work of Buell
or Blevins and absent a showing of collaboration among the would-
be co-inventors, P&G was not entitled to priority of invention. 63 7
On appeal, P&G argued that the 1984 amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 116 defined inventorship broadly and eliminated any collabora-
tion requirement. 638 Therefore, according to P&G, two or more
people could be joint inventors even though they did not know of
each other's work.639 Referring to the legislative history of the 1984
amendments, the Federal Circuit held that Congress did not intend
Id at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455; see infra notes 940-54 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) and doctrine of
equivalents).
632. 973 F.2d 911, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
633. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 915-17, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1925-26 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988). Section 116
provides:
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for
patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this
title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work
together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3)
each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 3383, 3384 (codi-
fied as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988)) (emphasis added to show text added by 1984
amendments).
634. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 915-17, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924-26.
635. Id. at 913, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922-23.
636. Id. at 912-13, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922-23.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 915, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925.
639. Id.
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to eliminate the collaboration requirement for joint inventorship. 640
Rather, Congress intended the 1984 amendments to clarify the law
of joint inventorship by codifying the principles stated in Monsanto
Co. v. Kamp.6 1 Despite P&G's arguments to the contrary, the Fed-
eral Circuit interpreted Monsanto as holding that joint inventorship
requires that the invention be a product of the collaboration of two
or more persons working toward the same end and producing the
invention by their combined efforts.642 The Federal Circuit also re-
jected P&G's argument that 35 U.S.C. § 103, 2, which accompa-
nied the 1984 amendments to § 116, eliminated the collaboration
requirement of § 116.63 The court held that § 103 was amended so
that, under certain conditions, prior work by a coworker would not
be treated as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and § 102(g) for
purposes of § 103 with respect to a later invention by another co-
worker, but did not eliminate the collaboration requirement for
joint inventorship.644 The court therefore affirmed the district court
with the explaination that "individuals [simply] can not be joint in-
ventors if they are completely ignorant of what each other has done
until years after their individual independent efforts." 5
2. Derivation of invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
In New England Braiding Co. v. A. W. Chesterton Co. ,646 the Federal
640. Id at 916-17, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925-26; see Patent Law Amendments Act of
1984, S. REP. No. 663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) (indicating desire to allow joint inventor-
ship in accordance with modern team research and adopting rationale of Monsanto Co. v.
Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (D.D.C. 1967), which held that invention is
joint if each makes some original, though partial contribution to final solution of problem,
despite differences in roles and relative contribution to solution).
641. 269 F. Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (D.D.C. 1967), cited in Kimberly-Clark, 973
F.2d at 916-17, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925-26.
642. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 916-17, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925-26 (interpreting
Monsanto as "clearly contemplat[ing] collaboration, working together, even if not physically").
643. Id.; see Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 104(a), 98 Stat.
3383, 3384 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) and precluding application of § 103 as bar to
patentability for subject matter developed by another, which qualifies as prior art only under
§ 102(f) and (g), where cited subject matter and claimed invention were owned by same per-
son or subject to obligation of assignment to same person at time of invention).
644. See Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 917, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926 (citing Innovation
and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 26-27, 61-62, 71-72 (1984) (reporting statements and written testimony of G. Mos-
singhoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and H. Manbeck, Jr., general counsel,
General Electric Company, that amendment would foster collaborative research and develop-
ment in accordance with General Motors v. Toyota, 667 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1981)); see also 130
CONG. REc. 28,071 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833-34 (describing congres-
sional intent to encourage sharing of information among research teams by eliminating provi-
sion that nonpublic earlier inventions of coworkers can be considered prior art for purposes
of § 103).
645. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 917, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
646. 970 F.2d 878, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Circuit addressed a derivation of invention issue in the context of an
appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction motion.647
The record established that Van Vleet, a Chesterton engineer, ex-
perimented with variously shaped braided packing used in sealing
rotating shafts.648 Champlin, another engineer, who was also a
Chesterton employee at that time, left Chesterton to start his own
braided packing business and eventually obtained patents on a trap-
ezoidal-shaped braided packing especially suited for preventing
fluid leakage around rotating shafts. 649 Champlin licensed his pat-
ents to the New England Braiding Company (NEBCO), who then
sued Chesterton for infringement and moved for a preliminary in-
junction. 650 In responding to the motion, Chesterton presented tes-
timony that Van Vleet was in fact the first true inventor, that
Champlin was involved with the development work while employed
by Chesterton, and that Champlin stated that if Chesterton did not
patent the packing, then he wanted to do so. 65 1 The district court
denied NEBCO's motion, finding that Champlin likely derived the
invention from Van Vleet.6 5 2
The Federal Circuit held that the district court was within its dis-
cretion when it made a credibility determination in finding
Champlin was likely not the first true inventor.653 The court specifi-
cally noted that it did not address whether derivation was proved.654
Instead, the Federal Circuit was only concerned with whether the
factual premise relied on by the district court was clearly erroneous
and whether denying the preliminary injunction was an abuse of the
district court's discretion.6 55
F. Double Patenting
1. Claim interpretation
Double patenting prevents an applicant from obtaining more than
one patent on a claimed invention, or on obvious variants of a
claimed invention, to thereby extend a patent term beyond the stat-
647. New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 884, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1626 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
648. New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 881, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
651. Id. at 883-84, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
652. Id. at 884, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
653. See id. (stating that credibility determinations are well within court's discretion when
ruling on preliminary injunction motion).
654. Id.
655. Id. at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
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utory seventeen-year period.656 Because double patenting is con-
cerned only with what a patent claims, the first step in determining
whether a double patenting problem exists is to interpret the patent
claims as a whole. In General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle
mbH,6 57 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of
invalidity based on obviousness-type double patenting because the
disclosure of the claims from the earlier-issued patent had been mis-
applied to the patent in suit.6 5 8 General Foods (GF) sought a decla-
ration that the Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH (SGK) patents
pertaining to decaffeination of coffee were not infringed, invalid for
obviousness-type double patenting, and unenforceable. 65 9 The dis-
trict court held claims 1 and 4 of SGK's U.S. Patent No. 4,260,639
(the '639 patent)660 invalid on the sole ground of obviousness-type
double patenting over the step (a) in claim 1 in SGK's earlier issued
and expired U.S. Patent No. 3,806,619 (the '619 patent).661
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court,662 holding that the
district court failed to consider whether the claims as a whole were
patentably distinct from each other.66 3 The court found the decaf-
656. See In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (describing policy supporting judicially created doctrine against double patenting).
657. 972 F.2d 1272, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
658. See General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1283, 23
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1839, 1847 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that trial court misapplied law by
focusing on information disclosed in first patent rather than determining what invention was
defined in earlier claim).
659. See id. at 1274, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (describing initiation of GF lawsuit that
took place after GF's status as exclusive licensee of number of SGK's U.S. patents pertaining
to decaffeination of raw coffee was modified to nonexclusive licensee 10 years after start of
license agreement for reasons not set forth in court's opinion).
660. See id. at 1276, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (providing claims of U.S. Patent No.
4,260,639). Claims 1 and 4 of the '639 patent read as follows:
1. A process for the decaffeination of raw coffee which comprises contacting the
raw coffee with water-moist carbon dioxide above its critical temperature and critical
pressure to effect removal of caffeine therefrom and recovering a substantially decaf-
feinated coffee, the amount of water in the carbon dioxide being sufficient to effectu-
ate said removal of the caffeine from the coffee.
4. A process as claimed in claim 1, in which the contact with the moist carbon
dioxide is effected for a period of from 5 to 30 hours.
Id.
661. Id. at 1273-74,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839-40; see id. at 1277,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1842 (describing claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,806,619, which relates to efficient process for
removing caffeine of 95% purity from supercritical carbon dioxide solvent that is used for
extraction of caffeine from raw coffee). Claim 1 of the '619 patent reads, in pertinent part:
'1. A process for obtaining caffein[e] from green coffee which comprises
a. contacting moist carbon dioxide in supercritical state with the coffee in a caf-
fein[e] absorption zone for absorption of caffein[e] by the moist carbon dioxide,
b. withdrawing the moist carbon dioxide from the absorption zone and contact-
ing it with water for extraction of caffein[e] ....
Id.
662. Id. at 1273, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
663. See id. at 1278-79, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843-44 (citing, in support of its holding,
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feination process of the '639 patent to be patentably distinct from
the caffeine recovery process of the '619 patent.6 64 The '639 patent
claims 1 and 4 defined a process of decaffeinating raw coffee with
supercritical water-moist carbon dioxide, but neither recited any-
thing about what happens to the caffeine.665 In contrast, the '619
patent claim 1 defined a nine-step process aimed at recovering 95%
pure caffeine from the coffee beans, or in other words, was directed
specifically to what happens to the caffeine during the decaffeination
process. 666 The two claimed inventions were thus separate, patent-
ably distinct inventions. 667 The court stated that "[t]he fact that it
may be desirable to use both inventions in the same commercial
process does not result . . . in any recognized form of double
patenting." 668
Although the Federal Circuit resolved the double patenting issue
by finding the two processes to be patentably distinct, the court also
proceeded to explain how the district court went awry in its analysis
of the obviousness-type double patenting issue. 669 In misconstruing
the claims, the district court failed to recognize that the inventions
claimed in the later-granted '639 patent were not protected by the
earlier-granted '619 patent claims because no '619 patent claim cov-
ered the 1639 decaffeination process. 670 According to the Federal
Circuit, the trial court's principal error was holding the '639 patent
claims obvious from step (a) in claim 1 of the '619 patent. 671 The
Federal Circuit explained that in double patenting determinations, a
claim is to be read as a whole in ascertaining what invention it de-
fines. 672 The district court also erred by using step (a) in claim 1 of
the '619 patent as though it were a prior art disclosure being applied
In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 621-22 (C.G.P.A. 1970) (holding that
there are two questions in double patenting: first, whether same invention is being claimed
twice, and if not, second, whether any claim in application defines merely obvious variation of
invention claimed in patent asserted as supporting double patenting); In re Braat, 937 F.2d
589, 594, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding rejection based on
double patenting to be in error if claims as whole are determined to be patentably distinct);
Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Opticon Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1580, 19 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) 1241,
1249 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that ultimate inquiry in determining double patenting is
whether claims as whole are patentably distinct); In re Borah, 354 F.2d 1009, 1017, 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 213, 220 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (holding that crux of obviousness-type double pat-
enting inquiry lies in comparison of claims)).
664. General Foods, 972 F.2d at 1278, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 1276, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
667. Id. at 1278, 23 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1844.
668. Id. at 1279, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
669. Id. at 1280-81, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845-46.
670. Id. at 1282, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846-47.
671. Id. at 1280, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
672. See id. (finding error by trial court in focusing on one step of patent claim, stating that
"step 1(a) is not 'claimed' in the '619 patent, nor is it 'patented' or 'covered'.. .. What is
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to support an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.673 The
Federal Circuit surveyed its precedent and explained that "the dis-
closure of a patent cited in support of a double patenting rejection
cannot be used as though it were prior art, even where the disclo-
sure is found in the claims."'6 74 Stated another way, "claims, being
definitions which must be read as a whole, do not 'claim' or cover or
protect all that their words may disclose. ' 675
2. Terminal disclaimers
To overcome an obviousness-type double patenting rejection,
patent applicants frequently file terminal disclaimers shortening the
term of a second patent to coincide with the term of the first issued
patent over which the rejection lies. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Smith,676 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle that a volunta-
rily filed terminal disclaimer does not act as an estoppel or admis-
sion that the claimed invention was obvious in view of a prior
claimed invention.677 According to the Federal Circuit, a terminal
disclaimer merely fixes an earlier date for the patent to expire.678
The disclaimer does not "tie the validity of... [one] patent with...
any other patent."6 79
An appellee, American Home Products (AHP), owned U.S. Patent
No. 3,959,322 (the '322 patent), which pertained to chemical com-
pounds used in oral contraceptives. 680 The claims of the '322 pat-
ent defined a subgenus of the genus defined in the claims of the
earlier issued U.S. Patent No. 3,850,911 (the '911 patent).681 A ter-
patented in claim 1 of the '619 patent is a 9-step caffeine recovery process, nothing more and
nothing less.").
673. Id. at 1281, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
674. See id, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (citing In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 594 n.5, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1293 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that patent disclosure must not
be used as prior art); In re Vogel, 442 F.2d 438, 441, 164 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 619, 622 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (same); In re Plank, 399 F.2d 241, 242, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(same)).
675. Id. at 1274, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
676. 959 F.2d 936, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 1103-
17 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to attorney's fees issue); infra notes
1221-30 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to modifying permanent injunc-
tions issue).
677. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 941-42, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1119, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Quad Envtl. Technologies Corp. v. Union Sanitary
Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392, 1394-95 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
terminal disclaimer is not admission of obviousness for invention claimed in later-filed
application)).
678. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
679. Id.
680. Id. at 937, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21 (describing as relevant, claims 5, 19, 40,
and 43 of '322 patent, all of which define class of carbon-based chemical compounds with
distinctive four-ring structure consisting of three hexagonal rings and one pentagonal ring).
681. Id. at 941, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (reporting that in addition to '322 patent,
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minal disclaimer set the claims of the '322 patent to expire concur-
rently with the '911 patent on November 26, 1991.682 Ortho, the
appellant, filed a declaratory judgment action against AHP to de-
clare the '322 patent invalid, and AHP counterclaimed for infringe-
ment.68 3 After a bench trial, the district court held that Ortho failed
to prove patent invalidity for double patenting or obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.684
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that a voluntarily filed termi-
nal disclaimer was not an admission of obviousness-type double pat-
enting.685 Ortho had argued that because the terminal disclaimer
was an admission that the '322 patent claims were obvious variants
of the '911 patent claims, the '322 patent claims were also obvious
variants of, and thus invalid, over claims in another patent over
which the '911 claims were invalid for double patenting.686 The
Federal Circuit rejected Ortho's "indirect" obviousness-type double
patenting defense, and held that the terminal disclaimer only short-
ened the term of the '322 patent to coincide with the '911 patent,
nothing more.687 Therefore, even if the '911 patent claims were in-
valid for double patenting over claims in another Ortho patent, the
'322 patent claims were not invalid under double patenting princi-
ples over claims in the other patent merely because the '322 patent
was voluntarily terminally disclaimed to expire with the '911
four other patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 3,407,217, 3,547,909, 3,391,165, and 3,417,081,
originated from the '911 patent).
682. Id
683. Iad at 937, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (describing declaratory judgment action by
Ortho andJohnson &Johnson, Ortho's parent company and infringement counterclaims by
AHP).
684. Idl at 938, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. Before trial, the district court granted AHP
a preliminary injunction that prevented Ortho from further activity related to the making,
using, or selling of Ortho's steroid, norgestimate. Id. The preliminary injunction prohibited
Ortho from using any data generated from activity related to its norgestimate product, includ-
ing the transmission of data to any foreign affiliates or any third party except the FDA for
agency approval. Id. After trial, the district court granted AHP a permanent injunction. Id.
The district court, however, refused to continue prohibiting Ortho from transmitting data
generated from the use, sale, or manufacture of norgestimate-containing products to Ortho's
foreign affiliates. Id. at 940, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122. The district court also refused
AHP's request to extend the injunction for two years past the expiration of the '322 patent. Id.
685. Id. at 941, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24.
686. lId, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (stating that Ortho's estoppel argument relied on
Quad Envtl. Technologies Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (holding that terminal disclaimer filed was admission that estopped patentee from
arguing nonobviousness), rev'd, 946 F.2d 870, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
The Federal Circuit announced its decision in Quad Environmental shortly after the oral argu-
ment in Ortho. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 941-42, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
687. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 941-42, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24 (citing Quad Envtl.
Technologies Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392,
1394-95 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which held that filing terminal disclaimer raises neither presump-
tion nor estoppel on merits of rejection).
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patent.688
Citing Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Systems, Inc. ,689 Ortho
also directly attacked claim 1 of the '322 patent on the basis that if
one claim in a patent is held invalid for double patenting then,
whether asserted or not, all claims residing in the same patent are
also invalid.690 The Federal Circuit, however, held that Gerber was
not controlling because in Gerber, only two claims were allegedly in-
fringed, and each claim was invalid for double patenting, whereas in
Ortho AHP was not asserting all of the '322 patent claims.691 The
court thus refused to extrapolate from Gerber the proposition that all
claims are invalid when only one unasserted claim is found invalid
for double patenting.692 To do otherwise would flout 35 U.S.C.
§ 282, which states patent claims are presumed valid, and each claim
is considered independently of the other claims in the same pat-
ent.693 Accordingly, even if unasserted claim 1 of the '322 patent
was invalid because of double patenting, it would not necessarily
require invalidating the remaining contested '322 patent claims.694
Ortho further asserted that the '322 patent specification included
examples disclosing, as starting materials for the '322 claimed com-
pounds, compounds claimed in still other AHP patents, and by do-
ing so AHP admitted those starting materials were also claimed in
the '322 patent.695 The court was not persuaded by this argument,
however, because the claims, not the specification, define the inven-
tion for purposes of double patenting determinations. 696
688. Id.
689. 916 F.2d 683, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
690. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 942, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 (citing Gerber Garment Tech-
nology, Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 686, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1439 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)). The Federal Circuit noted that AHP had not asserted claim I against Ortho. Id
Ortho sought to have claim 1 declared invalid for double patenting, asserting that if claim I is
invalid then all claims of the '322 patent are invalid. Id.
691. Id- (citing Gerber, 916 F.2d at 685, 689, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437, 1441).
692. Id. (citing Gerber, 916 F.2d at 689, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441). In Gerber, the prior
patent had already expired before the later-issued patent claims were held invalid for obvious-
type double patenting. Id. The later-issued patent could not be saved by a terminal dis-
claimer. Id.
693. Id (distinguishing effect of terminal disclaimer during patent prosecution when pre-
sumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not apply); see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) (pro-
viding that patent shall be presumed valid and that each claim of patent shall be presumed
valid independently of validity of other claims).
694. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 942, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 282 as
requiring that each individual claim of patent stands alone, and finding that merely invalidat-
ing one claim would not invalidate remaining claims of patent).
695. Id. at 942-43, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124-25 (referring to Ortho's assertion in
separate actions of obviousness-type double patenting over other AHP patents in addition to
'911 patent). The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that there was no sug-
gestion in the art to modify the compounds claimed in the other AHP patents to achieve the
compounds claimed in the '322 patent. Id. at 943, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124-25.
696. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
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G. New Matter-35 U.S.C. § 132
Under 35 U.S.C. § 132, an applicant cannot introduce new matter
into a patent application. 697 The difficulty arises in determining ex-
actly what constitutes new matter. In Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., the Federal Circuit, relying on the presumption of
validity, held that language added to an application without the pat-
ent examiner's objection did not constitute new matter. 698 Brook-
tree alleged that AMD infringed its patent that pertained to a device
for simultaneously reading and writing data to a computer memory
cell. 699 In its defense, AMD challenged the validity of the Brooktree
patent on the ground that the phrase "for video display" was new
matter improperly added to the preamble of the claims of the
Brooktree patent, because the application as originally filed no-
where disclosed the invention's use in video display.700 Brooktree
explained, however, that the phrase "for video display" was merely
explanatory and that the patent examiner had allowed the language
without objection. 70 1
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the jury, in
finding in favor of Brooktree, reasonably applied the law as ex-
plained in the uncontested instructions to the facts,70 2 The court
commenced its analysis with the comment that what constitutes
"new matter" depends on the facts of each case. 703 Of particular
importance in this case was the fact that the examiner allowed the
additional language without objection. 70 4 The court then held that
the presumption of patent validity clothes an examiner's decision to
allow amendments without objections with " 'an especially weighty
presumption of correctness.' "705 Therefore, a reasonable jury
could have concluded that "for video display" was not new mat-
ter.70 6
697. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1988) ("No amendment [to a patent application] shall introduce
new matter into the disclosure of the invention.").
698. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574-75, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1414-15 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
699. Id. at 1561, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
700. See id. at 1573-74, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413-14 (describing invention as dual-
port ten-transmitter SRAM core cell with two-stage sense amplifier that achieves operation at
extremely high speeds by making possible simultaneous reading and writing of data to single
ten-transistor memory cell).
701. Id. at 1573, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
702. Id. at 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414-15.
703. Id. at 1574, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
704. See id. (indicating that other relevant facts to consider include nature of disclosure,
state of art, and nature of added matter).
705. Id. at 1574-75, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376,
1385 n.5, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279, 286 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
706. Id. at 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414-15.
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III. INTERFERENCES UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 135
A. Application of Interference Rules
In Huston v. Ladner,70 7 the Federal Circuit held that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in finding that unsupported assertions of
attorney negligence did not satisfy the required "good cause" under
37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b). 708 According to the court, the PTO's interfer-
ence rules would become meaningless if an attorney's negligence
could constitute good cause for failing to meet a PTO requirement
because "parties could regularly allege attorney negligence in order
to avoid an unmet requirement." 70 9 Huston sought to provoke an
interference with a patent issued to Ladner.710 Huston's then lead
counsel submitted evidence under 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) to establish
prima facie priority over Ladner. 711 The examiner held that Hus-
ton's evidence did not establish priority over Ladner, declared an
interference, and concurrently issued a show cause order to Hus-
ton. 712 Huston replaced its lead counsel and filed a response to the
show cause order accompanied with additional declarations and affi-
davits under 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b). 7 13 To satisfy the "good cause"
requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b), Huston asserted that his origi-
nal attorney misrepresented his competence and ability in interfer-
ence matters and was grossly negligent in filing the original
707. 973 F.2d 1564, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
708. Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1567, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir.
1992); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b) (1992) (describing procedures for summary judgment against
applicant by patent examiner, including provision that additional evidence will not be
presented unless applicant can show "good cause" why evidence was not initially presented
with evidence filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b)).
709. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1567, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. But see id. at 1572, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (Newman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that circumstances of this
case, which judge characterized as extreme, would not open doors to careless litigants).
710. Id. at 1565, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
711. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (1992) (prescribing that applicant seeking declaration of
interference between its application and issued patent and having effective filing date more
than three months after effective filing date of patent must submit evidence demonstrating
that applicant is prima facie entitled to judgment of priority relative to patentee); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE § 2308.02 (5th ed. 1983) [hereinafter MPEP] (requiring applicant to state with particu-
larity basis for priority judgment before interference will be declared).
712. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1565, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912; see 37 C.F.R § 1.617(a)
(1992) (providing that if evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) is insufficient to es-
tablish that applicant is entitled to prima facie priority judgment, then interference is declared
and order requiring applicant to show cause why summary judgment should not be entered is
concurrently issued); MPEP, supra note 711, § 2317, at 2300-29 (describing summary judg-
ment procedures).
713. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1565, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912; see 37 C.F.R § 1.617(b)
(1992) (stating that additional evidence on priority issue will not be considered unless appli-
cant shows good cause why additional evidence was not previously submitted with original
section 1.608(b) response); MPEP, supra note 711, § 2317, at 2300-29 (relating that PTO in-
tends to use strict standard in requiring "good cause" showing and that ignorance by party or
counsel of provisions of rules or requirements of law will not constitute "good cause").
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submission under 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b). 714
The Board did not find "good cause" under § 1.617(b) based on
the attorney's alleged misrepresentation of competence because
Huston failed to put forth evidence supporting the claim that his
first attorney was incompetent. 715 Relying on Hahn v. Wong,716 the
Board added that an attorney's ignorance of the law is not "good
cause." 7 17 The Board then found that Huston's response to the ex-
aminer's show cause order did not include a showing that the addi-
tional evidence was unavailable at the time of the initial response, a
showing that would have been a valid excuse. 718 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit held that the Board did not err in interpreting the
rules and rejected Huston's equity-based argument that because he
did not knowingly and freely acquiesce to the attorney's conduct, he
should not suffer as a result. 719 In doing so, the court cited Link v.
Wabash Railroad Co.720 for the proposition that a party involved in
litigation cannot avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of
its freely selected attorney.7 2 1
The dissent argued that the Board's decision was an improperly
punitive action, wrongly visited on the client. 722 According to the
dissent, "[glood cause is an equitable term, and must be determined
in light of all the circumstances, with due attention to justice." 72 3
The dissent cited a number of authorities where "good cause" was
established when an attorney intentionally misrepresented facts and
the client justifiably relied on the misrepresentations to his or her
detriment.724 Consequently, the dissent concluded that the Board
714. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1565, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
715. Id. at 1566, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
716. 892 F.2d 1028, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
717. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1566, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912 (citing Hahn v. Wong, 892
F.2d 1028, 1034, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1989), which held that failure by
Hahn's counsel to fully appreciate need for corroborating evidence did not constitute good
cause for failure to submit that evidence with initial filing). In her dissent, Judge Newman
pointed out that the attorney was in fact not ignorant of the law, given that the examiner twice
told the attorney what the law was. Id. at 1569, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that Board's conclusion on this issue was in error as being contrary to
evidence).
718. Id. at 1566, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912-13. Judge Newman's dissent criticized the
majority for apparently making good cause a predicate on a showing as to why evidence was
unavailable when good cause should instead be interpreted more broadly by taking all the
circumstances into consideration. Id. at 1571-72, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1917 (Newman,J.,
dissenting).
719. Id. at 1566-67, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
720. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
721. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1567, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962), which held that attorney's failure to attend pretrial confer-
ence, resulting in dismissal of case by judge, did not impose unjust penalty on petitioner).
722. Id. at 1567-72, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-17 (Newman, J., dissenting).
723. Id. at 1571, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
724. Id. at 1570-71, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916-17; see, e.g., Jackson v. Washington
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abused its discretion because Huston did not cause the errors and in
fact acted to correct them, and because public policy favors resolu-
tion by litigation rather than default judgment, especially in cases
where dismissal results in a forfeiture of property rights. 725
In Gerritsen v. Shirai,726 the Federal Circuit considered whether the
Board correctly held that Gerritsen violated 37 C.F.R. § 1.662(b) 727
by failing to add a reissue application to an ongoing interference,
even though the reissue application was filed after the close of the
preliminary motion period.728 The court also considered whether
the Board's sanction under 37 C.F.R. § 1.616 for this violation was
appropriate.729
Applicant Shirai provoked an interference with the Gerritsen pat-
ent by copying a claim from the Gerritsen patent. 730 Eleven days
after the close of the preliminary motions period, Gerritsen filed a
reissue application for the patent involved in the interference, ad-
ding thirteen claims to the original patent.731 Gerritsen notified
Shirai and the examiner-in-chief that he filed a reissue application,
but failed to move to add the application to the interference. 73 2
When Gerritsen surrendered its patent for the reissue patent, the
examiner-in-chief redeclared the interference and designated the
thirteen reissue claims as additional claims corresponding to the in-
terference count.733 The examiner-in-chief also determined that
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that where client does not know-
ingly and freely acquiesce in his or her attorney's conduct but instead is led to believe that
attorney is industrious, dismissal punishes client and not lawyer and therefore is not re-
quired); In re Lonardo, 17 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1455, 1458-59 (Comm'r Patents & Trademarks
1990) (holding that attorney conduct was not charged to applicant because attorney inten-
tionally deceived applicant and petition to revise application was granted). The majority in
Huston dismissed these cases as nonbinding precedent, however. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1567, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
725. Huston, 973 F.2d at 1572, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
726. 979 F.2d 1524, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
727. 37 C.F.R. § 1.662(b) (1992). Section 1.662(b) states:
If a patentee involved in an interference files an application for reissue during the
interference and omits all claims of the patent corresponding to the counts of the
interference, judgment may be entered against the patentee. A patentee who files an
application for reissue other than for the purpose of avoiding the interference shall
timely file a preliminary motion under § 1.633(h), or show good cause why the mo-
tion could not have been timely filed or would not be appropriate.
Id.
728. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1526, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912, 1914 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
729. Id.;see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (1992) (providing list of sanctions that Board may impose
against party who fails to comply with regulations or any order entered by examiner-in-chief
or Board).
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Gerritsen violated § 1.662(b).734 Furthermore, upon final hearing,
the Board ordered as a sanction under § 1.616 that Gerritsen was
not entitled to the claims added to the reissue patent.7115
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that Gerritsen
violated § 1.662(b) by failing to move to add the reissue application
to the interference. 73 6 Contrary to Gerritsen's argument, the Fed-
eral Circuit refused to construe § 1.662(b) narrowly as applicable to
only reissue applications filed during the preliminary motions pe-
riod.737 The rule, § 1.662(b), merely "requires a preliminary mo-
tion, timely or otherwise, to add a reissue application to an
interference. ' 738 Therefore, the court concluded that Gerritsen
could and should have filed a belated preliminary motion to add the
reissue application to the interference. 73 9
Gerritsen argued that a belated preliminary motion would unduly
delay the interference proceedings because the examiner-in-chief
would have to set another preliminary motion period to allow Shirai
to contest the patentability of the reissue claims. 740 While the Fed-
eral Circuit conceded that such a scenario may result, it noted that
the examiner-in-chief has the discretion to order a delay.74 1 Gerrit-
sen's failure to make a prompt though belated preliminary motion
usurped the examiner-in-chief's discretionary authority. 742 The
Federal Circuit also rejected Gerritsen's argument that the Board's
interpretation of 37 C.F.R. § 1.662(b) unduly restricts the time in
which a patentee may file a reissue application.743 According to the
court, "[t]he Board merely required Gerritsen... to make a belated
preliminary motion and good cause showing after they had filed an
application for reissue. But the determination of when to file a reis-
734. See id. (indicating that examiner-in-chief also issued Gerritsen order to show cause
why sanctions under 37 C.F.R. § 1.616 should not be imposed and found unresponsive Ger-
ritsen's reply that timely motion to add reissue application to interference could not have
been made because preliminary motions had closed).
735. Id. Shirai did not file a brief on appeal. Id. Instead, the Commissioner appeared as
amicus curiae in favor of upholding the Board's sanctions. Id. Gerritsen argued that because
Shirai did not file a brief, Gerritsen was entitled to a reversal of the Board's ruling on the
ground that there was no longer any controversy between the parties. Id. The Federal Cir-
cuit, however, held that Shirai's failure to submit a responsive brief did not require that the
Board's decision be reversed. Id. at 1527, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. The court stated
that "[its] duty to review the case for reversible error does not turn on whether the appellees
filed a brief." Id.
736. Id. at 1530-31, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917-18.
737. Id at 1529-30, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
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sue application remains with the patentee. '7 44
The Federal Circuit next considered the appropriateness of the
Board's sanction)' 45 To do so, the Federal Circuit had to define, for
the first time, its standard of review of a Board's decision which se-
lected and imposed sanctions under 37 C.F.R. § 1.616.746 The
court held that the abuse of discretion standard was the appropriate
standard of review.747 It based this conclusion on several factors.
First, § 1.616, by its language, gives the examiner-in-chief and the
Board discretionary authority to decide whether sanctions are ap-
propriate and, if so, what the sanctions should be. 748 Second, the
court noted that this approach was consistent with the regulatory
scheme for conducting interferences. 749 The court reasoned that
"[a] narrow standard of review would promote the efficient determi-
nation of interferences . . . [and] gives proper recognition to the
interest of the Board and the examiner-in-chief in maintaining con-
trol over the . . . interference proceedings. ' 75 0 Third, the court
noted that the abuse of discretion standard is consistent with settled
law on judicial review of discretionary agency actions. 751 Finally,
the court found support for its conclusion that the abuse of discre-
tion standard was appropriate by analogizing its review of the
Board's discretionary decision with its appellate review of a district
court's discretionary decision.752
The Federal Circuit stated that the Board has abused its discre-
tion when the Board's decision: "(1) is clearly unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3)
rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) follows from a record
that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base
its decision." 753 Applying this abuse of discretion standard, the
744. Id. at 1531, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917-18.
745. IL at 1527, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
746. kd; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.616 (1991) (providing that appropriate sanctions may in-
clude holding that certain facts have been established in interference, precluding party from
filing motion or preliminary statement, precluding party from presenting or contesting partic-
ular issue, precluding party from requesting, obtaining, or opposing discovery, and granting
summary judgment in interference).
747. See Gerritsen, 979 F.2d at 1527-28, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (noting that when
decision pursuant to permissive statute concerns only PTO practice, Federal Circuit uses
abuse of discretion standard of review).
748. Id.
749. Ic at 1528, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
750. lId
751. ItL
752. IL, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
753. Id at 1529, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1039, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating
that appellate court may find abuse of discretion if lower court's decision "rests on an errone-
ous interpretation of the law or on clearly erroneous factual underpinnings")); Heat & Con-
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Federal Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by relying
on clearly erroneous findings of fact to support its choice of sanc-
tions.754 The court noted, for example, that the Board found as a
fact that Gerritsen attempted to circumvent the authority of the
Board by obtaining a reissue patent with claims that defined the
same invention as the interfering claims of the original patent with-
out filing a motion to add the reissue application to the interfer-
ence. 755 This finding was clearly erroneous because Gerritsen sent
copies of the reissue application to the examiner-in-chief and Shirai,
which, in the court's view, was evidence that Gerritsen did not in-
tend to obscure its actions or intentionally violate § 1.662(b). 756
The Board's further finding that Shirai was substantially prejudiced
by Gerritsen's nonfeasance was also clearly erroneous. 757 Gerrit-
sen's only sanctionable conduct was the failure to file a belated pre-
liminary motion and, therefore, Shirai was prejudiced only to the
extent that had the motion been filed and entered, Shirai would
have had opportunity to challenge the reissue claims.758 It was
clearly erroneous for the Board to find that Gerritsen's failure
caused Shirai to miss the opportunity to raise issues with respect to
the new reissue claims. 759 Finally, the Board's conclusion that re-
opening the preliminary motions period was against public interest
was also clearly erroneous. 760 Had Gerritsen adhered to § 1.662(b)
by making a belated motion and good cause showing, the Board
may still have reopened the preliminary motions period, which was
beyond Gerritsen's control.761
The Federal Circuit found further support for its conclusion by
comparing the Board's sanction with the dismissal of a civil action
for discovery abuse under rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 762 The court noted that before appellate courts
sustain a dismissal order, they have required a showing of egregious
behavior such as willful misconduct, bad faith, or fraud.763 The rec-
trol, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022, 228 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 926, 930 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (citing same four factors of abuse of discretion as Geritsen court, yet also discussing
deference generally given to district court decisions).
754. I. at 1532, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918-19.







762. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
763. Id. (citing Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
drastic sanctions require showing of "willfullness, bad faith, or fault"); Minotti v. Lensink, 895
F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring showing of willfulness to justify sanction of dismissal);
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ord in Geritsen contained no such evidence of egregious conduct. 7 4
As a result, the court concluded that it could not uphold the Board's
choice of sanctions.765
B. Preclusive Effect of Interference Judgments
It is generally recognized that a losing party to an interference
proceeding cannot obtain a patent on a claim that is patentably in-
distinguishable from the subject matter of the lost interference
count.76 6 This principle was called into question in In re Deckler,767
where the Federal Circuit decided whether the doctrine of In re
Hilmer768 renders an interference judgment, which is based on an
earlier-filed foreign patent application, applicable to bar the losing
party from patenting the subject matter of the lost count. The Fed-
eral Circuit in Deckler rejected the view that the Hilmer doctrine was
applicable. Instead, the court applied the principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, and held that the losing party in an interfer-
ence is not entitled to patent claims that are admittedly patentably
indistinguishable from the claim involved in the interference, even
when the interference judgment is based on an earlier-filed foreign
patent application.769 Under the "old" interference rules, Deckler
lost an interference to Grataloup, which was awarded priority based
on its foreign priority patent application.770 A patent was subse-
quently issued to Grataloup with a claim corresponding to the inter-
ference count.771 Deckler's application was returned to ex parte
prosecution and Deckler presented claims patentably indistinguish-
Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing appropriate-
ness of harsh sanctions for willful disobedience)).
764. Gerritsen, 979 F.2d at 1532, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
765. Id.
766. See Stoudt v. Guggenheim, 651 F.2d 760, 764, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359, 363
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (discussing res judicata effect of final decisions of PTO in interference pro-
ceeding); Exparte Tytgat, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 907, 910-12 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985) (re-
jecting patent claim as indistinct from earlier claim to avoid subjecting winning party to
repeated interference actions); Blackford v. Wilder, 28 App. D.C. 535, 542, 550-51 (1907)
(holding that final judgment in interference is conclusive of all matters which were adjudi-
cated and also of matters which might have been adjudicated).
767. 977 F.2d 1449, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
768. 359 F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Hilmer 1); see also In re
Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1112-13, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255, 258-59 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Hilmer I1)
(establishing Hilmer doctrine that for purposes of establishing U.S. patent as effective prior art
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), patent's effective filing date is date it is filed in United States, not its
foreign priority filing date).
769. See In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452-54, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448, 1449-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (rejecting view that Hilmer doctrine is applicable to determination in interference
judgment).
770. Id. at 1452, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
771. I at 1450, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
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able from the interference count lost to Grataloup. 772 The Board
affirmed the examiner's rejection of several of Deckler's claims
based on the preclusive effect of the interference judgment. 773
Consistent with the policies effectuated by res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel, the Federal Circuit held that the Board properly ap-
plied the interference judgment to Grataloup to reject Deckler's
new claims defining the same patentable invention. 774 According to
the court, the Board's decision "constituted a permissible applica-
tion of settled principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel" be-
cause that judgment decided which party was entitled to claim the
patentable subject matter defined by the interference court.775 The
court noted that it had previously applied interference estoppel to
reject claims that were patentably indistinct from those in an inter-
ference that the applicant had lost.776 The Federal Circuit cau-
tioned against the "unfortunate consequences" that would
otherwise follow if the interference judgment was not given preclu-
sive effect against Deckler.777 One such consequence would be the
declaration of a second interference between the parties involving a
priority contest over subject matter identical to the count in the
original interference. 778 The court rejected Deckler's assertions
that the discretionary authority of the Commissioner under 35
U.S.C. § 135(a) to announce an interference would preclude this re-
sult, noting that the Commissioner had conclusively stated that a
second interference would be declared. 779
772. Id.
773. Id. Deckler conceded that the claims on appeal were not patentably distinct from the
interference count. Id. at 1451, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
774. Id. at 1450-51, 24 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1448-49.
775. See id at 1452, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (providing that judgment in action
precludes relitigation of claims on issues that were or could have been raised in that proceed-
ing); see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (asserting that
final judgment on merits should stand to avoid creating uncertainty and confusion); Montana
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (holding that final judgment on merits bars
further claim by parties based on same claim); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475-
76, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that finality ofjudgments is
essential to maintenance of social order).
776. Deckler, 977 F.2d at 1452, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (citing In re Kroekel, 803
F.2d 705, 790-91, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that claim was
properly rejected under doctrine of interference estoppel because patent applicant's claim
was not patentably distinct from count lost in interference proceeding); Woods v. Tsuchiya,
754 F.2d 1571, 1579, 1580-82, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 11, 16, 17-18 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that
estoppel by judgment prevents losing party in previous interference between same parties
from making any patentably indistinct claim in new proceeding), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825
(1985)).
777. See Deckler, 977 F.2d at 1450-51, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448-49 (finding that
Grataloup should receive priority of invention in earlier interference judgment and rejecting
Deckler's appeal on ground of interference estoppel).
778. Id
779. IM.
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The Federal Circuit also held that the Hilmer doctrine,780 which
provides that under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) a U.S. patent is effective
prior art as of the date it was filed in the United States but not as of
its foreign priority date, did not preclude a rejection based on the
interference judgment.781 The fact that the interference judgment
against Decider was predicated on a foreign filing date awarded to
the prevailing party was not the determining factor.78 2 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that although the facts of Hilmer and In re McKel-
lin,7 83 cases on which Deckler relied, were similar to the present
case, the stated grounds for those decisions were quite different. 784
In Hilmer and McKellin, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals reversed obviousness rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which
accorded the prevailing interference party's patent prior art status
as of its foreign filing date.785 In Deckler, the Federal Circuit ob-
served that the Board applied the principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel, rather than § 103, in rejecting Deckler's claims. 78 6
Therefore, Deckler was distinguishable from Hilmer and McKellin.787
IV. INFRINGEMENT-35 U.S.C. § 271
A. Claim Interpretation and Construction
The Federal Circuit has continued to apply the traditional two-
step analysis in determining whether an accused device infringes the
claims of a patent.78 8 First, the language of the patent claims is in-
780. See Hilmer 1, 359 F.2d 852, 882-83, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 480, 499-500 (C.C.P.A.
1966) (holding that congressional intent supports doctrine that filing date in United States
will apply in determining prior art, rather than foreign filing date); Hilmer II, 424 F.2d 1108,
1112-13, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255, 258-59 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reasserting that inventor would
not get benefit of foreign filing date for use in claim as patent-defeating statutory prior art).
781. Deckler, 977 F.2d at 1453-54, 24 U.S.P.q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51 (citing Hilmer II, 424
F.2d at 1110, 1112-13, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 256, 258-59).
782. Id at 1453, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
783. 529 F.2d 1324, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
784. Deckler, 977 F.2d at 1453, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51 (citing Hilmer II, 424 F.2d
at 1110, 1112-13, 165 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at 256, 258-59 (reversing rejection for obviousness in
case where opposing party's prior art reference was based on foreign filing date); In re McKel-
lin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1329, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (finding no statutory
basis for ruling that subject matter of lost counts or disclosures of opposing party's patent is
prior art to appellants under 35 U.S.C. § 103)).
785. Deckler, 977 F.2d at 1453, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
786. Id
787. Id.
788. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976
F.2d 1559, 1570, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying two-step analy-
sis to determine patent infringement); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968
F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); Charles Greiner &
Co. v. Mari-Med. Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1034, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (citing Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, 720 F.2d 1565, 1569, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
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terpreted to ascertain the scope of the claims, and second, the
claims, as interpreted, are compared with the accused device. 789 In
determining the scope of the claims, the language of the claim and
the patent's specification, prosecution history, prior art, and other
claims are all considered. 790 In 1992, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed
that claim interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo re-
view on appeal. 79 1 Factual findings involved in interpreting claims,
such as ascertaining the events that occurred during prosecution,
are, however, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 792
1. Interpreting claim terminology
Claim interpretation begins with an examination of the language
of the claim. 793 The meaning of a particular claim term or phrase,
however, is sometimes open to different interpretations, especially
when the patentee assigns an unusual meaning to that term. In In-
tellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,794 the Federal Circuit refused to
adopt a claim construction that assigned an uncommon meaning for
1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (same); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948,
950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same).
789. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1570, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330; Read, 970 F.2d at
821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431; Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at
1528.
790. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1566, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1327 (citing Tandon
Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1021, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1286
(Fed. Cir. 1987)) (indicating that proper claim construction involves reference to specifica-
tion, prosecution history, prior art, and other claims); Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp.,
972 F.2d 1300, 1302, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1946, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing ZMI Corp. v.
Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1988)); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Read, 970 F.2d at 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432; Lemelson,
968 F.2d at 1206, 23 U.S.P.O_2d (BNA) at 1287; Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
791. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1565, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1327 (stating
that claim construction is question of law); Arachnid, 972 F.2d at 1302, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at
1948 (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that claim construction is issue of law
that is reviewed de novo)); Read, 970 F.2d at 822, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (providing that
claim construction is question of law); Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1528 (concluding that without factual disputes, claim interpretation proceeds as question of
law); Morton, 959 F.2d at 950, 22 U.S.P..2d (BNA) at 1234 (finding claim interpretation is
question of law subject to de novo review); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d
1384, 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (asserting that claim interpre-
tation is question of law amenable to summary judgment).
792. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1565, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327; Charles Greiner, 962
F.2d at 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (citing Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969,
974, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 7-8 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Morton, 959 F.2d at 950, 22 U.S.P.OJ2d
(BNA) at 1234.
793. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1432
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that proper interpretation of patent claim requires examination of
claim language and patent's specification and prosecution history).
794. 952 F.2d 1384, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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a disputed claim term in Phonometric's patent.7 95 Intellicall sued
Phonometrics for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of
Phonometrics' patent, and Phonometrics counterclaimed for in-
fringement. 796 The patent in suit related to an apparatus for auto-
matically computing and displaying the cost of a long-distance
telephone call. 79 7 The infringement determination depended on
the interpretation of the phrase "call cost register means, including
a digital display for providing a substantially instantaneous display
of cumulative call cost in dollars and cents" as set forth in claim 1 of
Phonometrics' patent.798 Like the patented invention, the accused
Intellicall devices visually displayed call cost information in human
readable form.79 9 The Intellicall devices, however, could also pro-
vide an audio output with call cost information interface and in-
cluded a machine readable interface for storing call information in
memory.800 In an effort to establish infringement, Phonometrics
contended that the phrase "digital display" was not limited to only
visual displays but encompassed both machine readable as well as
human readable displays.80 1 Phonometrics further argued that the
phrase "instantaneous display of cumulative call cost" encompassed
machine readable interfaces that provided call cost information to
the memory of the device.80 2 The district court granted summary
judgment of noninfringement, holding that the claimed device was
limited to an instantaneous visual display of cumulative call cost
rather than storing information in memory, and that none of Intelli-
call's allegedly infringing devices satisfied the "digital display" ele-
795. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1383, 1386-87 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
796. See id at 1386, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87 (reviewing prior history of
litigation).
797. Id.
798. See idL, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (noting that appeal focused on functions re-
quired for call cost register means of claim 1). Claim 1 provides in pertinent part:
An electronic solid state long-distance telephone call cost computer apparatus for
computing and recording the cost of each long-distance telephone call initiated from
a given calling telephone .... comprising: ... call cost register means, including a
digital display for providing a substantially instantaneous display of cumulative call
cost in dollars and cents ....
Id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
799. d
800. Id.
801. Id. at 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
802. See id. (reporting Phonometrics' reliance at trial on testimony of inventors, language
used in other patents, and principle of claim differentiation in support of Phonometrics' inter-
pretation of claim language, despite Phonometrics' admission that its interpretation gave
terms in its claims meaning not ordinarily associated with such terms). In opposition, Intelli-
call presented expert testimony that, to one skilled in the art, the language of claim 1 did not
encompass a machine readable display, but described a device that visually conveys the cost of
a call to a human being as the information is being collected.- Id.
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ment of Phonometrics' claim.803
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, relying primarily
on the evidence of what the words, as used in the context of the
patent, would mean to one skilled in the art.804 According to the
court, claim terms should be given their ordinary meaning to one
skilled in the art unless it appears from the patent and file history
that the inventors used the terms differently. 0 5 Furthermore, the
inventor must have set out the uncommon definition in some man-
ner within the patent disclosure before that term can be given an
"uncommon meaning." 806 The Federal Circuit discerned no such
disclosure in Phonometrics' patent.807 In an effort to establish an
"uncommon meaning," Phonometrics relied on the testimony of the
inventor and the attorney who drafted the patent-in-suit, but the
court held that this evidence did not raise a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact to defeat summary judgment. 80 8 According to the court,
inventor and attorney testimony explaining their subjective usage of
the disputed phrase did not alter the meaning objectively conveyed
to one of ordinary skill in the art from reading the patent.809 Pho-
nometrics also cited prior art patents to support its interpretation of
the claim language, but none mentioned a "digital display," and the
two that mentioned "visual" displays did not require or suggest any-
thing other than a visual display.810 In concluding that Pho-
nometrics' evidence did not raise an issue of material fact, the
Federal Circuit further noted that under the doctrine of claim differ-
entiation the use of a "readout means" in another claim of Pho-
nometrics' patent did not preclude the "digital display means" of
claim 1 from being visual. 811
803. Seeid. at 1386-87, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87 (restating district court's holding
that call cost register means of Phonometrics' patent must provide instantaneous visual dis-
play of cumulative call costs and that none of Intellicall's devices, which stored call informa-
tion or provided audio feedback of call costs, infringed Phonometrics' patent).
804. Id at 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
805. Id. at 1386, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc.,
730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
806. See id. at 1388, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (stating that
where inventor chooses to be own lexicographer and give terms uncommon meanings, inven-
tor must set out definition of uncommon term in some manner within patent disclosure).
807. See id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87 (agreeing with district court's finding that
there was no support for Phonometrics' construction of terms at issue in patent disclosure or
otherwise).
808. Id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
809. See id at 1388, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (asserting that extrinsic evidence pro-
vided by claimant does not negate meaning conveyed to one of ordinary skill in art upon
reading patent).
810. See id. at 1387-88, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87 (rejecting patents cited by claim-
ant because they do not suggest anything other than visual display).
811. Id
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The Federal Circuit applied a similar approach of referring to the
patent specification and the prior art to ascertain the meaning of
claim terminology in Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Manufacturing,
Inc.812 In Charles Greiner, the infringement determination depended
on the interpretation of the claim term "bight," as used in the Grei-
ner patent for a cervical collar. 813 The Greiner patent pertained to a
cervical collar described in claim 1 as consisting of two U-shaped
halves, a front half and a rear half, that joined to provide support for
the spine.814 The collar was made of light-weight foam with a rigid
support member "located only at the bight" of each half.8 15 Mari-
Med produced a competing cervical collar known as the Bums col-
lar.8 1 6 The Burns collar also consisted of two U-shaped halves, with
the rigid support member extending beyond the bend of the collar
and terminating just short of the ends of each half.817 Greiner as-
serted that the claim term "bight" meant that the rigid support ex-
tended substantially around each of the collar's U-shaped halves
and thus, Greiner's patent claims encompassed the accused Bums
collar.818 Mari-Med, however, contended that the bight was limited
to a narrow area at the extreme front and rear of the respective
halves.8 1 9 The district court agreed with the Mari-Med interpreta-
tion of the term "bight" and found no infringement.8 20 Referring
to the specification, the Federal Circuit determined that the district
court properly interpreted the term "bight" to define a fold located
only at the extreme front and rear of each half of the collar.821 In
support of this interpretation, the Federal Circuit referred to three
places in the Griener patent specification where the bight portion of
the collar was discussed in a manner that disassociated the bight
from other portions of the collar, thus limiting the location of the
812. 962 F.2d 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
813. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit cited a dictionary definition of
"bight" to mean a bend or bending. Id. (quoting definition of "bight" as found in THE
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 178 (3d ed. 1959)).
814. See id. at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (describing shape and components of
cervical collar disclosed by U.S. Patent No. 3,756,226).
815. IME at 1033, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527 (quoting from claim 1 of patent). In the
accused device, the foam increased the comfort of the collar by providing a rigid support only
at necessary locations, whereas in the prior art invention, the entire collar was rigid. Id.
816. Id, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1528-29.
817. See id. (discussing development of Bums cervical collar by Mari-Med).
818. Id. at 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
819. See id. (arguing that such interpretation of term "bight" required finding of no
infringement).
820. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
821. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528-29 (concluding that district court correctly inter-
preted specifications that "bight" does not extend beyond narrow width of rigid support
members).
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bight to the extreme front and back of the collar.8 22
In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,82s the Federal Circuit also referred to
the patent specification to divine the purpose of the disputed claim
language.8 24 Read brought an action against Portec fbr infringe-
ment of Read's patent for a portable loam screening apparatus,
which Portec had attempted to design around by incorporating two
distinguishing features.8 25 First, to avoid Read's claim limitation
that the short end of the sifter is "dosed to the ground," the short
end of Portec's sifter ended approximately six inches above the
ground.8 26 Second, instead of having retractable wheels for lower-
ing the sifter to the ground as set forth in Read's claims, Portec's
device had fixed wheels and long metal footpads running the length
of the sides of the device that, when lowered to the ground, re-
moved the weight from the wheels.8 27 Despite these design differ-
ences, the jury found Read's patent valid and infringed, and the
822. See id. (referring to three portions of patent to support interpretation that limited
location of bight to narrow areas). First, the Greiner specification stated, "[Tihe body 13
tapers away from the bight portion so that the vertical dimensions of the end portions .,. are
about one-half the vertical height of the bight portions." Id., 22 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) at 1529.
The Federal Circuit found that this placed the bight portion of the collar at the closed end of
the collar half, or a narrow area in the extreme end away from the open end of the half collar.
Id. Second, the specification referred to the bight portion of the collar as being shaped to
provide a chin cavity, thus suggesting that the bight was limited to a narrow area where the
chin rests. Id. Third, the specification described the rigid support members as extending the
entire length of the bight portion collar's body. Id. This implied that the bight portion is
equal in size to the rigid support member and does not extend substantially around tile cir-
cumference of the collar. Id The Federal Circuit also concluded that patent claim amend-
ments during patent prosecution that defined the rigid support members as being located
"only at the bight" amounted to patent prosecution history estoppel, which suggested that
the inventors limited the extent of the bight. Id. at 1035, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
823. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
824. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1432
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("One must look to the language of the claim, and the patent's specification
and prosecution history to properly interpret the scope of a patent claim.").
825. See id. at 820, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429 (reviewing prior history of patent dis-
pute). Claim 2 of Read's patent provides in pertinent part:
A portable screening apparatus for separating coarse material from finer material
comprising:
a frame of generally rectangular cross section and having a tall end and a short end
joint [sic] by sides, said short end being closed from an upper edge of said short end
to the ground and the lower portion of said tall end being completely open from the
ground to a height sufficient to permit a payloader to collect the finer material from
within the frame;
a set of wheels mounted to one side of said sides and moveable relative to said
frame from an operative position for transporting said apparatus to an inoperative
position for resting said frame flush on the ground ....
Id. at 819, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429; see also id. at 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430
(observing that Portec developed screening device with two features designed to avoid in-
fringement of Read's patent, and noting that Portec made several changes in accused device
during litigation to further distinguish it from existing patents).
826. Itt at 820, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430.
827. Id.
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district court denied Portec's motion for a JNOV.828
In reviewing the district court's denial of Portec's JNOV motion,
the Federal Circuit referred to the specification to discern the pur-
pose of the claim limitations. 829 The specification disclosed that the
purpose of the short end being "closed to the ground" was to keep
the loam separated from the coarse material.830 The court con-
cluded that to achieve this purpose, the language "end closed to the
ground" meant "sufficiently closed."183l Accordingly, infringement
of Read's patent did not require that the short end of Portec's sifter
actually touch the ground, so long as the short end fulfilled the pur-
pose of Read's invention.83 2 This claim interpretation was consis-
tent with claims as a whole because the word "completely" preceded
the word "open," with reference to another side of the sifter,
whereas the word "completely" did not similarly precede "closed"
in referring to the short end of the sifter.833 With regard to the
second disputed phrase, however, the Federal Circuit held that the
claim language requiring that the wheels be "movable relative to the
frame ... for resting said frame flush on the ground" only literally
encompassed retractable wheels.834 The specification, including the
figures, neither described nor suggested alternative interpreta-
tions.83 5
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Ortho-
paedics, Inc.,836 the Federal Circuit relied on the language of the
claim and the patent's specification and prior art, as understood by
one of skill in the art, to interpret a claim directed to an orthopaedic
casting material.83 7 The disputed claim language read, "a mesh size
of 20 to 200 openings per square inch .... "8 3 8 The Federal Circuit
828. Ide at 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31.
829. See id. at 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (holding that proper claim construction
requires examination of language of claim and patent's specification and prosecution history).




834. See id (discussing arguments by claimant regarding interpretation of phrase, "mova-
ble relative to said frame," and concluding that claim is limited to retractable wheels).
835. See id. (noting that specification and drawings of patent only show retractable
wheels).
836. 976 F.2d 1559, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
837. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1566, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying claim construction
principles to determine scope of U.S. Patent No. 4,502,479 issued to Garwood). The pat-
ented synthetic orthopaedic casting tape was designed to replace plaster of paris casts used to
immobilize broken bones and facilitate healing. Id at 1563, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. It
was to be strong, light-weight, porous enough to allow the skin to "breathe," quick to harden,
and water resistant. Id at 1563-64, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327-28.
838. Id. at 1572, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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recognized that interpreting the term "openings" to mean an open-
ing through which air and water can pass would result in a finding of
no infringement by the accused JJO products, whereas an interpre-
tation of "openings" to mean openings defined by the courses and
wales of the fabric would result in a finding of infringement by the
accused JJO products.83 9
The Federal Circuit held that "mesh" referred to the coarseness
or fineness of the grid or screen-like structure of the cast and not to
actual openings or holes in the fabric.8 40 The court referred to the
specification itself, which listed several fabrics used in the invention
that were distinguishable by their "mesh number openings."8 41
Upon examination, this distinction referred to the number of open-
ings calculated by multiplying the number of courses per inch by the
number of wales per inch.842 The Federal Circuit also found this
claim interpretation to be consistent with the prior art and the un-
derstanding of persons skilled in the art, including JJO employees,
that "mesh size" is measured not by the number of holes in a given
area, but by the number of courses multiplied by the number of
wales.8 43
In Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. ,844 the Federal Cir-
cuit considered whether the "means for overriding," as set forth in
claim 1 of Brooktree's patent, was limited to a circuit that simultane-
ously employed both a reference voltage source and a constant cur-
rent source.8 45 The court cited expert testimony that one skilled in
the art would understand that the disputed claim language was suffi-
cient to support a jury's verdict in favor of the patentee.8 46 Brook-
tree's patent pertained to a circuit that provides a transistor with a
constant voltage bias using either a constant current source or a ref-
839. Id. at 1576, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. The district court held that the number of
openings referred to the spaces in the knit fabric of the mesh and were defined by courses and
wales. Id. at 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. Courses are the horizontal elements or
threads that run across the fabric, while wales are the vertical elements or threads that run
lengthwise through the fabric. Id.
840. Id at 1576, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
841. See id. at 1576, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335-36 (comparing mesh openings of vari-
ous fabrics).
842. Id, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
843. See id. (interpreting mesh size openings based on prior art and testimony of persons
skilled in art). The testimony and laboratory documents of inventors assigned the task of
inventing around the Garwood patent indicated that they understood the phrase "mesh size
openings" to refer to the number of courses per inch multiplied by the number of wales per
inch. Id
844. 977 F.2d 1555, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
845. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1577-78, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
846. Id.
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erence voltage source.847 AMD argued that it was not infringing the
claims because the Brooktree patent was limited to a circuit that si-
multaneously required both a reference voltage and constant cur-
rent source and that their accused device avoided this specific
limitation.8 48
The Federal Circuit upheld the jury's verdict because substantial
evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could have found that
the claimed invention did not simultaneously require both a current
source and a voltage source.8 49 Specifically, the court cited the testi-
mony of Brooktree's expert witness, Dr. Martin, who testified that
one skilled in the art would understand, after reading Brooktree's
patent disclosure, that the invention does not use both sources at
the same time.850 According to Dr. Martin, ajumper connection be-
tween electrical contact pins in the circuit allowed the user to select
whether the circuit will use a constant current source or a reference
voltage source to supply the bias voltage for the circuit.8 51 The
court quoted the part of the specification describing the overriding
function8 52 and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found
that "overriding" did not require the simultaneous presence of both
the voltage and current sources.8 53
2. Prosecution history estoppel
Courts frequently refer to a patent's prosecution history to inter-
pret its claims.8 54 The prosecution history can indicate what a pat-
ent applicant originally claimed, how the applicant interpreted
salient claim language, and what the applicant surrendered in re-
sponding to the patent examiner's rejections. This information is
especially important when the invention is within a crowded art field
or when there is a particular prior art reference that the patentee is
trying to distinguish while still asserting the accused device
infringes. 855
847. Id- at 1561, 1575-76, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404, 1415-16.
848. Id- at 1576, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416. AMD asserted that "overriding" requires
both the simultaneous presence of the constant current source and the reference voltage
source because otherwise, there would be nothing to override. Id.
849. Id. at 1577, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416-17.
850. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
851. See id. (noting that Martin also testified that accused AMD device had identical elec-
trical functioning to that of claimed Brooktree circuit).
852. See id (indicating that specification stated that reference generator operates to over-
ride stages of circuit producing substantially constant voltage during introductions of sub-
stantially constant current).
853. Id.
854. See supra note 790 and accompanying text (reciting case law establishing that claim
construction requires examination of specification, prosecution history, and other claims).
855. See Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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In Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Marketing Corp. ,856 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of Arachnid's motion for JNOV
because substantial evidence from the patent prosecution history
supported the jury's conclusion that the claims in Arachnid's patent
did not encompass Medalist's accused device, which was capable of
playing both point-dependent and nonpoint-dependent dart
games. 857 During prosecution of Arachnid's patent for an electronic
dart game, the examiner had rejected a claim that encompassed an
electronic dart machine that could score both point-dependent and
nonpoint-dependent dart games.8 58 Arachnid acquiesced to the re-
jection and amended its claims to incorporate the examiner's sug-
gested claim language that limited the claim to only point-
dependent dart games.85 9 The accused electronic dart machine
could score both point-dependent and nonpoint-dependent types of
dart games.8 60 The patent specification and prosecution history of
Arachnid's patent constituted substantial evidence in support of the
noninfringement verdict, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial
of Arachnid's motion for JNOV.861
In Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc. ,862 the Federal Circuit held that a
patentee's acquiescence to a patent examiner's suggested claim
amendment estopped the patentee from later asserting a claim in-
terpretation contrary to the amendment suggested by the exam-
iner.8 63 Lemelson, the patentee, brought an infringement action
1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating importance of prosecution history because such informa-
tion provides insight into what applicant originally claimed as invention).
856. 972 F.2d 1300, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
857. See Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1946, 1948-49 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that there was substantial evidence that claim
1 of Arachnid's patent covered electronic dart machines that only play point-dependent
games); see also id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (describing U.S. Patent No. 4,793,618 owned
by Arachnid). Claim I of Arachnid's patent reads:
An electronic dart game apparatus . . . comprising ... a first electronic memory
storage area containing algorithms for scoring one or more different dart games
wherein the value of points earned in a particular turn of said one or more different
dart games is dependent upon the scoring segments hit during previous players'
turns ....
Id.
858. Id, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
859. Id This claim amendment was consistent with the specification, which described no
embodiment of any machine having both point-dependent and nonpoint-dependent game ca-
pability. Id.
860. ld
861. See id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49 (affirming district court denial ofJNOV mo-
tion based on substantial evidence, which included fact that disclosed embodiments only cov-
ered point-dependent dart games and no embodiment contained both point-dependent and
nonpoint-dependent dart games).
862. 968 F.2d 1202, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
863. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1207-08, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1284, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing district court finding ofinfringement of Lemelson's
patent by General Mills).
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against General Mills alleging that the accused Hot Wheels toy track
infringed Lemelson's patented track for toy vehicles. 86 During the
prosecution of Lemelson's patent application, the examiner rejected
Lemelson's original five-clause claim 1 as anticipated by a prior art
reference called Gardiol.8 65 Lemelson overcame the rejection by
canceling the original claim 1 and presenting a new seven-clause
claim with the addition of clauses (f) and (g).866 The accused Hot
Wheels track did not have elements corresponding to the limitations
set forth in new clauses (f) and (g) of the Lemelson patent.8 67
Lemelson therefore argued for infringement on the grounds that
clauses (f) and (g) were superfluous and had been unnecessary to
distinguish the claim from Gardiol and other prior art cited during
patent prosecution.8 68 The Federal Circuit gave Lemelson's argu-
ment short shrift, stating that "Lemelson cannot acquiesce to a re-
jection and to an agreed alternative, and now years later shift his
stance 1800 to argue for a second bite at the abandoned apple."8 69
In Read Corp., the Federal Circuit considered whether patent pros-
ecution history estopped Read from asserting the claim limitation
that the wheels be "'moveable relative to said frame' from an opera-
tive to 'an inoperative position for resting said frame flush on the
ground' " was equivalent to the combination of fixed wheels and
movable foot pads in Portec's sifter.8 70 The Federal Circuit dis-
missed as unfounded the assertion that "Read was seeking to recap-
ture in the infringement litigation something that was surrendered
during the prosecution."8 71  Portec asserted that Read's patent
claims encompassed only a sifter with retractable wheels because the
864. Id. at 1205, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
865. See id. at 1207, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (noting that first five clauses in original
claim comprised separate claim that examiner had rejected as anticipated by Gardiol).
866. See id. (stating further that five original clauses did not distinguish Lemelson's patent
over Gardiol because at no time did PTO find Lemelson patent sufficiently distinguishable
from prior art until two supplemental clauses were added). According to the court, if Lemel-
son's claim was distinguishable over the prior art, "it must be because of something in the
added two clauses." Id. at 1208, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. Clauses (0 and (g) stated:
(0 said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the
pathway of a vehicle moving over said track,
(g) said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding
the wheels of a vehicle.
Id at 1204, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
867. See id at 1208, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289 (noting that patentee identified no ele-
ments in accused track that corresponded to limitations in clauses (f) and (g)).
868. Id
869. See id (reversing district court and finding no patent infringement on ground that
"no reasonable jury could read reissue claim 3 both to be valid in view of Gardiol and in-
fringed by Hot Wheels").
870. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823-24, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1432-
33 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
871. Id at 824-25, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
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retractable wheel limitation of the Read patent was added during
prosecution to overcome prior art cited by the examiner.8 72 How-
ever, the same rejection that prompted Read to include the retracta-
ble wheel limitation had also included rejections of other claims,
including claims having the retractable wheel limitation. 873 The
court therefore concluded that "adding a set of retractable wheels
to the claim, movable or not, could not have been the basis for
allowance." 874
Portec also contended that because Read distinguished the prior
art based on differences in the wheel configurations, Read was es-
topped from asserting infringement over equivalent structures. 875
During prosecution Read had attempted to distinguish prior art de-
vices, which had wheels, on the basis of structural differences in-
cluding differences in the wheel configurations. 876 No patent
prosecution history estoppel arose, however, because Read did not
distinguish the prior art solely on the basis that Read's device had
retractable wheels and the prior art did not.877 The court reiterated
the truism that not every statement made by a patentee during pros-
ecution creates a separate estoppel and stressed that arguments
must be considered in context. 878 Therefore, Read's arguments dis-
tinguishing a prior art device having movable wheels did not auto-
matically require a very narrow construction of the movable wheels
limitation in Read's patent claims so as to exclude Portec's
equivalent sifter.879
B. Literal Infringement
1. Establishing literal infringement
The second step of the infringement analysis involves comparing
an accused device with the claim language as interpreted to ascer-
tain whether the device falls within the claim's scope.880 There are
872. Id at 822, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
873. See id. at 824, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433 (analyzing prosecution history with re-







880. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1431
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365,
376, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 678, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (requiring that accused device be com-
pared to claim language as interpreted)); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Madi-Med Mfg., Inc., 962
F.2d 1031, 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Standard Oil Co.
v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that final step of infringement analysis is to demonstrate whether accused device is
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two types of patent infringement: literal infringement and infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement results
when an accused device contains all the limitations specified in the
claims. 81 A finding of literal infringement is a question of fact, sub-
ject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.8 82 Several 1992
Federal Circuit patent cases addressed the literal infringement
issue.88 3
In Charles Greiner, the Federal Circuit held that Mari-Med's ac-
cused device, the Bums collar, did not literally infringe the Greiner
cervical collar patent.8 84 The Greiner patent claim explicitly stated
that the rigid support member was located at the bight of the collar,
which the court previously interpreted as corresponding to a narrow
area at the extreme front and back of the collar.885 Because the
Bums collar had a rigid support member extending substantially
around the entire length of each collar half, the court held that the
Bums collar did not literally infringe Greiner's patent. 886
In Read Corp., the Federal Circuit held that the footpad arrange-
ment on Portec's portable sifter did not literally respond to the re-
tractable wheel feature of Read's patent, even though both
accomplished the same function.887 Read argued that there was lit-
eral infringement because in both the claimed invention and the ac-
cused Portec device, the frame moved relative to the wheels.888 The
within scope of claim)); see also supra note 789 (reciting cases that have held second step in
two-part infringement analysis to be comparison of accused device with claims as interpreted
in first step).
881. See, e.g., Read, 970 F.2d at 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431 (finding infringement
when accused device contains all of limitations specified in claim); Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at
1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (stating that accused device must embody exactly each
claim limitation to constitute literal infringement); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co.,
959 F.2d 948, 950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231, 1234 (asserting that each limitation in claim
must be found to constitute literal infringement), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Intellicall,
Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (requiring that every limitation must be met to establish literal infringement).
882. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034-35, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528; Morton, 959 F.2d
at 950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
883. See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838, 23
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming noninfringement finding because
accused process was substantially different than that claimed in patent); Charles Greiner, 962
F.2d at 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529 (finding no literal infringement of cervical collar
patent); Read, 970 F.2d at 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433-34 (holding that patent for
portable loom screening device was literally infringed); Morton, 959 F.2d at 952, 22
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1235 (affirming district court finding of no literal infringement of pat-
ented compounds used as chemical additives); Intellicall, 952 F.2d at 1389, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1387 (finding no literal infringement of telephone call cost computer).
884. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
885. Il
886. Id
887. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1432-33
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
888. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. In the Read patent, the frame remained stationary
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Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the claim lan-
guage of Read's patent specifically required that the wheels move
relative to the frame.a 9 Because the accused Portec sifter had
wheels that remained stationary with respect to the ground while the
frame was lowered, it did not literally infringe Read's claims 890
In Atlantic Thermoplastics, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment that the shoe innersoles manufactured by
Sorbothane did not literally infringe Atlantic's product-by-process
claim.891 The district court had determined that there were two rea-
sons the Sorbothane process did not literally infringe the product-
by-process claim. 892 First, the Sorbothane process required that the
insert material, which is in liquid form, be poured into the mold
rather than "placed" there, as claimed in the Atlantic patent. 898
Second, the insert in the Sorbothane process was not held in place
by the tackiness of the insert material, as claimed in the Atlantic pat-
ent, but instead was held firm by a small dam as it solidified in
Sorbothane's teflon-coated mold. 94 Therefore, the Sorbothane
process did not contain all the limitations of the process recited in
the product-by-process claims.8 95
In Intellicall, the Federal Circuit restated the standard for literal
infringement of means-plus-function claims.8 96 The court noted
that to literally infringe a means-plus-function claim, the accused
device must perform the identical function required by the means-
plus-function limitation and incorporate the structure disclosed in
the specification, or its substantial structural equivalent, as the
means for performing that function. 97 The Federal Circuit held
that there was no literal infringement because Intellicall's tele-
while the wheels were retracted, thus lowering the frame to the ground, Id In the Portec
device, the wheels remained stationary while the frame was lowered to the ground. Id. Read
argued that in both situations the frame and wheels moved relative to one another, and that
therefore Portec's device literally infringed Read's patent. Id
889. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
890. Id.
891. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838, 23 U.S.P.QJ2d
(BNA) 1481, 1483-84 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
892. Id. Two claim limitations in Atlantic's patent were at issue. Id. at 835, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1482. The first limitation read "placing an elastomeric insert material into the
mold," and the second read "the insert material having sufficient surface tack to remain in the
placed position on the introduction of the expandable polyurethane material." Id
893. See id. at 835, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482 (reporting Atlantic's insert as solid or
cellular material).
894. Id at 838, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
895. Id
896. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388-89, 21 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1383, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
897. Id. (citingJohnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382,
1387 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
[Vol. 42:909
1992 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS
phones did not perform the identical function required by the
means-plus-function limitation of claim 1 of Phonometrics' pat-
ent.8 98 Specifically, Intellicall's telephones did not provide an in-
stantaneous digital display of cumulative call cost in dollars and
cents, as literally required by the claims.899
In another case involving literal infringement of means-plus-func-
tion claims, the Federal Circuit, in In re Hayes Microcomputer Prod-
ucts,900 upheld a jury verdict that an accused device contained
structures identical or equivalent to the structure described in an
existing patent specification and corresponding to the "timing
means" and "means, operative" limitations in the claims. 901 The
Federal Circuit noted that Dr. Cliett, Hayes' expert witness, testified
that Ven-Tel's accused modem incorporated a "timing means,"
which he manually tested and found performed the same time delay
recognition as claimed in the Hayes patent.90 2 Furthermore, Ven-
Tel stipulated that its modem used a microprocessor, which the
Federal Circuit previously held was the structure in the Hayes pat-
ent supporting the "timing means" and "means, operative" func-
tions.90 3 The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that the "timing means" was contained
in the accused device.904 As to the "means, operative" element, the
Federal Circuit again pointed to on Dr. Cliett's testimony as evi-
dence supporting the jury's determination that the accused device
contained structure identical or equivalent to this element.9 05 Spe-
cifically, the court referred to Dr. Cliett's testimony that the Ven-Tel
modem had a means, operative to switch between two different
modes of operation, which is the same function performed by the
"means, operative" limitation in the Hayes patent.9 06
As further evidence that the accused device was functionally
equivalent to the claimed invention, the Federal Circuit noted that
898. Id at 1389, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
899. Id
900. 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
901. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its position that for purposes of deter-
mining the scope of means-plus-function claims in a literal infringement analysis, such claims
are construed to cover the structure described in the specification and the equivalents thereof.
Id. at 1541, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251 (citing D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570,
1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (positing that sole question in applica-
tion of means-plus-function is "whether the single means in the accused device which per-
forms the function stated in the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding
structure described in patentee's specification as performing that function")).
902. Id. at 1541-42, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
903. Id, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53.
904. Id. at 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
905. Id. at 1542, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
906. Id.
19931 1017
1018 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the engineer in charge of designing Ven-Tel's modem testified that
he was instructed to design a Hayes-compatible modem.90 7 In addi-
tion, the Ven-Tel modem was advertised as being "Hayes compati-
ble." 90 8 Also, Dr. Cliett testified that based on his comparison of
the accused device with the claims, the accused device was function-
ally equivalent to the device claimed in the Hayes patent. 90 9 The
court stated, "Although Dr. Cliett was not a patent law expert, he
had read and understood the claims [in the Hayes] patent at the
time he tested the accused infringing devices." 9 10 The court there-
fore held that a reasonable juror could have concluded from the
foregoing evidence that the accused modem contained a functional
equivalent to the "timing means" and "means, operative" elements
claimed in the Hayes patent.9 1'
2. Evidentiary considerations
Determining whether an accused device contains all the limita-
tions set forth in the claims can pose difficult evidentiary problems.
In Minnesota Mining, the Federal Circuit considered whether appro-
priate testing procedures were used to determine if the accused
product met the limitations of the 3M patent claims. 912 In proving
literal infringement, 3M needed to show that at least one major sur-
face of the accusedJJO product had a KCOF less than about 1.2, as
claimed in the 3M patent.9 13 To establish the KCOF of.JJO's prod-
uct, each party conducted separate KCOF tests on the accused prod-
uct. 914 The company 3M obtained an average KCOF of about 0.86
for the interior face of the tape roll and of about 1.12 for the exte-
rior face of the tape roll.915 In contrast, JJO obtained a combined
average of about 1.59 for both faces of the tape roll.9 16 The ap-
pointed master resolved the discrepancy, finding 3M's tests more
reliable because they were performed in accordance with the direc-
tions given in the 3M patent. 917 The district court thus found that
907. Id, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53.
908. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
909. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
910. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
911. Id. at 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
912. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1570-71, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
913. See id. at 1565, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (describing 3M patent as claiming cura-
ble resin-coated sheet, such as casting tape, which included additive lubricant at major surface
present in such amount so as to reduce KCOF of casting tape to less than approximately 1.2).
914. Id. at 1570, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
915. Id
916. Id
917. Id. at 1571, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. The master also noted that 3M's tests
were more reliable because the tests were made on rolls taken from commercial batches of the
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the M1O product literally infringed the 3M patent. 918
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
as not clearly erroneous. 919 The court rejectedJJO's argument that
3M's test results were unreliable because 3M failed to take an equal
number of readings in each direction along the strip of tape.920 The
testing method disclosed in the 3M patent did not require that the
number of readings in each direction be equal, however.92 1 The
method only specified that tests be conducted a sufficient number of
times in each direction to determine the mean or average KCOF
value.922 Although an equal number of readings taken in both di-
rections could yield a more accurate result, the court concluded that
one reading less in one direction did not necessarily render the
KCOF value obtained unreliable or inaccurate so that it would be
clearly erroneous for the district court to rely on the readings. 923
The Federal Circuit also rejected JO's second argument that
3M's test results were unreliable because 3M used defective samples
in conducting its tests.924 The samples 3M tested were taken from
commercial batches of products sold by JO.925 The master con-
cluded that these samples were more reliable than the experimental
samples that JO used in its tests, and the Federal Circuit endorsed
this conclusion.926 Moreover, 3M's testing procedure was in accord
with the method taught in the 3M patent.927 Accordingly, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that there was no clear error in the master's
conclusion that 3M's tests were more reliable than those conducted
by JO. 9 2 8
Evidentiary issues can also highlight problems caused by drafting
claims to secure patent grants without adequate consideration of
how to prove infringement of the claimed inventions. The Federal
product sold by JO, whereas JJO's tests were made on experimental tape. Id The test
method used for determining the KCOF of the casting tape was based on a method developed
by the American Society for Testing Materials. Id. at 1568, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
The test involves a special "sled" that is pulled a specified distance along the length of an 18-
to 24-inch sample of tape. Id.
918. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1417 (D. Minn. 1991).





924. See id. (noting defects attributed to "pooling" and "puddling" of resin in samples
used for testing).
925. Id. at 1571-72, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
926. Id. at 1572, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
927, See supra note 917 and accompanying text (describing testing method disclosed in 3M
patent).
928. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1572, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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Circuit's Morton International decision illustrates such a situation. In
Morton International, the infringement issue centered around whether
partial connectivity, as claimed in Morton's patent, was present in
Cardinal's allegedly infringing composition.929 The district court
found that Morton failed to show that partial connectivity existed in
Cardinal's allegedly infinging mixture.930 Morton argued that the
district court improperly limited the evidence it could introduce to
prove the partial connectivity to isolation and to nuclear magnetic
resonance (NMR) data.93' The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court decision, noting that the district court did not require isola-
tion as proof of the partial connectivity.93 2 Instead, the district
court found that no amount of testing by presently available meth-
ods could isolate, identify, or separate any compound as claimed in
Morton's patents. 933 The district court specifically found that the
NMR test performed on Cardinal's composition did not objectively
support the actual existence of the claimed connectivities. 934
The Federal Circuit also rejected Morton's building block theory
to prove the existence of the partial connectivities in Cardinal's
compound. 935 Morton argued that Cardinal's mixture was infring-
ing because the mixture contained the building blocks used in Mor-
ton's patented invention, and that these building blocks can
combine to form compounds, at least some of which contain the
claimed connectivity. 936 The Federal Circuit dismissed this analysis
because Morton did not prove that the accused mixture actually
contained the claimed connectivity. 937 According to the court, it
would be mere speculation to assume that the accused mixture con-
tained the claimed connectivity. 938 The hypothetical existence of
the claimed compounds in Cardinal's mixture was insufficient to
929. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 949, 22 U.S.P.Q,2d
(BNA) 1231, 1233 (Fed. Cir.) (describing chemical bonding in Morton's claimed organotin
compound as partial connectivity, which specifically denotes composition wherein tif atom is
bonded to sulfur atom, sulfur atom is bonded to second tin atom, and second tin atom is
bonded to mercaptoalkyl ester), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
930. Id at 950, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
931. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
932. See id. (finding that district court had only required identification of compounds in
Cardinal's mixture).
933. Id. at 950-51, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
934. Id. at 951, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. The district court found Cardinal's experts
more credible than Morton's experts. Id. The testimony of Cardinal's expert witness, Dr.
Story, discredited the testimony of Morton's expert witness that the NMR data showed the
existence of the partial connectivities. Id. Dr. Story testified that performing the reactions
disclosed by the Morton patent would not necessarily result in the compounds contained in
Cardinal's allegedly infringing composition. Id.
935. Id. at 951, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234-35.
936. Id
937. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
938. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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show that the accused mixture contained all the limitations set forth
in the claims. 939
C. Doctrine of Equivalents
When an accused device does not literally infringe, a court may
find that the device nevertheless infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents. 940 Whether a device infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact.94 ' Recently, the Federal Circuit has
intimated that application of the doctrine of equivalents is the ex-
ception and not the rule.942 In 1992 the Federal Circuit again ad-
verted to the tension inherent between the equity-based doctrine of
equivalents and the cardinal principle that the claims define the lim-
its of patent protection.943
In Charles Greiner, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the defendants did not infringe the patent under the
doctrine of equivalents. 944 After briefly reviewing the historical
antecedents of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit
stressed the "fundamental principle [that] claims define the limits of
patent protection" 945 must be balanced with judicious application of
the doctrine of equivalents. 946 The court opined that the rule of
prosecution history estoppel prevents, in theory, the legal signifi-
cance of the claims from clashing with the doctrine of
equivalents. 947 According to the court, the rule of prosecution his-
tory estoppel combined with "careful confinement of the doctrine of
equivalents to its proper equitable role, promotes certainty and clar-
939. See id. (agreeing with expert's conclusion that number of claimed compounds were
theoretically possible, but holding that such possibility was insufficient to support infringe-
ment claim).
940. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (pro-
viding that essence of doctrine of equivalents is that one may not pirate invention simply by
avoiding literal language of claim). The Graver Tank test states that even in the absence of
literal infringement, an accused device can be found to infringe if it performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result. Id. at 608-09.
941. Id. at 609-10.
942. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1456, 1458-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that if doctrine of equivalents is "regularly available to
extend protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their in-
tended purpose").
943. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (admonishing that doctrine of equivalents
should be carefully confined to its proper equitable role).
944. Id. at 1036-37, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
945. Id. at 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529 (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. East-
em Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908)).
946. Id.
947. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530 (citing Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S.
784, 789-90 (1931); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1880)).
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ity in determining the scope of patent rights. '9 48 The accused
Burns cervical collar achieved a better result in a different way than
the patented invention and thus did not satisfy the well-known func-
tion-way-result test of Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co. 949 The accused device, therefore, did not infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents.9 50
In contrast to Charles Greiner, the court in Read, which was decided
less than three months later, did apply the doctrine of equivalents,
and held that the Portec sifter infringed the Read patent.95 ' In find-
ing substantial evidence to support equivalency, the Federal Circuit
noted that Portec's retractable footpads performed substantially the
same function, which was the taking of weight off the wheels to pro-
vide stability during the device's operation, as the retractable wheels
in the Read patent. 952 The court characterized the Portec device as
having merely substituted an equivalent structure for Read's retract-
able wheels limitation. 953 The Federal Circuit, however, did not
specifically discuss how the accused device satisfied the elements of
the Graver Tank test. 954
In Intellicall, the Federal Circuit emphasized that to establish in-
fringement of a means-plus-function claim under the doctrine of
equivalents, every limitation of the claim must be found in the ac-
cused device, either literally or by a substantial equivalent.95 5 Be-
cause Phonometrics adduced no evidence that the disputed claim
limitations were met, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment that Intellicall's telephone did not infringe Pho-
948. Id
949. See Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530 (applying func-
tion-way-result test of Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950), and determining that accused collar had rigid support member providing comfortable
support throughout cervical collar and not just at narrow bight at front and rear as in claimed
collar); see also supra note 940 (discussing Graver Tank test).
950. Id.
951. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1426, 1432-33
(Fed. Cir. 1992). The specific limitation of Read's claim pertaining to the retractable wheels
reads "a set of wheels mounted to one of said sides and movable relative to said frame from
an operative position for transporting said apparatus to an inoperative position for resting
said frame flush on the ground." Id. Portec had attempted to design around Read's patented
portable sifter, which had become popular in the industry. Id. at 820, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1430. To this end, Portec designed its sifter so that the wheels remained stationary. Id. To
take the weight of the device off the wheels, Portec incorporated retractable footpads into the
sides of the frame. Id. The footpads could be lowered by hydraulic cylinders, thus lifting the
device off its wheels. Id.
952. Id. at 823, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1433.
953. Id at 824, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
954. Id
955. Intellicall Inc. v. Phonometrics Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1389, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1383, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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nometrics' patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 956 Pho-
nometrics argued that the accused device was equivalent overall to
the claimed invention. 95 7 The Federal Circuit pointed out, however,
that its decision in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.95 8 rejected
the determination of equivalency based on an overall comparison in
favor of an element-by-element analysis. 959
D. Design Patent Infringement
In 1992, the Federal Circuit heard two cases involving design pat-
ent infringement: Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. and Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America.960 In both cases the Federal Circuit applied the test
set forth in Gorham Co. v. White961 to determine design patent in-
fringement based on an objective standard of whether the ordinary
observer would likely confuse one item for another because of their
similarity in appearance. 962 In Read, the patentee, Read, sued
Portec for infringement of Read's design patent pertaining to a
portable sifting device. 963 To prove infringement, Read testified as
956. Id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387-88.
957. Id.
958. 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961
(1988).
959. Intellicall, 952 F.2d at 1389, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (quoting prior cases that support finding that each element of
every claim is material and thus that accuser must show presence of every element (or its
substantial equivalent) in device at issue)). The Federal Circuit further noted that Pho-
nometrics failed to produce evidence showing that the limitations of its claims were met
equivalently and rejected Phonometrics' argument that, as the nonmoving party on a nonin-
fringement issue, it had no duty to submit evidence with respect to infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. Id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387-88.
960. 975 F.2d 815, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
961. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871). The test reads:
[I]f, in the eye of the ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive
such an observer, inducing him [or her] to purchase one supposing it to be the other,
the first one patented is infringed by the other.
Id. at 528.
962. See Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 819-21, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1121, 1124-26 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (focusing analysis on whether burden of persuasion
was met and upholding jury's verdict that defendant infringed Braun's design patent); Read
Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 825-26, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(concentrating analysis on whether burden of production was met and finding no substantial
evidence to support jury's finding of infringement).
Infringement is an issue of fact proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mannes-
mann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282, 230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 45, 46 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that burden of proving infringement by preponderance
of evidence rests on accuser and remains issue of fact reviewable for clear error). Review of a
jury verdict requires a court to consider the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the verdict.
See Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir.)
(stating that jury's decision must be supported by substantial evidence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
281 (1991).
963. Read, 970 F.2d at 825-26, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434; see also supra notes 823-35
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to the common features between his patented design and the design
of the accused Portec device.964 Based on this evidence, the jury
found that Portec infringed Read's design patent. 96 5 The district
court subsequently denied Portec's motion for JNOV.966 The Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding that Read's
evidence was insufficient to prove infringement. 967 According to
the Federal Circuit, infringement depends on "(1) the similarity of
the ornamental features of the Portec device and the patented de-
sign, and (2) the likelihood that an ordinary person would be con-
fused because of such ornamental similarity."968 The court held
that Read had failed to prove that an ordinary person would be
deceived by the similarities in the common ornamental features be-
cause Read had only drawn attention to similarities in the common
functional features. 969
In Braun, the owner of a design patent on a hand-held electric
blender filed a design patent infringement suit against Waring, the
manufacturer of a competing hand-held blender.970 To prove in-
fringement, Braun introduced as evidence only its patented design
and the accused device.971 After comparing the two designs, the
jury found that Waring's device infringed Braun's patented de-
sign.972 The Federal Circuit held that a jury could reasonably find
that, under the Gorham test, Waring's blender infringed the Braun
patent.973 A trier of fact is permitted under Gorham to rely exclu-
sively on a visual comparison of the patented design and the ac-
cused device.9 74 Lack of statistical surveys and other empirical data
and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to defining claim terms based on specifi-
cations issue); supra notes 870-79 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to pros-
ecution history and estoppel issues); supra notes 887-90 and accompanying text (discussing
case with regard to literal infringement issue); supra notes 951-54 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing case with regard to doctrine of equivalents issue); infra notes 1118-30 and accompany-
ing text (discussing case with regard to willful infringement issue); infra notes 1101-02 and
accompanying text (discussing case with regard to attorney's fees issue).




968. Id. at 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
969. See id. at 825, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citing Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838
F.2d 1186, 1188, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1625, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (holding that in situations
where design is composed of both functional and ornamental features, patent owner must
show that ordinary person would be deceived by common ornamental features).
970. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 821, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1121, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 1174-81 and accompanying text (discussing
case with regard to 35 U.S.C. § 289 issue); infra notes 1340-43 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing case with regard to inequitable conduct issue).
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did not preclude a jury from finding design patent infringement. 975
According to the court, "a jury, comprised of a sampling of ordinary
observers, does not necessarily require empirical evidence as to
whether ordinary observers would be deceived by the accused de-
vice's design. '976
E. Product-by-Process Claims
A product-by-process claim "is one in which the product is de-
fined at least in part in terms of the method or process by which it is
made." 977 An uncertainty currently exists with respect to the inter-
pretation of product-by-process claims for infringement purposes.
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions that concern whether the pro-
cess recited in product-by-process claims should be interpreted as a
claim limitation for infringement analysis purposes have resulted in
conflicting holdings.978 This conflict leaves the patent practitioner
with a dilemma on how to analyze product-by-process claims for in-
fringement purposes, and whether to draft patent claims for a prod-
uct which may not be adequately definable by conventional
structural claim limitations. 979
In 1991, the Federal Circuit in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation
v. Genentech, Inc. 980 held that a product-by-process claim is not lim-
ited to products prepared by the process set forth in the claims.981
The court in Scripps cited three ex parte cases that recognize that the
patentability of an invention defined by product-by-process claims
turns on the patentability of the product, not the process. 982 The
court held that claims must be interpreted the same way for patenta-
975. Id.
976. Id-
977. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.05, at 8-81 (1992).
978. DonJ. DeBenedictis, Inconsistent Patent Rulings, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1992, at 36 (reporting
conflict between Federal Circuit decisions interpreting product-by-process claims).
979. One solution has its basis in the Federal Circuit's practice that where there are con-
flicting precedents, the earlier precedent controls. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rich, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc).
980. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
981. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that in determining patentability,
court should not construe product as limited by process stated in claim).
982. See id (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697-98, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 964, 966 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejection of
product-by-process claims); In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685, 688
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (stating that patentability of product must be established independent of pro-
cess in product-by-process claims); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682-83, 149 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 55, 57-58 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (recognizing that while some courts have construed prod-
uct-by-process claims as limited to particular process, courts have determined patentability
independent of process)).
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bility and infringement purposes. 988 The Federal Circuit remanded
to the district court the question of whether Genentech's accused
factor VIII:C, produced by recombinant DNA technology, infringed
Scripps' claimed factor VIII:C, produced by antibody absorption
methods.98 4
In 1992, a different three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit in
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.985 declined to follow Scripps,
holding that "process terms in product-by-process claims serve as
limitations in determining infringement. ' 98 6 The panel in Atlantic
Thermoplastics perceived a conflict between Scripps and certain pre-
1952 Supreme Court precedents, which the panel cited for the
proposition that for infringement purposes, product-by-process
claims include the limitation of the process identified in the claim.98 7
The court explicitly cited the traditional dichotomy existing between
the way product-by-process claims are construed by the PTO for
patentability purposes and the way the same claims are interpreted
for infringement or validity purposes.988
983. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1581, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. This ruling may not be
confined to "validity" or "infringement," and may present interesting issues for the interfer-
ence practitioner. Scripps seems out of step with the Federal Circuit's comments about con-
ception of product claims versus product-by-process claims in Fiers v. Sugano, 984 F.2d 1164,
25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993), where the court stated:
A product-by-process claim normally is an after-the-fact definition, used after one
has obtained a material by a particular process. Before reduction to practice, con-
ception only of a process for making a substance, without a conception of a structural
or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute a conception of the
substance as a process. Conception of a substance per se without reference to a
process requires conception of its structures, name, formula or definitive chemical or
physical properties.
Id. at 1169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
984. Id
985. 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
986. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846-47, 23 U.S.P.QJ2d
(BNA) 1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
987. See id. at 838-43, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485-88 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Wa-
bash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 373-74 (1938) (stating that nothing can be held to in-
fringe patent which is not made by same process)); Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda
Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884) (same); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S.
222, 230 (1880) (concluding that where patent claimed both product and process, accused
product must be substantially same and process must be equivalent); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94
U.S. 568, 572-73 (1877) (maintaining that process language in specification is limitation on
claims for that process only); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493(1877) (holding that product could not be separated from process and that both were
patentable).
988. See Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91 (observ-
ing that Federal Circuit permits PTO to give product-by-process claims their broadest mean-
ing possible when interpreting claims for patentability). Product-by-process claims are
treated as a product for patentability, and the question becomes whether the product itself is
novel and nonobvious. Id- For infringement, on the other hand, the question has been
whether the accused infringing product is manufactured in an identical fashion as set forth in
the claims. Id. The court emphasized that its decision does not disturb the PTO's present
practice for assessing patentability of product-by-process claims. Id.
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Atlantic owned a patent for a shock absorbing shoe innersole
that contained process claims 989  and a product-by-process
claim. 990 Faytex sold innersoles made from two different manufac-
turing processes, called the "Surge process" and the "Sorbothane
process." 991 Atlantic asserted that both processes produced inner-
soles indistinguishable in structure from the innersole made accord-
ing to Aflantic's patent. 992 Atlantic filed a suit against Faytex for
selling the innersoles manufactured under both processes, alleging
that the innersole made by either process infringed the Atlantic pat-
ent.9 93 Because Faytex was not the manufacturer of the innersoles,
Atlantic asserted infringement of only the product-by-process
claim.9 94 The parties agreed that the innersoles made under the
Surge process infringed, but the district court went further and held
that those made under the Sorbothane process did not infringe the
Atlantic patent because the Sorbothane process differed from the
process in the product-by-process claim. 995 Citing Scripps, Atlantic
argued on appeal that Faytex nevertheless infringed the Atlantic
patent because the Sorbothane produced innersoles which were in-
distinguishable from infringing innersoles made by the Surge
process. 996
In Atlantic Thermoplastics, the Federal Circuit eschewed the Scripps
rationale for a number of reasons, and cited old Supreme Court de-
cisions 997 and decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
989. See id. at 835, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482 (describing process claim contained in
claim I of Atlantic patent for shock absorbing innersole). Claim I of the Atlantic patent de-
fines the process as follows:
In a method of manufacturing a shock-absorbing, molded innersole for insertion
in footwear, which method comprises:
(a) introducing an expandable, polyurethane into a mold; and
(b) recovering from the mold an innersole which comprises a contoured heel and
arch section composed of a substantially open-celled polyurethane foam mate-
rial, the improvement which comprises:
(i) placing an elastomeric insert into the mold, the insert material having
greater shock-absorbing properties and being less resilient than the
molded, open-celled polyurethane foam material ... ; and
(ii) recovering a molded innersole with the insert material having a tacky sur-
face forming a part of the exposed bottom surface of the recovered
innersole.
Id at 835-36, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
990. See id at 836, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (describing product-by-process claim
contained in claim 24 of Atlantic patent for shock absorbing innersole). Claim 24 of the At-
lantic patent reads: "The molded innersole produced by the method of claim I." Id.
991. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
992. lId, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
993. Id at 835, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482-83.
994. Id. at 836, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
995. Id at 837-38, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
996. Id. at 838, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
997. See supra note 987 (reciting Supreme Court case law that Federal Circuit relied on to
reject its holding in Scripps). The Supreme Court cases discussed in Atlantic Thermoplastics,
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for the principle that process steps in a product-by-process claim are
limitations on the claims for infringement purposes. 998 The Federal
Circuit further sought to justify its holding that the process in a
product-by-process claim should be read as a limitation on the claim
based on the notion that ignoring the process limitation might vio-
late fundamental patent law principles.999 For example, ignoring
the process recited in a product-by-process claim would directly
clash with the principle of infringement analysis that every limitation
of a claim or its equivalent must be found in the accused device to
constitute infringement. 000 Moreover, finding infringement of a
product-by-process claim by a product made using a different pro-
cess would clash with the basic patent law principle that the claims
of a particular patent define the invention disclosed in that pat-
ent. 1001 The Federal Circuit also reasoned that the comparison of
however, are themselves susceptible to different interpretations as seen from Judge Newman's
dissent from the denial of Atlantic's request for rehearing in banc. Atlantic Thermoplastics
Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1289-93, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1802-16 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Nies, CJ., and Rich, Newman, and Lourie, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing in
banc). While, for example, the dissent may be correct to question the continued vitality of
Goodyear v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222 (1880), to present day product-by-process claims, the dissent
did not address the Supreme Court's rationale. The Supreme Court in Davis, itself stated that
"[tihe process detailed in the description antecedent to the claim, and referred to thereby, is as
much a part of the invention as are the materials of which the [dental] plate or product is
composed." Id at 224 (emphasis added). The dissent also criticized the Atlantic panel's reli-
ance on Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877), and asserts, "the [U.S. Supreme] Court
found the product old and interpreted the claims accordingly." Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974
F.2d at 1290, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (Newman, J., dissenting).
998. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 843-47, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-91 (citing In
re Moeller, 117 F.2d 565, 568, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542, 545 (C.C.P.A. 1941) (identifying rule
in infringement analysis of product-by-process claims that patentee is limited in protection to
articles produced by method referred to in claims); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682-83,
149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 55, 57-58 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (acknowledging that process operates as limi-
tation on infringement actions)).
999. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1000. It (indicating that for finding of infringement, Federal Circuit has required presence
of every claim limitation or its equivalent) (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.,
822 F.2d 1528, 1533, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lemelson v. United
States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). As Judge New-
man noted in dissent, however, the Federal Circuit has held that, for the purpose of determin-
ing validity, the claims must be construed the same way as for infringement. Atlantic
Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1296, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (Nies, CJ., and Rich, Newman,
and LourieJJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc) (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1001. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (citing Conti-
nental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908)). It might be as-
sumed that the doctrine of equivalents could be applied to the process recited in the product-
by-process claims, especially because the doctrine is such a well-established principle of pat-
ent law. See id. at 837-38, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (affirming no literal infringement and
no infringement under doctrine of equivalents of product-by-process claim). Concerns about
unsparing application of the doctrine of equivalents to the process recited in the product-by-
process claims could be tempered by application of the so-called rule of necessity or the re-
verse doctrine of equivalents. See Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1581, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013-14
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the accused product to the product-by-process claims without any
limitation by the recited process would be like 'comparing the ac-
cused product only to an embodiment of the claims. 100 2 The court
thus rejected Atlantic's argument because proper infringement anal-
ysis compares an accused product with the patent claims, not with
an embodiment of the claims. 100 3
Atlantic's petition for an in banc rehearing was denied, but four
Federal Circuit judges dissented. 100 4 The substance of the dissent-
ing opinions and that of the opinion concurring with denial for re-
hearing in banc suggests that neither Scripps nor Atlantic Thermoplastics
will be the last word on product-by-process claims. The first dissent
was rather perfunctory, expressing no opinion on the merits. 100 5 A
second dissent objected to the Atlantic Thermoplastics decision on the
ground that the entire discussion regarding interpretation of prod-
uct-by-process claims was unnecessary.10 0 6 This second dissent em-
phasized that Atlantic had admitted that the product-by-process
claims were limited to the process. 00 7
A third dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc reasoned that
reconciliation of the seemingly irreconcilable cases of Scripps and At-
lantic Thermoplastics requires an understanding that there are in fact
three different types of product-by-process claims: first, where a
product is new and unobvious but is not capable of independent
definition; second, where a product is old or obvious but the process
is new; and third, where a product is new and unobvious but has a
process-based limitation (e.g., a molded product). 00 8 This dissent
characterized type one cases as "true product-by-process" claims,
typified by Scripps.1009 In type one cases, the invention cannot be
(stating that product-by-process claims are subject to infringement analysis involving claim
construction and reverse doctrine of equivalents).
1002. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1003. Id. (citing Intervet Am. v. Kee-Vet Lab., 887 F.2d 1050, 1055, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1474, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 824, 11
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1989); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d
1107, 1121, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 586 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1004. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d 1279, 1280-99, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1817 (de-
nying rehearing in banc) (Nies, CJ., and Rich, Newman, and Lourie, JJ., dissenting from de-
nial of rehearing in banc).
1005. Itt at 1280, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801 (Nies, CJ., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing in banc).
1006. Id. at 1280, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801 (RichJ., dissenting).
1007. Itt
1008. Id at 1284, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing E.P.
Mirabel, Product-by-Process Claims: A Practical Perspective, 68J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OF. Soc'y 3,
4 (1986)).
1009. Itt at 1282, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. This conclusion and its application to
Scripps may be questioned. The Scripps case was not one in which a product-by-process claim
was necessary because the products were incapable of definition. Scripps involved a reissue
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described solely by structure or physical characteristics, but the
product is nonetheless new and nonobvious and thus patentable in-
dependent of the process.10 10 These inventions would be examined
as product claims and would encompass any infringing product, ir-
respective of the process by which the infringing product was
made.101' In contrast, type two cases, such as the one in Atlantic
Thermoplastics, are not really "product-by-process" claims because
their patentability is predicated on the novelty and the unobvious-
ness of the process. 01 2 Such claims are infringed only when the
process set forth in the claim is used. 0 1 3 This dissent therefore
concluded that the panel in Atlantic Thermoplastics blurred the distinc-
tion between "true" product-by-process claims and claims that in-
clude a process limitation, thereby unnecessarily limiting the scope
of patent protection available to inventors. 0 14
Furthermore, the third dissent criticized the Atlantic Thermoplastics
panel decision as bad policy. 0 15 According to the third dissent, in-
ventors whose inventions are not capable of being defined in terms
of structure, which can occur in the chemical and pharmaceutical
arts, are precluded from establishing infringement except in the
specific case where the accused product is made by the disclosed
process. 10 16 The third dissent argued that the Atlantic Thermoplastics
patent having new product claims in addition to original product-by-process claims. Scrpps,
927 F.2d at 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
1010. Id. Where an invention could not adequately be described in terms of its structural
characteristics, whether due to language lagging behind innovations or an inability to deter-
mine the structural characteristics, product-by-process claims have been permitted to describe
the product. See In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 55, 58 (C.C.P.A.
1966) (stating that invention defined by product-by-process claim is product, not process). In
Atlantic Thermoplastics, the Federal Circuit referred to this exception as the "rule of necessity."
Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 843 n.9, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 n.9,
1011. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. Interestingly,
in Scr ps, the patent was a reissue that contained a product-by-process claim and newly added
product claims. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1571,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Scri ps opinion does not really explain
the difference in scope between those claims. Therefore, it is not altogether clear how the
hypothetical paradigm of type one, type two, or type three product-by-proces claims would
apply.
1012. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
1013. Id.
1014. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (remarking that "[t]he Atlantic panel has simply
lumped all of these classes and claims and inventions into a one-size-fits-all law, in a distress-
ingly superficial treatment").
1015. Id.
1016. Id at 1283, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. But see id. at 1303, 24 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at
1142 (Rader, J., concurring with denial of rehearing in banc) (emphasizing that role of court
should not be to bend interpretation of patent laws to remedy undesirable situations and that
change in policy is legislative function).
Interestingly, Congress considered a bill granting special patent protection for biotechnol-
ogy patents. See S. 654, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (providing for issuance of patents for
biotechnology processes); H.R. 1417, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (providing for issuance of
patents for biotechnology processes). The Senate passed the bill, but the House did not con-
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decision denies important patent protection to such inventors even
though their disclosures, described in terms of a product-by-pro-
cess, are in accord with 35 U.S.C. § 112 and that such a policy
change should have been done by the legislature, or at a minimum,
by the court sitting in banc.1 17
A fourth judge dissented from the denial of rehearing in banc for
two reasons.101 8 First, the Atlantic panel acted contrary to prior case
law and procedure by failing to follow the prior precedent of the
Federal Circuit. 10 19 Second, the Atlantic panel wrote its holding too
broadly when it could have decided the issue more simply merely by
recognizing that the parties had agreed that the claimed innersoles
were limited to the process by which the innersoles were made. 0 20
The concurring opinion to the denial of an in banc rehearing, criti-
cized the categorization of claims based on whether patentability de-
pends on the product or the process.' 0 21 The concurring opinion
implied that the so-called type two product-by-process claim, in
which the product is old or obvious, would simply be invalid. 10 22
Indeed, the third dissent had also recognized that old or obvious
products are not made patentable by the addition of method steps
to the claim. 0 23 According to the concurring opinion, postulating
such a category of claims as one of a narrow class of claims in which
the process steps limit the scope of what is covered is difficult to
accept because what is really being described is a class of seemingly
invalid claims. 10 24
The concurring opinion also emphasized that claim 24 of Atlan-
tic's patent was directed to a product and that the Atlantic panel sim-
ply interpreted that product claim to include the limitation of the
sider it. Reportedly, strong opposition from members of the patent community outside the
biotechnology field felt that it was inappropriate to single out an industry for special patent
protection. See Five Biotech Bills Signed into Law, New Congress Ponders Many More, BIOTECHNOL-
OGY NEiWSWATCH, Jan. 4, 1993, at 1, 6 (reporting charge that lobbying pressure prevented
House consideration of biotechnology patent bill); see also Patent Wrap-Up, 8 ACS Washing-
ton Alert, No. 21, at 6 (Oct. 19, 1992).
1017. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1283, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
1018. Id. at 1298-99, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-17 (Lourie,J., dissenting).
1019. Id at 1298, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816 (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort How-
ard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 36, 37 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The fourth
dissenter pointed out that the Atlantic panel, upon concluding that Scripps was wrongly de-
cided, should have either followed the precedent or sought an in banc review. Id.
1020. lId at 1298-99, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-17.
1021. Id. at 1303, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (Rader, J., concurring with denial of re-
hearing in banc).
1022. Id, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
1023. Id. at 1286, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing In re Pilk-
ington, 411 F.2d 1345, 1348, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 147 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
1024. See id at 1303, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141 (Rader, J., concurring) (arguing that it
would be difficult for courts to identify products and perform infringement analyses under
categories of claims proposed by dissent).
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process stated in the claim for making the product, in full accord
with the well-established patent doctrine that the claims measure
the invention. 0 25 Ignoring the process limitation to claim 24 would
be ignoring the primary, if not the only, limitation in the claim. 10 26
Without this limitation, there would be no legal basis for a court to
determine infringement. 0 27
F. Exceptions to Infringement
1. Experimental use under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), it is not an act of infringement "to
make, use, or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products."' 0 28 The statute, however, does
not expressly specify whether a party could lose its exempt status by
using properly obtained information in a manner collateral to ob-
taining government approval. In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc.,10 29 the Federal Circuit considered this issue and held
that Ventritex's collateral use of data related to obtaining FDA ap-
proval did not result in a loss of the § 271(e)(1) exemption. 10 30
Pursuant to an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), Ventritex
began conducting clinical tests of its implantable defibrillator and
collecting data needed to obtain FDA approval of the device.103 1
Ventritex also displayed its device to physicians and nonphysicians
at medical conferences and submitted its clinical test results to in-
vestors, analysts, and journalists. 0 32 Telectronics subsequently
filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that Ventritex's activi-
ties relating to the defibrillator were not exempt under § 271(e) (1)
1025. Id. at 1300, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing United Carbon Co. v, Binney &
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942)).
1026. Id.
1027. Id This rationale assumes that the doctrine of equivalents or the reverse doctrine of
equivalents would not be used to compare the process recited in the product-by-process claim
with the process by which the accused product was made. Whether those doctrines alone, or
melded with the rule of necessity discussed in In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 182 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 106 (C.C.P.A. 1974), will be applied by the court to construe product-by-process
claims remains unanswered.
1028. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
1029. 982 F.2d 1520, 25 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text (discussing case with respect to declaratory judgment issue).
1030. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525, 25 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1196, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1031. See id at 1521, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (observing that IDE also permitted
Ventritex to sell its device at cost for implantation in patients to obtain test data).
1032. Id.
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and thus infringed Telectronics patents. 103 3 The district court is-
sued a summary judgment dismissing the action, holding that there
was no actual controversy supporting a declaratory judgment action
because Ventritex's activities were within the scope of
§ 271(e)(1).10 34
The Federal Circuit agreed that Ventritex's activities were solely
for uses reasonably related to gaining FDA approval and thus af-
firmed the district court's holding. 0 35 The court noted that the
only activity Telectronics alleged was "solely" unrelated to FDA ap-
proval was the display of the defibrillator to nonphysicians at medi-
cal conferences.1 036  The court, however, held that these
demonstrations were related to FDA approval and were permissible
under § 271(e)(1) because the displays were aimed at attracting
clinical investigators to test Telectronics' device and at providing
the investigators with enough information to perform the clinical
tests. 10
37
The Federal Circuit also explicitly rejected Telectronics' argu-
ment that a non-FDA related use of data properly acquired as a re-
sult of an originally exempt activity can strip that activity of its
§ 271(e)(1) exemption. 038 The court held that the plain meaning
of the statute did not contemplate any such limitation, nor did the
legislative history support Telectronics' contention.1039 The court
noted that one reason Congress enacted § 271(e)(1) was to annul
the outcome of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,1040 in
which using a patented invention to seek FDA approval was held to
be patent infringement. 104 1 The court interpreted the 1984 amend-
ments to § 271(e)(1) as Congress' attempt to allow competitors to
1033. Id. at 1522, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
1034. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1960, 1960
(ND. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1520, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1035. Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1525, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
1036. See id at 1523, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198 (reporting that Telectronics asserted
during oral argument that this activity was not intended as sale or offer to sell and that court
noted statute does not define information dissemination as potentially infringing activity).
1037. Id. (noting fact that some nonphysicians were able to view defibrillator was of mini-
mal import because only physicians could implant device in patient).
1038. Id. at 1522-24, 25 U.S.P.q.2d (BNA) at 1198-99 (dismissing Telectronics' argument
that data dissemination was not act of making, using, and selling to obtain FDA approval and
therefore did not qualify for § 271(e)(1) exemption).
1039. Id. at 1524, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (stating that if language is clear, plain
meaning of statute will be regarded as conclusive).
1040. 733 F.2d 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
1041. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 937, 941 (Fed. Cir.) (stating that Bolar's use of Roche Products' patent to derive FDA-
required test data was infringement because "unlicensed experiments conducted with a view
to the adoption of the patented invention to the experimentor's business" violates patentee's
rights), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
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obtain government approval of products before the patent expired
to enable them to begin actually marketing the competing products
as soon as the patent expired.10 42 According to the court, "[i]f Con-
gress intended to make [it] more difficult .... by preventing compet-
itors from using, in an admittedly non-infringing manner, the
derived test data for fund raising and other business purposes, it
would have made that intent clear."' 10 43
2. "Crop exemption" under 7 U.S.C. § 2543
The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 10 44 which Congress en-
acted in 1970, protects novel varieties of sexually reproduced seeds,
plants, and transplants. 10 45 Once a developer obtains a PVPA certif-
icate on a novel plant variety, that developer has the right to exclude
others from selling, offering for sale, reproducing, importing, ex-
porting, or using the variety to produce a hybrid or different variety
therefrom. 10 46 The PVPA, however, also includes a limited "crop
exemption" that allows farmers to save and sell seed harvested from
crops the farmers have grown with PVPA-protected seed, without
infringing the developer's PVPA rights. 10 47 The Federal Circuit in-
terpreted the crop exemption for the first time in Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer,10 48 where it reversed the district court's summary judg-
ment permanently enjoining the defendant from selling seed har-
vested from the plaintiff's protected seed. 10 49
Asgrow Seed developed two novel varieties of soybean, which it
protected under the PVPA. 10 50 The Winterboers obtained the pro-
1042. Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1525, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199-1200 (recognizing that
one effect of § 271(e)(1) was to invalidate holding of Roche and concluding that by permitting
testing and regulatory approval process to begin well before controlling patent had run its
course, Congress must have intended to allow competitors to be in position to market their
products as soon as legally possible).
1043. Id at 1525, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
1044. 7 U.S.C. §9 2321-2582 (1988). The PVPA, which protects sexually reproduced
plants for 18 years, is distinguishable from the Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161-164 (1988),
which was enacted nearly 30 years earlier and provides 17-year patent protection to nonsexu-
ally reproduced plants.
1045. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988) (entitling breeders of novel varieties of sexually
reproduced plants to plant variety protection). The PVPA also defines such terms as "novel
variety," "breeder," and "sexually reproduced." Id. § 2402(a), (e)-(O.
1046. Id. § 2483(a).
1047. See id. § 2543 (establishing that "it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person
to save seed produced by him [or her] from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained,
by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed for use
on his [or her] farm, or for sale").
1048. 982 F.2d 486, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1049. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 487-88, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202,
1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1050. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 916-17, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1937, 1937-38 (N.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd, 982 F.2d 486, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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tected soybean from an authorized source, grew a soybean crop on
their family farm, and harvested seed.10 5' The Winterboers sold
harvested seed directly to other farmers by a process referred to as
"brown-bagging sales."' 0 52 Asgrow Seed alleged that these brown
bag sales of seed harvested from the protected seed infringed its
PVPA rights and sued for damages and a permanent injunction. 10 53
The district court ruled in favor of Asgrow Seed and issued a sum-
mary judgment permanently enjoining the Winterboers from engag-
ing in brown bag sales.' 0 54
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit
presented a step-by-step discussion of the crop exemption and its
limitations. 10 55 The court began by noting that the introductory
clause to the § 2543 crop exemption does not exempt acts defined
by § 2541, subsections (3) and (4),1056 from infringement. 0 57 The
court deduced that all other acts of infringement defined in § 2541
were exempt once the crop exemption applied. 058 The court then
interpreted the § 2543 crop exemption to mean that a farmer does
not infringe by saving seed harvested from a crop grown from PVPA
protected seed, regardless of the amount of seed saved. 0 59 The
court made clear, however, that to be within the crop exemption,
"the farmer must have obtained that PVPA seed by authority of the
PVPA certificate holder and with the intent to grow a crop."' 0 60
The court also noted that brown bag purchasers are not purchasers
authorized by the PVPA and therefore cannot save any seed without
infringing the PVPA certificate holder's rights.' 0 61
1051. Id. at 916, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1052. Id. The term "brown-bagging" refers to the process in which a farmer purchases
seed from a company engaged in the development of plant seed for planting future crops. Id.
The farmers plant, harvest, clean, and place the seeds in nondescript brown bags for sale. Id.
1053. Id. at 916-17, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1054. Id. at 920, 22 U.S.P.q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41.
1055. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 488-91, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202,
1204-06 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1056. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3)-(4) (1988). Section 2541 subsection (3) states that sexually multi-
plying the novel variety "as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety" is in-
fringement, and subsection (4) states that using a novel variety in producing a hybrid is also
infringement. Id..
1057. Asgrow, 982 F.2d 489, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (interpreting § 2541 to define
infringement as "the unauthorized practice of a right granted exclusively to the PVPA certifi-
cate holder"). The court pointed out that "[almong other activities, the unauthorized sale of
seed harvested from crops grown with novel varieties is infringement." Id.
1058. See id. (observing specifically that selling novel variety, offering it for sale, or dispens-
ing it to another without notice of PVPA protection, all of which would otherwise be infring-
ing acts under § 2541, are within crop exemption); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(1), (6) (1988)
(proscribing selling or dispensing of novel seed varieties); 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988) (outlining
crop exemption).
1059. Asgrow, 982 F.2d at 489-90, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1060. Id., 982 F.2d at 489, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1061. Id. at 489-90, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204-05.
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The court explained that § 2543 permits the farmer to use the
"saved seed" to produce another crop on his or her own farm or to
sell the seed under certain limitations set out in § 2543.1062 First,
both the seller and the buyer must be farmers. 0 63 Second, the
buyer's and seller's "primary farming occupation for the crops pro-
duced from the protected seed must be for sale as food or feed."10 6 4
The court explained that "[t]he exemption does not permit brown
bag sales if either the buyer or the seller primarily grows crops from
the novel variety to produce seed."' 0 65 The court interpreted the
term "primary" to mean that more than half the crop grown from
the protected seed must be used or sold for food or feed, the mean-
ing of which is determined on a crop-by-crop basis. 0 66 Conse-
quently, the district court erred in requiring that the seed saved by
the farmer be used exclusively for seeding ensuing crops. 0 67 Ac-
cording to the court, this was an undue restriction on what a farmer
could do with saved seed, and resulted from the district court's erro-
neous conclusion that "for seeding purposes" modified the verb
"save" in § 2543.1068 The court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of what amount of crop the Winterboers grew for consumption
and what amount for brown bag sales, noting that if the latter ex-
ceeds the former, the crop exemption would not apply. 0 69
The court then interpreted § 2541(3), which states that the multi-
plication of protected plant or seed varieties for "marketing" pur-
1062. Id- at 490, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1063. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988) (stating that person whose primary farming occupation is
growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes is exempt from infringement
liability for selling saved seeds to other persons so engaged).
1064. See Asgrow, 982 F.2d at 489, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (discussing limitations on
brown bag sales under § 2543).
1065. Id. at 489-90, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1066. Id. The court summarized its interpretation of § 2543 as it applies to brown bag
sales as follows:
- a farmer remains subject to infringement under subsection 2541(3) and (4);
- a farmer may only save, use, or sell seed produced from or descended from seed
obtained by authority of the PVPA certificate owner for seeding purposes;
- a farmer selling a novel variety must primarily grow crops from that seed for
consumption;
- a farmer acquiring a novel variety must primarily grow crops from that seed for
consumption;
- a farmer who acquires a novel variety in a brown bag sale can neither save nor sell
seed harvested from that seed;
- the sale must comply with state laws; and
- a farmer cannot divert seed originally sold for consumption to planting purposes.
Id. at 490, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205-06 (interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 2543).
1067. Id. at 491, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
1068. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that the district court omitted language necessary to
the statute in arriving at its interpretation, stating that "[r]eading the entire passage without
critical omissions shows that 'for seeding purposes' modifies the verb 'obtained,' not
'saved."' Id.
1069. Id. at 492, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
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poses is infringing.'0 70 The Federal Circuit explained that
"marketing" means extensive or coordinated selling activities such
as advertising, extended merchandising, or using sales representa-
tives.1 0 7 ' In the court's view, a more expansive reading of the term
"marketing" would swallow the entire crop exemption. 10 72 The
Federal Circuit also held that the notice requirement of § 2541(6),
which requires sellers to notify buyers of the protected status of the
novel variety of seeds, transplants, and plants, does not apply if the
sale is exempt under § 2543.1073 According to the Federal Circuit,
"[b]ecause subsection (6) is not included as an exception to the crop
exemption, a qualifying sale under section 2543 remains exempt
from the notice requirement."'1074
V. REMEDIES
A. Lost Profits-35 U.S.C. § 284
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a patent owner may recover compensa-
tory damages as a remedy for patent infringement. 0 75 In 1992, the
Federal Circuit addressed the lost profit valuation as a measure of
compensatory damages 0 76 in two cases. In Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,1077 the Fed-
eral Circuit considered whether the patentee was entitled to lost
profits based on lost sales and price erosion. 0 78 In Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. ,1079 the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's market share analysis and lost profits award. 0 80
In Minnesota Mining, the Federal Circuit affirmed the master's find-
ing that 3M was entitled to lost profits based on lost sales.'10 8 The
court held that in order for a patentee to recover lost profits as ac-
tual damages, the patentee must show that there was a reasonable
1070. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206-07.
1071. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
1072. See id. (indicating that on remand district court was to determine whether Winterboer
was engaged in "marketing" protected seed).
1073. Id Under § 2541(6), it is an act of infringement to dispense a novel variety that is
capable of propagation without notifying the buyer that it is a protected variety. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2541(6) (1988).
1074. Asgrow, 982 F.2d at 492, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
1075. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); see infra note 1099 (giving pertinent text of § 284).
1076. See 5 CHiSUM, supra note 977, § 20.03, at 20-71 (noting that other measures of com-
pensatory damages include awarding patentee or exclusive licensee established royalty or rea-
sonable royalty, depending on circumstances).
1077. 976 F.2d 1559, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1078. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1577-79, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1079. 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1080. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 847, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1081. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1577-78, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37.
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probability that, but for the infringement, the patentee would have
made the infringer's sales.' 08 2 The patentee can show this, for ex-
ample, by proving demand for the product, absence of acceptable
noninfringing substitutes, its manufacturing and marketing capabil-
ity to exploit the demand, and the amount of profit it would have
made. 1083 The Federal Circuit held that JJO failed to establish that
the master's findings were clearly erroneous. 0 8 4 JJO argued that
two of 3M's patents had acceptable, noninfringing substitutes that
the master failed to consider. 08 5 Quoting the master's findings, the
court pointedly noted that MJO had previously admitted that these
alleged noninfringing substitutes were not commercially accepta-
ble.'08 6 As for 3M's other patents, the Federal Circuit refused to
consider JJO's analogous arguments that noninfringing substitutes
existed because JJO had failed to raise this issue at trial.'0 87
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the master's conclusion that 3M
was entitled to lost profits due to price erosion. 088 The court dis-
agreed withJJO's assertion that there was "not a shred of evidence"
in the record to support the master's conclusion that 3M could have
increased the price of its patented product 2% per annum during
the infringement period. 08 9 The master's findings, including the
fact that 3M and JO had engaged in vigorous price competition,
contradictedJJO's arguments. 10 90 WithoutJJO, 3M would have had
a 70-80% market share with no serious price competition from
other lawful competitors.10 9' JJO, without patent protection, itself
1082. Id. at 1577, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus.,
Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1022 (1990)). The amount of damages fixed by the district court is a question of fact,
reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. Subsidiary decisions underlying the damage
theory, such as choosing between reasonable alternative accounting methods to determine
profit margin, are discretionary with the court. These decisions are reviewable under the
abuse of discretion standard. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d
1161, 1164, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1083. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1577, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (citing Radio Steel
& Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1556,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431,432 (Fed. Cir.
1986)) (noting that existence of noninfringing substitute is question of fact, reviewable under
clearly erroneous standard).
1084. Id. at 1578, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1085. Id. at 1577-78, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. JJO alleged that it could have
purchased casting tapes from Bayer, a German company licensed to manufacture and sell
casting tapes under 3M's patents. Id. at 1578, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1086. Id. The master also consideredJJO's additional argument thatjJO could have taught
Bayer to make acceptable products. Id. JJO, however, was in no position to do so absent
possession of 3M's technology. Id. Therefore, the court foundJJO's assertions unpersuasive.
Id
1087. Id.
1088. Id. at 1578-79, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337-38.
1089. Id. at 1578, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1090. Id
1091. Id. at 1579, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
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had raised prices 4%o per annum in the market for plaster castings,
providing further evidence that 3M would have raised its prices ap-
proximately 47o per annum on the patented casting products. 0 92
Because damages need not be proved with unerring precision, and
because the master was not required to accept a figure advocated by
either side, the court held that the decision to award 3M the 2 % rate
was not clearly erroneous.109 The Federal Circuit also rejected
JJO's further allegation that the district court had failed to correct
the master's computational errors. 09 4 The court noted that the
master's $10 million estimate of 3M's production costs was a com-
promise between 3M's estimate of $7,272,908 andJJO's estimate of
$13,074,334, rather than an error in reading JJO's chart, as JJO
asserted. 09-5
In Atlantic Thermoplastics, the Federal Circuit reached a different
result from Minnesota Mining, holding that the district court had im-
properly applied a market share approach in awarding Atlantic lost
profit damages based on all of Faytex's sales. 10 96 The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's lost profits ruling because the dis-
trict court had incorrectly assumed that Atlantic and Faytex were the
only suppliers of innersoles and thus Atlantic would have made all
of Faytex's sales. 1097 The court also reasoned that even if Atlantic
and Faytex were the sole market suppliers, Atlantic would not have
made all of Faytex's sales because the innersoles of one of Faytex's
supplying manufacturers did not infringe. 098
B. Willful Infringement and Exceptional Cases-
35 U.S.C. § 284 and § 285
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a trial court has discretion to award a pre-
vailing patent owner up to three times the amount of a compensa-
tory patent damages award.' 0 99 Although no statutory standard
automatically mandates an award of enhanced damages, courts have
granted such damages particularly in cases where the infringer acted
in wanton disregard of the patentee's patent rights-i.e., where the
1092. Md., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1093. Id.
1094. See id. (noting JJO's argument that master misread JJO's chart depicting impact of
incremental cost errors and therefore wrongly found 3M's production cost would be $10
million).
1095. Id.
1096. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1492. The court re-
manded this issue for the trial court to recalculate the appropriate damages. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Id.
1099. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). Section 284 provides, in pertinent part:
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infringement was wiliful." 0 0 In exceptional cases, a court may
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party under 35
U.S.C. § 285.1101 A party's misconduct during litigation, a paten-
tee's fraud or inequitable conduct during patent prosecution, or
willful infringement, have been factors considered in determining
whether a case is exceptional.1 0 2
In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 1 10 3 the Federal Circuit con-
sidered whether the defendant-appellant's infringement was willful
and whether attorney's fees should be awarded under § 285.1104
The district court denied attorney's fees to the appellants, AHP, and
concluded that Ortho had obtained and reasonably relied upon
opinion letters rendered by counsel. 1105 The Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees as not an abuse of
discretion. 10 6 According to the court, the issue of willful infringe-
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement ....
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.
Id
1100. See Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 166, 228 U.S.P.O,(BNA) 356, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (awarding treble damages and attorney's fees to patentee for
willful infringement); see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754, 8 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1029,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that "[p]rovisions for increased damages ... are available as
deterrents to blatant, blind, willful infringement of valid patents"). But see Modine Mfg. Co. v.
Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(holding that finding of willful infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced,
much less trebled), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct. 2017 (1991).
1101. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988) (stating that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party"). Whether a case is exceptional is a factual
determination subject to appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard. Reactive
Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1583, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821, 824 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
1102. See Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 455, 227 U.S.P.Q(BNA) 293, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting other circumstances such as unjustified or frivolous
litigation as grounds for finding exceptional circumstances).
Several Federal Circuit opinions addressed the issue of whether a party's misconduct, either
during prosecution or litigation, supported an award of attorney's fees under § 285. See Read
Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(holding that changes made to accused device during litigation to avoid infringement was not
litigation misconduct, but remanding case for consideration of whether alteration of trial ex-
hibit was litigation misconduct); Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d
1048, 1050, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (refusing to award attorney's
fees due to litigation misconduct because party had performed reasonable pre-lawsuit inquiry
into possible success of case); Morton Int'l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 952, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231, 1234 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that district court did not commit clear
error in denying request for attorney's fees when decision whether to award attorney's fees
was a "close case"), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
1103. 959 F.2d 936, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1104. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944, 22 U.S.P.OQ2d (BNA)
1119, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1105. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977, 1987 (E.D. Pa.
1990), aff'd, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1106. Id.
1993] 1992 AREA SUMMARY: PATENTS 1041
ment requires an evaluation of the totality of the surrounding cir-
cumstances.110 7 In the context of willful infringement for § 284
purposes, an infringer who has knowledge of another party's patent
is charged with an affirmative duty of due care, which may include
obtaining competent legal advice. 1108
The Federal Circuit explained that willful infringement is by defi-
nition a factual question of intent. 110 9 Where the defendant relies
on advice of counsel in an invalidity, noninfringement, or unen-
forceability opinion as a defense to an assertion of infringement, the
appropriate question is not whether the opinion is correct, but
whether "counsel's opinion [was] thorough enough, as combined
with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court
might reasonably hold the patent.., invalid, not infringed, or unen-
forceable."11 10 Therefore, a finding of willful infringement is inap-
propriate if Ortho's beliefs were reasonable and if Ortho did not
intend to infringe.111 ' The Federal Circuit in Ortho characterized
the attorney's written opinion letters in question as prepared by ex-
perienced patent counsel and thorough and complete. 1112 Relying
on Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc.,1113 AHP argued that the letters
were deficient because they did not contain an infringement analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents.' 11 4 The Federal Circuit noted,
however, that Datascope does not stand for the proposition that the
lack of an analysis under the doctrine of equivalents renders a cli-
ent's reliance on such an opinion per se unreasonable.1 115 More-
over, a party is not guilty of willful infringement simply because it
1107. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
1108. Id. See generally George M. Sirilla et al., The Advice of Counsel Defense to Increased Patent
Damages, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 705 (1992) (noting that included in person's
affirmative duty in his or her duty to obtain competent counsel). But see Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., 970 F.2d 810, 828, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Kloster
Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 91 (Fed. Cir.
1986) for proposition that absence of advice of counsel does not mandate finding of
willfulness).
1109. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
1110. Id. (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390,
219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569, 576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which suggested that defendant may show
justification for reliance on attorney's opinion letters).
1111. Id.
1112. Id.
1113. 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024
(1990).
1114. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 945, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
1115. Id. Instead, Datascope merely concluded that where analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents was impossible, the court must look to the other evidence indicating willful in-
fringement. In other words, it was the existence of other factors, not only the absence of
analysis under the doctrine of equivalents, that indicated willful infringement. Datascope
Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 828-29, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
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resolves a close question of infringement in its favor. 1116 Because
the opinions that Ortho had received were well reasoned and thor-
ough, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no willful in-
fringement and that no attorney's fees should be awarded.'117
In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,1118 the Federal Circuit reversed an
award of enhanced damages under § 284 holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding no willful infringement
in Portec's unsuccessful attempt to design around Read's patent. 1 19
In making this determination, the non-egregiousness of the in-
fringer's conduct, based on all the facts and circumstances, was a
focal point." 120 The court explained that where willful infringement
is found in spite of the rendering of an opinion of counsel, willful-
ness findings usually result from the client's disregard of the opin-
ion or from the incompetence of the counsel giving the opinion. 121
The court in Read, as in Ortho, also focused on the competency of
the advice of counsel.'122 According to the court in Read, "[a] writ-
ten opinion may be incompetent on its face by reason of its contain-
ing merely conclusory statements without discussion of facts or
obviously presenting only a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis,'1123
whereas "[a]n honest opinion is more likely to speak of probabilities
than certainties."" 124
In Read, Portec had obtained two independent written opinions
and engaged in numerous conferences with its attorneys on the de-
sign of Portec's products.1 25 The legal opinions obtained by Portec
1116. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 945, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
1117. Id.
1118. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1119. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828, 830, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware for reconsideration of whether Portec should be assessed Read's attor-
ney's fees based on Portec's alleged litigation misconduct. Id. at 832, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at
1439.
1120. Id at 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 819
F.2d 1120, 1125-24, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The court listed nu-
merous factors that can be considered in evaluating the infringer's conduct. Id. at 827-28, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435-36.
1121. Read, 970 F.2d at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
1122. Id- at 829-30, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
1123. Read, 970 F.2d at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc.
v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569, 577 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
1124. Id. at 829 n.9, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 n.9.
1125. Id. at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. Portec tried to design around Read's pat-
ents, and "sought professional advice [from its counsel] on making a competing device which
avoided the patent." Id at 830, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438. Read argued the "design
around" effort was copying which evidenced willful infringement. Id. at 830, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1436. This argument received short shrift. Id.; see also Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control
USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that attempting to
avoid infringement and to invent around licensed patent is not sufficient basis for willfulness).
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were not incompetent. 1126 The district court's criticism of one of
the opinions as incompetent for failing to perform specific legal re-
search was unjustified. 1127 A failure by the patent attorney to per-
form legal research on the basic concepts of literal infringement, the
doctrine of equivalents, and prosecution history estoppel did not,
without more, render the opinion incompetent.' I28 Furthermore,
Portec's failure to provide the first lawyer's opinion to the second
lawyer had the virtue of assuring separate independent conclu-
sions. 11 29 Most importantly, the second attorney's opinion was de-
tailed, not conclusory, and contained nothing to alert the client to
reject the opinion as an "obviously bad" opinion. 1130
In Minnesota Mining, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of will-
ful infringement and an award of double damages based on the will-
ful infringement. 13 1 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, JJO argued
that the district court had applied an improper legal standard in
adopting the conclusions of the master regarding willfulness. 13 2
The Federal Circuit rejected JJO's contention, noting that the
master correctly quoted the legal standard for determining willful
infringement as set forth in Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp. 133 The Ryco
decision provided that a court must consider whether, "under all
the circumstances, a reasonable person would prudently conduct
himself [or herself] with any confidence that a court might hold the
patent invalid or not infringed."' '134 The Federal Circuit rejected
JJO's further assertion that reliance on its corporate counsel's oral
legal opinion was reasonable."135 The court stated that oral opin-
ions "carry less weight... because they have to be proved perhaps
years after the event, based only on testimony which may be affected
by faded memories and the forces of contemporaneous litiga-
tion."1136 The oral opinion in question was not objective.1137 It was
based on information obtained from a biased supplier who did not
1126. Read, 970 F.2d at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (noting that attorney rendering
opinion had many years of experience, and failing to perform legal research on basic patent
law concepts does not per se make opinion of lawyer who specializes in patents incompetent).
1127. Id-
1128. Id
1129. Id at 830, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
1130. Id.
1131. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1582, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1132. Id at 1580, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1133. 857 F.2d 1418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1134. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
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want to have its market share eroded. 138 Quoting the master, the
Federal Circuit noted that JJO ignored the known facts and instead
knowingly relied on an oral opinion based on unreasonable repre-
sentations from a supplier to justify JJO's continued infringe-
ment.113 9
The Federal Circuit also held that the master properly considered
JJO's misappropriation of 3M's trade secrets as part of the totality of
the circumstances. 1140 In particular, JJO's counsel was apparently
aware of the misappropriated trade secrets, had prepared and pros-
ecuted aJJO patent application involving the misappropriated tech-
nology, 114 1 and rendered an oral opinion resting on prior art
considerations that were inconsistent with positions taken while
prosecuting theJJO application. 1142 The Federal Circuit concluded
that "[a]n alleged infringer who intentionally blinds himself [or her-
self] to the facts and law, continues to infringe, and employs the
judicial process with no solidly based expectations of success can
hardly be surprised when infringement is found to have been
willful."1143
In Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,114 4 the Federal Circuit
reversed a jury award of treble damages for willful infringement,
concluding that ample undisputed evidence demonstrated Waring's
exercise of due care and good faith in an effort to avoid infringe-
ment.1145 The court cited six factors that favored a finding of no
willful infringement. 1 46 First, Waring had hired an independent
design firm to design its blender. 1147 Second, a patent attorney was
involved as a consultant at all stages of the Waring blender develop-
ment.1148 Third, the attorney had discovered the Braun patent
1138. Id at 1580-81, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
1139. Id at 1581, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1140. Id.
1141. Id at 1582, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1142. Id JJO's reliance on the outside counsel's opinion was also unreasonable because
JJO apparently withheld facts from outside counsel that contradicted the factual bases for the
conclusion as to one 3M patent. Id. at 1582 n.13, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340-41 n.13.
1143. Id at 1581, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (citing Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857
F.2d 1418, 1429, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Because the Federal
Circuit affirmed the master and district court conclusions that 3M's patents were valid, JJO
infringed the patents, and 3M was entitled to enhanced damages, id. at 1582, 24 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1341, it is not surprising that a settlement was negotiated. See 3M and Johnson Settle
Patent Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1993, at D3 (noting that 3M will receive $129 million from
JJO as result of settlement reached).
1144. 675 F.2d 815, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1145. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 823, 24 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court analyzed the jury verdict under the substantial evi-
dence standard. Id. at 822, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1127.
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through a search conducted at Waring's request. 1149 Fourth, War-
ing had rejected one design because it looked too much like Braun's
blender."- 50 Fifth, Waring received a brief letter from the patent
attorney strongly suggesting that Waring's design did not infringe
the Braun patent. 115' Finally, the patent attorney followed up sev-
eral months later with a letter that stated in extensive detail why
Waring's blender design did not infringe the Braun patent."152
Upon considering these factors, the court reversed the jury's verdict
of willful infringement. 1 5 3
In In re Hayes Microcomputer Products,1154 the defendant, Ven-Tel,
also attempted to rely on an attorney's opinion letter to establish
that it did not willfully infringe the plaintiff's patent. 11 5 The Fed-
eral Circuit, however, affirmed the jury's verdict that Ven-Tel will-
fully infringed the Hayes patent."156 The court noted that the
apparent purpose of the attorney's opinion letter was not to enable
Ven-Tel to determine whether it infringed the patent.'' 57 Rather,
the letter was used as a basis for forming a consortium of manufac-
turers to challenge the validity of the plaintiff's patent."158 The
court concluded, "[a]lthough Ven-Tel received advice of counsel on
the invalidity of [Hayes'] patent, advice of counsel alone cannot be
used as a shield irrespective of the nature and timing of that advice
in the context of the surrounding circumstances.""159
Even upon finding willful infringement, a district court is not re-
quired to exercise its discretion and award enhanced damages
throughout the period from the date of infringement until the con-
clusion of appeals in the patent litigation. 160 In In re Hayes






1154. 982 F.2d 1527, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1155. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., 982 F.2d 1527, 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1156. Id. at 1545, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253-54.
1157. See id at 1543, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 (noting that Hayes' expert witness testi-
fied that letter failed to give Ven-Tel reasonable basis for believing in good faith that Hayes'
patent was invalid because letter treated patent's claims superficially, failed to set out standard
for one of ordinary skill in art, failed to discuss secondary obviousness considerations, and
failed to offer proper best mode analysis).
1158. See id. at 1544, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254 (indicating that after Ven-Tel and other
manufacturers were notified that they were infringing Hayes' patent, Modem Patent Defense
Group (MPDG) was formed to challenge Hayes' patent). The attorney then prepared the
opinion, which concluded that the patent was invalid. Id. To join MPDG, each potential
member was asked to contribute $10,000 in return for a copy of the attorney's letter. Id.
1159. Id-
1160. See id. at 1545 (stating that trial court may award enhanced damages upon finding of
10451993]
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court did not abuse its discretion by denying enhanced damages on
royalties to be paid by the defendant, Ven-Tel, pending its ap-
peal." 6  The district court considered enhancing the royalties post-
appeal, but did not do so because the district court believed that
enhancing the royalties prior to the appeal had sufficiently punished
the defendant." 6 2 The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that
"[although] it seems somewhat illogical to have awarded Hayes
double damages [on royalties] prior to the filing of the appeal, but
fail to do so during the appeal, we cannot say that the [district] court
abused its discretion."' 6 3
In Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. ,' 16 the Federal Cir-
cuit held that "[a] finding of willful patent infringement supports,
but does not compel, enhancement of damages.""165 Rather than
assessing enhanced damages against the infringer whenever willful
infringement is found, however, the district court must take into
consideration the "closeness" of the case and "the culpability of the
infringer with due attention to any circumstances in mitigation." ' 66
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) produced no opinions from coun-
sel of invalidity or noninfringement regarding any of the three
Brooktree patents asserted against it.1167 AMD contended that
none of the Brooktree patents had issued when the allegedly in-
fringing activities began." 168 Furthermore, AMD argued that it had
no knowledge of the patents until Brooktree had filed the law-
suit. 1 69 Brooktree responded that AMD continued its accused ac-
tivities even after learning of the Brooktree patents and had no
good faith basis for asserting noninfringement or invalidity. 1 70
The district court found Brooktree's evidence sufficient to sustain
the jury verdict of willful infringement, but observed that the evi-
dence was "not of the weight and strength that would support the
imposition of enhanced damages." '" 7' The Federal Circuit affirmed
willful infringement, and court's decision will not be reversed unless court abused its
discretion).
1161. Id-, 982 F.2d at 1545, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
1162. Id-
1163. Id.
1164. 977 F.2d 1555, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1165. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1581, 24 U.S.P.q,2d
(BNA) 1401, 1419-20 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367, 369 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).





1171. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 757 F. Supp. 1088, 1097, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692, 1700 (S.D. Cal. 1990), aft'd, 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the lower court's finding of willful infringement and held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying enhanced dam-
ages, even though the jury found willful infringement. 172
C. Design Patents-35 U.S.C. § 289
Patentees who successfully establish infringement of a design pat-
ent can elect to recover the infringer's profits under 35 U.S.C.
§ 289.1173 In Braun, however, the Federal Circuit held that lost
profits recovered under § 289 may not be trebled under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.1174 According to the Federal Circuit, "[n]othing in 35 U.S.C.
§ 289 authorizes an increase in a patentee's total profit.... In fact,
35 U.S.C. § 289 explicitly precludes a patentee from 'twice re-
cover[ing] the profits made from infringement.' "1175 Braun elected
to recover the infringer's profits under 35 U.S.C. § 289 as compen-
sation for design patent infringement and then argued that the in-
fringer's lost profits should be trebled under § 284 because the
infringement was willful." 176 The district court agreed and awarded
Braun three times Waring's total profits. 1 77 The district court rea-
soned that there is very little substantive difference between § 284
damages and lost profits under 35 U.S.C. § 289, and thus, the in-
fringer's lost profits may be trebled."178
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred
in failing to uphold the longstanding distinction in patent law be-
1172. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1582, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court's
denial of attorney's fees, because a trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
Id. The Federal Circuit held that there was no abuse of this discretion in denying attorney's
fees to the plaintiff because the trial judge characterized the lawsuit as a "close case." lId
1173. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1988). Section 289 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1)
applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of man-
ufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manu-
facture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to
the owner to the extent of his [or her] total profit ....
Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other remedy which
an owner of an infringed patent has under the provisions of this title, but he [or she]
shall not twice recover the profit made from the infringement.
Id
1174. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 824-25, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1121, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 1144-53 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Braun in context of treble damages for willful infringement).
1175. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496
F. Supp. 476, 496 (D. Minn. 1980)).
1176. Id. at 824, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
1177. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 775 F. Supp. 33, 39-41, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1696, 1700-02 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 975 F.2d 815, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1178. Id.
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tween damages and profits.1 179 The court explained that compensa-
tory damages evolved in the courts of law and could be increased,
whereas recovery of an infringer's profits evolved in the courts of
equity and could not be increased.1180 Therefore, the court held
that an award of the infringer's lost profits for design patent in-
fringement under 35 U.S.C. § 289 may not be trebled under 35
U.S.C. § 284.1181
D. Limitations on Damages-35 U.S.C. § 286
Title 35, section 286 of the U.S. Code provides that a patentee
shall not recover damages for any infringement committed more
than six years prior to filing of the complaint or counterclaim for
infringement in the action.' 182 In A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings
Co.,1 183 the Federal Circuit refused Stucki's invitation to create new
law by allowing equity-based considerations to toll the six-year limi-
tation on damages in § 286.1184 This issue arose as a consequence
of Stucki's decade-long effort to obtain and then collect $2.2 million
in damages. 1185 Stucki finally prevailed in its patent infringement
suit against Railroad Dynamics Inc. (RDI) and was awarded $2.2
million in damages. 1186 Concerned with RDI's solvency, 187 in late
1983 Stucki sued RDI shareholders Schwam and Worthington In-
dustries. 1188 In 1987, Stucki moved to add Buckeye to its suit
against Schwam and Worthington but withdrew the motion to avoid
1179. Braun, 975 F.2d at 824, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
1180. Id.
1181. Id.
1182. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988) (providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no
recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action").
1183. 963 F.2d 360, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1184. See A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 963 F.2d 360, 362-63, 22 U.S.P.OQ2d
(BNA) 1581, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rejecting Stucki's request to read equity-based excep-
tion into introductory phrase of § 286 because latitude to do so was not present in case law or
legislative history).
1185. Id at 361-62, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582 (discussing background of case).
1186. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1520-21, 220 U.S.P.QJ
(BNA) 929, 934 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984). Stucki sued RDI in 1980 for
infringement of its hydraulic shock absorbers used in boxcars. Id. at 1509-10, 220 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) at 933-34. Ajury awarded Stucki $2.2 million in damages. Id. The award was affirmed
on appeal. Id. at 1520-21, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 934.
1187. Stucki, 963 F.2d at 361, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
1188. A. Stucki Co. v. Schwam, 634 F. Supp. 259, 260, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 903, 903, modi-
flied, 638 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd sub nom. A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Stucki alleged that Worthington was liable because it had
merged with Buckeye, which owned 50% of RDI's stock. Worthington, 849 F.2d at 594, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. Schwam was allegedly liable because he was the other 50% share-
holder in RDI. Schwam, 634 F. Supp. at 262, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 905. The district court
held that Worthington did not merge with Buckeye and issued a directed verdict in favor of
Worthington, Worthington, 849 F.2d at 595, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067, but issued a sum-
mary judgment against Schwam. Schwam, 634 F. Supp. at 262, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 905.
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postponement of the trial date. 18 9 Despite Stucki's efforts, most of
the $2.2 million remained uncollected, and in March 1988, Stucki
separately sued Buckeye.' 190 Stucki alleged that Buckeye was jointly
and severally liable for RDI's infringement because Buckeye was a
50% shareholder in RDI during the period of infringement.1191
The district court held that 35 U.S.C. § 286 barred Stucki's claim
for relief because Buckeye had no part in RDI's infringing activities
for at least six years prior to Stucki's action against Buckeye. 119 2
Buckeye's liability could include only those infringing acts that oc-
curred between March 1982 and March 1988.1193 The district court,
however, found that Buckeye had adopted a "hands-off and stay
clear policy" with respect to RDI since June 1980 and thus barred
Stucki's claim for relief during the period between 1982 and
1988.1194
In its appellate case, Stucki first argued that its action to collect on
a past damage award was equitable in nature and the court, there-
fore, should exercise its equitable power to award Stucki the relief
sought.' 5 The Federal Circuit rejected Stucki's threshold argu-
ment, holding instead that Stucki's action was one at law to establish
liability, not one requesting equitable relief against Buckeye. 1 96
Stucki next asserted that the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law" in § 286 contemplated the availability of equity-based ex-
ceptions to the six year time bar of § 286.1197 The court, however,
declined Stucki's plea to create equity-based exceptions to § 286 be-
cause neither the legislative history of § 286 nor prior case law sup-
ported Stucki's argument." 9 8 Although Buckeye had not raised
laches or equitable estoppel as a defense, Stucki put forth a related
argument: equitable considerations, such as the "other litigation"
excuse raised to rebut the equitable laches defense, could suspend
Despite Schwam's additional liability, Stucki's judgment remained largely unsatisfied. Stucki,
963 F.2d at 362, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1189. Stucki, 963 F.2d at 362, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. Stucki's apparent problem
with § 286 would appear to have its genesis in Stucki's apparent failure to add Buckeye during
either the original RDI suit or during the later suit against Schwam and Worthington. Id.
1190. A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 795 F. Supp. 847, 849 (S.D. Ohio 1991),
aff'd, 963 F.2d 360, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1191. Id. In a separate count, Stucki also alleged that Buckeye was liable under the Racket-
eer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Id. Stucki alleged
that Buckeye engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by causing RDI to infringe Stucki's
patents. Id.
1192. hd at 853-55.
1193. Id.
1194. Id. at 855.
1195. Stucki, 963 F.2d at 362, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1196. I at 362-63, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1197. Id. at 363, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1198. Id
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the time limitation in § 286.1199 The court, however, dismissed this
argument, stating that laches and § 286 are independent con-
cepts. 120 0 Furthermore, merely borrowing the six-year damage limi-
tation period from § 286 as the delay period for raising a rebuttal
presumption of laches had no effect on the independent application
of either § 286 or laches.' 20 1 Finally, the Federal Circuit refused to
restrict the application of § 286 only to direct infringers.120 2
E. Injunctions-35 U.S.C. § 283
1. Preliminary injunctions
In 1992, the Federal Circuit considered preliminary injunctions in
New England Braiding Co. v. A. W. Chesterton Co. 120 3 and in Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 120 4 In New England Braiding, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's request for a pre-
liminary injunction and discussed the application of the presump-
tion of validity in a preliminary injunction analysis. 1205 In
Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's grant of
a preliminary injunction, lifting the district court's restriction
preventing the patentee from notifying potential infringers of their
possible infringement. 206
In New England Braiding, the patentee, NEBCO, sued Chesterton
for infringement of NEBCO's patents that pertained to a braided
compression packing. 20 7 NEBCO subsequently filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction. 20 8 The district court denied the injunction
on the ground that NEBCO was not likely to succeed at trial because




1202. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583-84. Stucki alleged that Buckeye was liable as a
contributory infringer and then argued that § 286 should only operate against those paten-
tees who allege direct infringement. Id.
1203. 970 F.2d 878, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1204. 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 1350-
71 and accompanying text (discussing case with regard to patent misuse issue).
1205. New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882-84, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1625-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The following factors must be established
by the movant for a grant of a preliminary injunction: (1) that the movant is likely to succeed
on the merits at trial; (2) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is
not granted; (3) that the balance of the hardships tips in the movant's favor; and (4) that a
preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625 (cit-
ing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 13,18-49
(Fed. Cir. 1991); H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 387, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1927 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
1206. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 710, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173,
1175 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1207. New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 878-82, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622-25.
1208. Id. at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
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§ 102(f).1209 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial
of NEBCO's motion, holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because Chesterton presented evidence raising a substan-
tial question regarding the patent's validity.1210 In reaching this
conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected NEBCO's assertion that the
presumption of validity, rather than the defendant's evidence of in-
validity, controls the determination of whether the plaintiff is likely
to succeed at trial.1211 According to the court, "[t]he presumption
acts as a procedural device which places the burden of [production]
and the ultimate burden of persuasion of invalidity at trial on the
alleged infringer."' 21 2 Therefore, the statutory presumption of va-
lidity does not relieve a patentee seeking a preliminary injunction
from the normal burden of proving that it is likely to succeed on all
disputed liability issues at trial, even when the issue concerns the
patent's validity. 1213
In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
preliminary injunction that prevented Mallinckrodt from issuing no-
tices warning users that violating the "single use" restriction on the
patented device would be deemed patent infringement. 1214 The
court held that a patentee, who in good faith believes its patents are
being infringed, does nothing illegal in notifying all alleged infring-
ers that their conduct may or will be infringing. 12 15 Infringement
1209. See New England Braiding Co. v. Chesterton Co., 746 F. Supp. 1200, 1201 (D. Mass.
1990) (explaining that § 102() requires patentee to be actual inventor of subject matter pat-
ented), aft'd, 970 F.2d 878, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1210. New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 882-85, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625-27. The
Federal Circuit also asserted that to reverse a grant of a preliminary injunction, the alleged
infringer must show that one of the factual premises was clearly erroneous. Id. at 882, 23
U.S.P..2d (BNA) at 1625. To reverse a denial of a preliminary injunction, however, the
burden on the movant is greater. Id. The plaintiff must show that one or more of the factors
relied on by the district court was clearly erroneous and that denial of the preliminary injunc-
tion would be an abuse of the court's discretion upon reversal of an erroneous finding. Id
1211. See id at 882-83, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625-26 (explaining NEBCO's argument
that district court should have "given weight" to statutory presumption of validity).
1212. Id at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
1213. Id. (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 868, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The Federal Circuit also noted that in ruling on the preliminary
injunction motion, it is not the court's role to decide whether NEBCO's patents are actually
invalid. Id. Therefore, the court did not consider NEBCO's evidence establishing the validity
of its patents. Id. All that the court decided in this appeal was whether the district court
"seriously misjudged the evidence underlying its finding respecting NEBCO's likelihood of
success at trial." Id at 884, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
1214. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701-10, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1173, 1173-81 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Mallinckrodt's proposed notice emphasized that its device
was for a single use only in order to protect hospitals and patients from the adverse conse-
quences of reconditioning, such as infectious disease transmissions. Id. at 703, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1175. The notices also warned users that the device was protected by certain pat-
ents and that the device was licensed to hospitals for only one use. Id. Moreover, reuse would
be deemed infringement of the patents. Id.
1215. Id. at 709-10, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180-81; see also Virtue v. Creamery Package
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notices may be enjoined, however, when, for example, the patentee
acted in bad faith, 12 16 indiscriminately sent notices to all members
of the trade,121 7 or did not have a good faith belief in the validity of
its patent. 21 8 The court held that Medipart neither asserted nor
proved any of these conditions. 1219
2. Modifying permanent injunctions
Under 35 U.S.C. § 283, a district court can grant an injunction "in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems rea-
sonable."' 220 In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith,122' the Federal
Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in re-
fusing to modify its permanent injunction. 222 The district court
originally enjoined Ortho from making, using, or selling any prod-
uct containing the chemical compound "norgestimate" in violation
of patents owned by AHP.122s The district court denied AHP's mo-
tion to expand the permanent injunction specifically to prohibit
Ortho from using or transmitting data obtained in gaining FDA ap-
proval of norgestimate and to extend the prohibitions two years be-
yond the term of AHP's patent. 224 The Federal Circuit refused to
address the question of whether the transmission of data is an in-
fringing act, but instead concluded that if transmission of data was
indeed infringing, the present injunction would cover it.1225 If
Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8, 37-38 (1913) ("Patents would be of little value if infringers of them
could not be notified of the consequences of infringement or proceeded against in the courts.
Such action considered by itself cannot be said to be illegal.").
1216. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 710, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (citing Betmar Hats, Inc.
v. Young America Hats, Inc., 116 F.2d 956, 957,48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1941)).
1217. Id- (citing International Indus. & Devs., Inc. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 241 F.2d 246,
247-48, 112 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 349, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1957)).
1218. Id. (citing Magnetic Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 868, 84
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1950)).
1219. Id.
1220. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
1221. 959 F.2d 936, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1222. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 945-46, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1119, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court stated that "the grant, denial, or modification of
an injunction under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard." Id.
at 945, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127 (citing Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d
995, 1002, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 567 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986)).
1223. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856, 1864 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (restricting Ortho's activities with respect to norgestimate under injunction to those
solely for uses reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, as provided by 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (providing that it shall not be act of infringement to
make, use, or sell patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to development and
submission of information under federal law that regulates manufacture, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products).
1224. Ortho, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
1225. Ortho, 959 F.2d at 945-46, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
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transmission is not an infringement, however, it is not clear whether
the district court has the discretionary power under 35 U.S.C. § 283
to enjoin such acts. 1226 The Federal Circuit advised that a determi-
nation of whether certain acts constitute infringement should be ad-
dressed in contempt proceedings, rather than in a request for
modification of an injunction. 1227
With respect to the district court's denial of AHP's two-year ex-
tension request, the Federal Circuit held that AHP failed to establish
that the district court had abused its discretion. 228 AHP relied on
two cases to illustrate that courts have enjoined the use of data to
prevent an infringer from profiting from its infringement. 229 The
Federal Circuit, however, was unpersuaded that these cases, or any
other evidence presented by AHP, demonstrated that the district
court abused its discretion by denying the motion to amend. 1230
VI. EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
A. Laches and Equitable Estoppel
InA.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co. ,1231 the Federal
Circuit, sitting in banc, clarified the applicable standards under which
the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel are to be applied in
patent infringement suits and reversed the summary judgment.1232
Aukerman owned two patents relating to a method of forming con-
crete highway barriers. 1233 Having learned that Chaides was possi-
bly infringing its patents, Aukerman sent Chaides a letter, dated
February 13, 1979, that informed Chaides of the potential infringe-
ment and offered to license the patents to Chaides. 1234 In subse-
quent letters, Aukerman advised Chaides that Aukerman's patents
would be enforced against all infringers, but as of June 1, 1979,
Aukerman had taken no action against Chaides. 1235 After eight




1229. Id. at 946, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier
Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157, 162-63 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 652, 662, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352, 1360 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd and vacated on other
grounds, 915 F.2d 670, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1230. Id. at 946, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127-28.
1231. 960 F.2d 1020, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in banc).
1232. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1026, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in banc) (stating that court reheard Aukerman
specifically to reconsider principles of laches and equitable estoppel in patent infringement
suits).
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products that possibly infringed Aukerman's patents. 236 Referring
to the earlier letters, Aukerman again offered a license to Chaides,
but the parties were unable to agree on the terms of such a li-
cense. 1237 About one year later, Aukerman filed suit against
Chaides for patent infringement. 238
The district court granted Chaides' motion for summary judg-
ment based on the defenses of laches and equitable estoppel.' 239
The district court shifted the burden of proof to Aukerman to show
why the six-year delay in filing suit was reasonable and to show that
Chaides was not prejudiced by the delay. 240 Unpersuaded by
Aukerman's arguments, the district court applied laches because
Aukerman's delay in filing suit against Chaides was unreasonable
and because Chaides was prejudiced by the delay.' 241 The district
court also held that Chaides satisfied the four-part test for equitable
estoppel set forth in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products.12 42
Even though Chaides allegedly came before the court with "unclean
hands" as a result of its having made a copy of Aukerman's patented
slipform, this allegation did not defeat Chaides' equitable estoppel
defense because Aukerman had not shown how the accused Chaides
slipform infringed Aukerman's patents.1243




1240. See id. (noting that district court cited Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839
F.2d 1544, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988), for proposi-
tion that delay of more than sx years before commencing litigation shifts burden of proof to
patentee to show delay was reasonable and not prejudicial to accused infringer).
1241. Id Aukerman argued that its delay was excused by the fact that it was involved in
other litigation. Id The district court, however, rejected this excuse because this litigation
did not cover the time period in question, nor did Aukerman give notice to Chaides that it was
engaged in this other litigation. Id. The district court also held that Chaides was prejudiced
by this delay for three reasons. Id First, Chaides would have to pay a license fee on projects
it had bid on without factoring in the royalty costs. Id Second, Chaides had foregone seeking
bankruptcy protection because Chaides was not made aware of its liability for past infringe-
ment. Id. Lastly, Chaides' ability to defend itself would be prejudiced by this delay because
necessary witnesses, including the inventor, were no longer available to testify. Id. As to
other litigation, at least one court applied laches and estoppel to bar Aukerman's claims. See,
e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693 F.2d 697, 701-02, 216 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
863, 867 (7th Cir. 1982).
1242. 839 F.2d 1544, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828
(1988). TheJamesbury four-part test requires:
(1) unreasonable and unexcusable delay in filing suit,
(2) prejudice to the infringer,
(3) affirmative conduct by the patentee inducing belief that it abandoned its claims
against the infringer, which can include silence, and
(4) detrimental reliance by the infringer.
Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839 F.2d 1544, 1553-54, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779,
1786-87 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
1243. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. Aukerman appealed this
decision to the Federal Circuit. Id. After the original panel released its decision, the Federal
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit provided a thorough treatment of
laches as a defense in patent infringement suits. 124 4 The court be-
gan its analysis by explaining that in patent cases, laches can bar
recovery for the alleged infringement occurring prior to the filing of
the complaint. 1245 The existence of laches, however, would not bar
the plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against an infringer. 1246
The Federal Circuit counseled that to determine whether laches is
applicable, the district court must weigh the length of delay, the se-
riousness of the prejudice, and the defendant's conduct and culpa-
bility to determine whether the patentee dealt unfairly with the
alleged infringer by not promptly bringing suit. 1247 The laches de-
fense therefore is not subject to automatic application but is instead
committed to the discretion of the trial judge. 1248
The Federal Circuit announced that two elements must be proven
Circuit sua sponte ordered an in banc rehearing and vacated the panel's decision. Id. at 1028, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. The court explicitly stated that the appeal was being heard in banc
to clarify and apply principles of laches and estoppel. Id The Federal Circuit, sitting in banc,
reversed the district court, finding upon clarification of the applicable law that genuine issues
of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment. The court therefore remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id at 1026, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1323.
1244. Id. at 1039-40, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. Laches has been defined as the ne-
glect or delay in bringing a suit to remedy an alleged wrong that, in combination with lapse of
time and other factors, causes prejudice to the adverse party and thus serves as an equitable
bar to the claim asserted. See William M. Tabb, Reconsidering the Application of Laches in Environ-
mental Litigation, 14 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 377, 377-79 nn. 1-9 (1990) (tracing origins of equita-
ble defense of laches). The defense of laches has long been recognized in patent
infringement actions brought in equity. See, e.g., Land & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193,
200-01 (1893) (finding that plaintiff in patent infringement suit regarding stop valve for hy-
draulic elevator was guilty of laches for allowing unreasonable delay in bringing suit); Wallen-
sak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 101-02 (1885) (determining applicant was not guilty of laches for
two-year delay in applying for reissue of patent). The laches defense was thus well established
at the time of recodification of the patent laws in 1952. Indeed, one of the drafters of 35
U.S.C. § 282 specifically recognized laches as a defense to an infringement action. See P.J.
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (1954) (stating that defenses
which may be raised in action involving validity or infringement of patent encompass non-
infringement, absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability, and include equitable
defenses such as laches, estoppel, and unclean hands).
1245. Aukermnan, 960 F.2d at 1039-40, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35. Aukerman argued
that the laches defense was inapplicable in patent infringement suits because it conflicts with
35 U.S.C. § 286 and does not apply to claims based in law. Id. at 1029-30, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1325-26. In addition, Aukerman argued that the laches defense must be proven for
each act of infringement because infringement is a continuing tort. Id. The Federal Circuit
disagreed, noting that § 286 or its equivalent has coexisted with the laches defense for some
time and that the § 286 limitation on damages is not mutually exclusive of the laches defense.
Id. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the distinction between claims based in law and
claims based in equity is inappropriate in view of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Id at 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (merging legal and
equitable claims into single form of action known as "civil action"). Relying on Lane & Bod-
ley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893), the Federal Circuit concluded that laches is a single
defense to a continuing tort. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-28.
1246. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35.
1247. Id. at 1032-33, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29.
1248. See id at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (citing cases that established now well-
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to establish laches. First, the patentee's delay in bringing the suit
must be unreasonable and inexcusable. 1249 The length of delay "is
measured from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the defendant's alleged infringing activities to the date of the
suit."'1250 Second, the alleged infringer must suffer material preju-
dice as a result of the delay.1251 The material prejudice may be
either economic or evidentiary. 125 2 For laches purposes, economic
prejudice does not result merely because one is found liable for in-
fringement. There must instead be a change in position by the al-
leged infringer resulting from the period of delay. 1253 Economic
prejudice exists, for example, where the defendant will incur mone-
tary loss or damages that would likely have been prevented by an
earlier, timely filed suit.1254 Evidentiary prejudice may arise when
the defendant is unable to provide a "full and fair defense" because
of factors such as "loss of records, the death of a witness, or the
unreliability of the memories of long past events thereby undermin-
ing the court's ability to judge the facts."' 1255 These factors and all
other evidence and circumstances must be considered by the district
court in determining whether equity should intercede to bar prefil-
ing damages. 1256 The court further noted that even if the delay is
unreasonable, the patentee can rebut the application of laches by
offering an excuse for the delay or by showing that the infringer
founded proposition that "application of the defense of laches is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court").
1249. Id. at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1250. See id- (mentioning cases that cite well-settled factors that defendants must prove to
invoke laches defense successfully). The court also noted that the period of delay does not
begin prior to the issuance of the patent. Id.; see also Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304,
1307, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (relying on Meyers v. Brooks Shoe,
Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1462, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which held that
it was not unreasonable for Meyers to wait until second patent issued to sue on both first and
second patents together, and therefore determining that period of delay begins upon issuance
of second patent, even though patentee could have sued on first alone).
1251. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328; see also Costello v. United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (noting that laches defense requires proof of lack of diligence
by party against whom defense is asserted and proof of prejudice against party asserting de-
fense); Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1057
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that defendant must prove unreasonable and inexcusable delay and
material prejudice from this delay to establish laches).
1252. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1253. Id.; see also Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1294, 23
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1860, 1863 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that to satisfy prejudice element,
there must be nexus between patentee's delay and alleged infringer's expenditures in re-
search and development).
1254. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1255. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1256. Id. at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. The court noted that the standard of
review for a finding of laches is abuse of discretion. Id. at 1039, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
"An appellate court, however, may set aside a discretionary decision if the decision rests on an
erroneous interpretation of the law or on clearly erroneous factual underpinnings." Id.
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" 'has engaged in particularly egregious conduct which would
change the equities significantly in plaintiff's favor.' "1257 Ignorance
or good faith belief in the merits of a defense, however, may weigh
in the defendant's favor.1258
Following the holding of Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 1259 the
Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle that a presumption of laches
arises when a patentee delays six years before filing an infringement
action. 1260 The Federal Circuit stated that the "underlying critical
factors of laches are presumed upon proof that the patentee delayed
filing suit for more than six years after actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the defendant's alleged infringing activity."' 126 1 Aukerman
argued that the presumption of laches, which includes a prejudice
element, is unfair in patent litigation and should be eliminated in
the same manner that the Federal Circuit eliminated the presump-
tion of prejudice in Cornetta v. United States.' 262
The Federal Circuit, however, distinguished Cornetta, which dealt
with military pay, from patent cases. 1263 In Cornetta, the Govern-
ment was required to prove prejudice in order to establish laches,
rather than rely on a presumption of prejudice, because such a pre-
sumption could not be justified on principles of fairness or public
1257. lId at 1033, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d
1567, 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1216-17 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (listing acceptable excuses
for unreasonable delay, including other litigation, negotiations with accused, poverty and ill-
ness (under limited circumstances), wartime conditions, extent of infringement, and dispute
over ownership of patent). The Federal Circuit commented on the frequently asserted "other
litigation excuse," explaining that the district court erred in rejecting Aukerman's "other liti-
gation" excuse on the ground that Aukerman did not notify Chaides of the other litigation.
I at 1039, 22 U.S.P.O-2d (BNA) at 1334. The court held that a notice requirement should
not be imposed rigidly because there may be other circumstances making notice unnecessary.
Id
1258. Id.
1259. 726 F.2d 734, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1260. Auke-man, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citing Leinoff v. Louis
Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734, 741-42, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 845, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (af-
firming court's determination in Leinoffthat six-year delay is presumptively unreasonable for
filing patent infringement suit).
1261. Id at 1035-36, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. This is consistent with the historical
development of the doctrine of laches where courts often "borrowed" the time period from
the statute of limitations, which apply to claims at law, and presumptively applied it to laches,
which applied to claims in equity. Note, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1950). The "borrowing" concept was extended to patent cases
when various courts borrowed the six-year limitation of damages set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 286
and applied it by analogy to laches cases. See Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at
850 (arguing that six-year limitation for damages in § 286 is analogous to presumptively un-
reasonable six-year delay in filing patent infringement action).
1262. 851 F.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (requiring Government to prove that it was
prejudiced by delay in suit for reinstatement and back pay rather than rely on presumption of
prejudice that originated from civilian pay cases).
1263. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1036-37, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-32 (examining
Cornetta decision).
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policy.1 264 The Federal Circuit noted that the court in Cornetta gave
several reasons for its conclusion, including the fact that the soldier-
Government relationship is not a purely commercial relation-
ship,1 265 that the individual "soldier was at a decided disadvantage
vis-a-vis the might of the government," and that "the government
held the evidence of its prejudice." 1 266 According to the court,
"[t]hese fairness considerations are not transferable to patent
litigation."1 26 7
The Federal Circuit then explained that in patent cases, a pre-
sumption of laches does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion
from the defendant to the patentee. 1268 Instead, the defendant con-
tinues to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion of the affirmative
defense of laches at all times. 1269 Therefore, even if a patentee is
successful in rebutting the presumption of laches, the laches defense
is not necessarily precluded. 1270 Once rebutted, the presumption of
laches simply has no further role in rendering the ultimate deci-
sion.127 1 The facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice must then
be proven by the totality of the evidence presented. 272
The presumption of laches has no applicability to the equitable
estoppel defense. 2 75 At all times, the defendant has the burden of
proving equitable estoppel without the aid of presumptions.1274
1264. Id at 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1265. This conclusion is consistent with Justice Holmes' observation in White v. United
States, 270 U.S. 175, 180 (1926) (explaining that "the relation of the government to (all
soldiers] if not paternal was at least avuncular").
1266. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1036-37, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-32.
1267. Id. at 1037, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1268. See id. (suggesting that this legally unsound view of presumption was perhaps incor-
rectly put forth in Leinoff, where it was not clear whether alleged infringer still bore ultimate
burden of persuasion that laches in fact existed once presumption arose).
1269. Id. at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
1270. See id (noting that elimination of presumption does not mean laches is precluded as
defense). A presumption of laches is rebuttable under the "bubble bursting" approach found
in rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 301 advisory committee's note
(stating that presumption imposes burden of going forward on party against whom presump-
tion is made, to rebut or meet presumption, but that burden of persuasion remains through-
out trial on party to whom presumption was originally cast). Under this approach, if evidence
sufficient to support the nonexistence of the presumed fact is introduced, the presumption
vanishes. Id. To rebut a presumption of laches the party against whom the presumption
would operate must present evidence sufficient to put the existence of the presumed fact into
genuine dispute, nothing more. Id. Once the presumption arises, it shifts the burden of pro-
duction from the alleged infringer to the patentee. Therefore, to rebut the presumption the
patentee may offer proof either that the delay was reasonable or excused, or that the alleged
infringer was not prejudiced by the delay. See supra notes 1244-53 and accompanying text
(defining laches, shifting of burden of proof, and test for proving laches).
1271. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
1272. Id.
1273. Id
1274. See id. at 1043, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1337 (distinguishing laches from equitable
estoppel). Unlike laches, equitable estoppel bars all relief, including both damages and in-
junctions. Id. at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
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This is justified by the broader relief accorded a defendant under
equitable estoppel as opposed to laches and by the fact that the ele-
ments of laches are not the elements of the equitable estoppel
defense. 1275
In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit expressly overruled the four-ele-
ment equitable estoppel defense articulated in Jamesbury.1276 The
court instead listed three elements that an alleged infringer must
prove to establish an equitable estoppel defense. 1277 First, there
must be misleading conduct by the patentee from which the accused
infringer could have reasonably believed the patentee did not in-
tend to enforce the patent against the infringer. 1278 Accordingly, in
order to satisfy the first element, the alleged infringer must be aware
of the patentee and/or its patent and "know or reasonably be able
to infer that the patentee has known of the former's activities for
some time."'1279 Second, the alleged infringer must have relied on
the patentee's misleading conduct. 1280 The accused infringer must
show that it substantially relied on the misleading conduct of the
patentee in connection with taking some action.128 ' Reliance re-
quires the infringer to prove that a relationship existed with the pat-
entee, which lulled the infringer into a sense of security that the
patentee would not enforce the patent against the infringer. 128 2
Third, the alleged infringer must prove that material prejudice
would result if the patent infringement action was continued.1283 As
with laches, the accused infringer must prove material prejudice,
1275. Id
1276. See id at 1042, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (rejecting test set forth in Jamesbury
Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839 F.2d 1544, 1552-54, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779, 1786 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988), as "confusingly intertwin[ing]" elements of laches and
equitable estoppel); see also supra note 1242 and accompanying text (describing four-element
test articulated inJamesbury).
1277. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
1278. IA
1279. Id The court pointed out that on summaryjudgment silence will not create estoppel
unless the only possible inference is that the patentee acquiesced in allowing the defendant to
remain unmolested. Ia at 1043-44, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337; see also Hemstreet v. Com-
puter Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1295, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1864 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (holding that mere silence, to be misleading conduct, must be accompanied by some
other factor that indicates that silence was sufficiently misleading as to amount to bad faith);
Meyer v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308-09, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036, 1039 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (citing Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939,
1941 (Fed. Cir. 1987), which maintained that attempts to negotiate licenses followed by si-
lence, without more, were insufficient to establish equitable estoppel defense).
1280. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042-43, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37 (instructing that
reliance is essential element to equitable estoppel defense but not to laches defense).
1281. Id
1282. Id. at 1043, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1283. Id at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
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such as economic or evidentiary prejudice. 1284 The second and
third elements are often grouped together and jointly referred to as
detrimental reliance by commentators. 128 5 The Federal Circuit in
Aukerman thought it important to separate these elements for the
purpose of clarity. 1286
The court considered what standards of proof would control the
determination of laches and estoppel.128 7 After reviewing the differ-
ent standards of proof in civil cases, the court held that a prepon-
derance of the evidence is the appropriate standard to establish the
facts relating to laches and the equitable estoppel defense, absent
special circumstances such as fraud or intentional misconduct. 128 8
The court reasoned that special considerations presented, for exam-
ple, where a danger of deception exists, where a particular claim is
disfavored on policy grounds, or where a particularly important in-
dividual interest is at stake and requiring facts to be proven by clear
and convincing evidence, are not triggered by the concerns laches
and equitable estoppel address, and, therefore, a higher level of
proof would be inappropriate. 128 9
Having anounced these principles, the Federal Circuit applied
them in Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Systems Corp. 1290 and reversed the
district court's summaryjudgment that the plaintiff was barred from
recovery by laches and equitable estoppel.' 29 1 With respect to the
laches defense, the court noted that Aukerman restored equitable
flexibility, thus allowing the court to consider a host of factors in its
laches analysis. The court stated that delay may be excused due to
involvement in other litigation and that explicit notice to the de-
1284. Id.; see also supra notes 1252-56 and accompanying text (describing elements of eco-
nomic and evidentiary prejudice).
1285. See, e.g., 5 CHISUM, supra note 977, § 19.05[3], at 19-193 to 19-196 (discussing mis-
leading conduct as essential element of finding of detrimental reliance).
1286. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
1287. Id. at 1044-45, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (observing that issue of'proper eviden-
tiary burden for laches and estoppel defenses was one of first impression for Federal Circuit).
1288. Id. at 1045-46, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA).at 1339.
1289. Id. at 1046, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
1290. 972 F.2d 1290, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1291. Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1291, 23 U.S.P.Q02d
(BNA) 1860, 1861 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Hemstreet was an individual inventor of an optical char-
acter reader. Id. at 1291-92, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861-62. After twenty years of patent
prosecution, Hemstreet began enforcing his patent. Id. In 1983, Hemstreet sent warning
letters to the defendant and others in the industry, informing them of their potential infringe-
ment. Id. Six years later, after pursuing litigation against other infringers, Hemstreet filed a
suit against Computer Entry Systems Corporation (CES). Id. The district court, without the
benefit of the Aukerman decision, held that Hemstreet was barred by the doctrine of laches and
equitable estoppel. Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1308, 1313, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1204, 1208 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd and vacated, 972 F.2d 1290, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1860 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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fendant of the other proceedings is not an absolute requirement.1 292
To prove prejudice under Aukerman, it is not enough that the alleged
infringer changed its position. 1293 Rather, the change in position
must have a nexus to the patentee's delay.1 294 With respect to the
equitable estoppel defense raised by Computer Entry Systems, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case for findings consistent with the
three-part test newly announced in Aukerman. 1295 The court specifi-
cally stated that for mere silence to be misleading, some other factor
must be present that indicates the silence was sufficiently misleading
as to amount to bad faith. 296
In Meyers v. Asics Corp.,1297 the Federal Circuit also reversed the
district court's summary judgment that laches and estoppel barred
the plaintiff's infringement claims. 1298 In reversing the laches de-
termination, the court noted that the defendants dearly suffered an
economic prejudice. 1299 The court, however, stated that "the ques-
tion is whether this prejudice resulted from Meyers' delay."'' 3 0 0 The
Federal Circuit held that Asics failed to show that it would have ac-
ted differently if it had been sued earlier.' 3 0 ' Also, Asics did not
specify particular evidentiary prejudices. 3 0 2 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court erred in determining the period of alleged delay.' 30 3 As
to the equitable estoppel defense, the Federal Circuit held that Mey-
1292. Hemstreet, 972 F.2d at 1293, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
1293. Id
1294. Id at 1294, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329). The court noted that CES's prejudice argument was severely
undercut by the fact that Hemstreet explicitly notified CES that CES was infringing. Id.
1295. Id at 1295, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864; see supra notes 1276-88 and accompanying
text (describing derivation and elements of Aukerman three-part test to establish equitable
estoppel defense).
1296. Id (citing Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573-74, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1939, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1336).
1297. 974 F.2d 1304, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1298. Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1305, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036, 1036 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Meyers owned three patents on therapeutic shoe sole structures. Id. After receiv-
ing these patents, Meyers began a period of aggressive enforcement. Id. Nonetheless, four
years passed before Meyers filed the present case. Id. at 1306, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
The district court found that this delay caused prejudice to the defendant and consequently
ruled in favor of the defendant on its laches and equitable estoppel defenses. In re Meyers
Patent Litigation, 731 F. Supp. 640, 641-42, 17 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1078, 1079-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
1299. See Meyers, 974 F.2d at 1308, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038 (describing defendants'
economic detriment resulting from expenditure of substantial amounts of money to develop
and promote shoe models that Meyers alleged were infringing).
1300. Id The court noted that prejudice due to reliance on a plaintiff's delay is different
from prejudice that results from the delay and that the former is not a prejudice that satisfies
the laches defense. Ied at 1308 n.1, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038 n.1.
1301. Id. at 1309, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1302. Id.
1303. Id
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ers' initial efforts at licensing its patents, followed by silence, were
insufficient to show that the defendants were lulled into believing
Meyers did not intend to enforce its patents. °30 4 There was, there-
fore, no reliance by the defendant on the plaintiff's conduct, and
thus, equitable estoppel did not apply. °30 5
B. Fraud and Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense to a patent infringe-
ment allegation 3 06 and stems from the requirement that applicants
for a patent conduct themselves with candor in their dealings with
the PTO. °30 7 If an applicant engages in inequitable conduct in the
prosecution of a patent application, the resulting issued patent is
rendered unenforceable. 30 8 To establish inequitable conduct, two
elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 309
First, the applicant must have withheld material information from
the PTO. 310 Second, the applicant must have intended to deceive
the PTO by failing to disclose this material information in order to
affect the allowance of the claims.' 3' 1 Thereafter, the trier of fact
must exercise its discretion and make an equitable judgment, in
1304. Id at 1308-09, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
1305. Id
1306. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814-17 (1945) (barring plaintiff in infringement action from enforcing two patents under
equitable doctrine of unclean hands).
1307. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1992) (prescribing duty of candor each patent applicant has
to deal in good faith with PTO, including duty to disclose all information known to applicant
to be material to patentability).
1308. See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877, 9
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that inequitable conduct occurring
during prosecution of patent application renders patent unenforceable), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1067 (1989); see also MPEP, supra note 711, § 2010, at 2000-13 (remarking that subject of
inequitable conduct that is equivalent to fraud before FO has become increas;ingly important
and suggesting that PTO attempt to define its substantive policy regarding its decision to
render patents unenforceable when applicants engage in inequitable conduct before PTO).
1309. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223 U.S.P.Q, (BNA)
1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (describing requirements for proving inequitable conduct
through comparison to common law fraud), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 882 (1985). A finding of
inequitable conduct is committed to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed on appeal
under an abuse of discretion standard. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1392.
1310. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112,
1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that defendant who alleges "failure to disclose" type of inequi-
table conduct must prove information is material);J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559, 233 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 1094 (maintaining that finding of inequitable conduct requires proof of failure to
disclose material information).
1311. See Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241-42, 14 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1474, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that allegation of inequitable conduct must be sup-
ported by proof of applicant's intent to deceive); FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1411, 5 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1115 (stating that to be guilty of inequitable conduct one must have intended to act
inequitably); see also MPEP, supra note 711, § 2010.01, at 2000-13 to 2000-14 (describing cases
that define level of proof of intent to deceive required for finding of inequitable conduct).
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view of all the evidence and circumstances, whether the patentee is
so culpable that the patent ought not be enforced. 31 2
In LaBounty Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission,1313 the Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the ITC
that LaBounty committed inequitable conduct. 3 1 4 Specifically, the
ITC found that LaBounty intentionally withheld "on-sale" bars that
anticipated some of the claims of LaBounty's patent1315 and that the
withheld "on sale" bars were more material prior art than the art of
record before the examiner.13 16 Consequently, the ITC held that
LaBounty's patent was unenforceable.1 3 1 7
The claimed LaBounty shears had an upper and lower jaw for cut-
ting workpieces. 318 The upper jaw had a movable shearing
blade. 31 9 The lower jaw consisted of two blades, a lower shearing
blade and a guide blade for receiving and supporting the workpieces
1312. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.Johnson &Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1569-70, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (examining whether paten-
tee was guilty of inequitable conduct and determining that defendant failed to prove prior art
was material or intent to deceive); Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (failing to prove element of intent defeated
affirmative defense of inequitable conduct); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Dis-
trib. Co., 973 F.2d 911,917-18, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1926-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (deter-
mining that district court fully examined issue of inequitable conduct and agreeing that
requisite intent to deceive was not present); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070-77, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1028-33 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (af-
firming unenforceability of patent in question because inequitable conduct was proven by
clear and convincing evidence).
In Minnesota Mining, however, the Federal Circuit did not address the application of the
separate elements of inequitable conduct to the facts. Minnesota Mining, 976 F.2d at 1569-70,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330. Instead, the Federal Circuit upheld the Master's findings of
fact that JJO failed to show both the materiality and intent elements, and therefore found
insufficient evidence to establish that the lower court abused its discretion in reaching this
conclusion. Id. at 1570, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1313. 958 F.2d 1066, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1314. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1077, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1315. In re Certain Heavy-Duty Mobile Scrap Shears, Inv. No. 337-TA-252, 1989 ITC
LEXIS 415, at *146 (Nov. 7, 1989), af'd, LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The term "on-sale"
bar refers to the bar under 35 U.S.C. § 2543(b) that prohibits a person from obtaining a
patent if "the invention was ... in public use or on sale in this country for more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States .. " 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988). The LaBounty patent pertained to a heavy duty scrap shear used to cut metal such as
iron pipes, steel pipes, and structural steel. In re Certain Heavy-Duty Mobile Scrap Shears, 1989
ITC LEXIS 415, at * 146.
1316. In re Certain Heavy-Duty Mobile Scrap Shears, 1989 ITC LEXIS 415, at * 146. More than
one year prior to filing the application for its patent, LaBounty had placed on sale or in public
use certain shears referred to as "MS-107," "Adamo/Dodge," and "Ace." Id. at *145.
1317. See id. at *137 (making determination of inequitable conduct where patentee's shears
were found to be "far closer to the claimed inventions than any of the art cited by the
examiner").
1318. See LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1069-70 n.2, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1027-28 n.2 (describ-
ing design and function of claimed LaBounty shears).
1319. Id.
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after the shearing blades performed the cut.13 20 The prior art of
record before the examiner included two shearing devices, although
neither disclosed a lower guide blade.1321 One reference had two
shearing blades, but no guide blade on the lower jaw. 1-22
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC's ruling that LaBounty's
previous sales of three different types of shears constituted material
information that LaBounty should have disclosed to the PTO so that
the examiner could have properly decided whether or not to grant
the LaBounty patent. 3 23 The ALJ and the ITC both found that the
undisclosed shears (model MS-107) anticipated five claims of
LaBounty's patent. 3 24 LaBounty argued that the undisclosed "on-
sale" shears were not material, but only cumulative to, the prior art
patents before the examiner. 3 25 LaBounty admitted that the MS-
107 shears were sold to one customer, but nonetheless argued the
shears had two lower shear blades and not just the one lower shear
blade as recited in the LaBounty patent claim.' 3 26 Photographs and
credible testimony from that purchaser, however, showed that the
MS-107 shears had one lower shear blade and one lower guide
blade, which was corroborated by LaBounty's parts list for the MS-
107 shears. 13 27 Notations made by the inventor on a photograph of
the MS-107 shear and testimony from the respondent's expert wit-
nesses furnished additional support for the ITC's findings.13 28
The shears that LaBounty sold to other customers, Ace Equip-
ment and Adamo/Dodge, were designed to cut single work pieces
and had a top shear blade and a bottom shear blade.'3 29 These
shears were designed not only for single-cutting the workpiece, like
the claimed LaBounty shears, but also possessed an offset lower
1320. Id at 1071-74, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028-30.
1321. Id.
1322. Id at 1074, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
1323. Id.
1324. Id
1325. See id. (reporting LaBounty's contention that undisclosed shears sold were not mate-
rial to PTO's investigation because they presented no relevant features beyond prior art al-
ready before examiner).
1326. Id at 1074-75, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
1327. Id
1328. Id. at 1075, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031-32. The court specifically cited "a notation
made by Roy LaBounty on a picture of a MS 107 shear in the course of litigation contempora-
neous with prosecution of the... patent application ... clearly indicated the MS 107 had one
lower shear blade." Id.
1329. Id. at 1075, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031-32. Specifically, the MS-107 shear had
only one lower shear blade, like the LaBounty patent. Id. The Federal Circuit also noted that
an advertisement showing the MS-107 shears in an "upside down" position (two lower blades
on top and one nearer the ground), which LaBounty asserted was the shears' "normal" posi-
tion, was insufficient to show that the administrative law judge's reliance on the witness's
contrary testimony was misplaced. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
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guide blade that could serve as the receive and support struc-
ture. 330 The prior art patents before the examiner, however, did
not disclose a single cut shearing device having one lower shear
blade, an upper shear blade, and a lower guide blade to support the
workpiece after the blades had sheared off a length of workpiece. 13 3 1
Therefore, all the nondisclosed shears sold by LaBounty were more
material to the patentability of the LaBounty patent claims than the
references cited by the examiner.133 2
Having determined that LaBounty withheld material information,
the Federal Circuit addressed the intent element. 333 The ITC
found clear and convincing evidence of a culpable lack of candor,
citing LaBounty's misleading arguments to obtain allowance com-
bined with concealment of contemporaneously known material
prior art which contradicted those arguments. l33 4 During the pat-
ent prosecution, LaBounty stressed that the prior art cited by the
examiner did not disclose a lower guide blade, the receive and sup-
port feature in the claims. 335 On the other hand, the contempora-
neously known, but undisclosed, LaBounty "on sale" shears
contained that critical claim limitation. 3 36 Because LaBounty with-
held contemporaneously known prior art that would have refuted its
patentability arguments to the examiner, the Federal Circuit held
that LaBounty possessed culpable intent to mislead the PTO.1337
The court also dismissed LaBounty's argument that because the is-
sues respecting the experimental use of the so-called Ace and
Adamo/Dodge shears were "close," its decision not to disclose the
previous sales was reasonable. 338 The Federal Circuit emphasized
that "close" cases should be disclosed to the examiner. 339
In contrast to LaBounty, the Federal Circuit found that the paten-
tee had not committed inequitable conduct in either Braun, Inc. v.
1330. Id
1331. Id
1332. Id. at 1075-76, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
1333. Id. at 1076, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. The Federal Circuit noted that because
direct proof of an intent to deceive the PTO is rarely available, intent may be inferred from
clear and convincing evidence. Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technologies, 925
F.2d 1435, 1442, 17 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1834, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Merck & Co. v. Danbury
Pharmacal Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1989);





1337. See id (noting that had LaBounty's own prior art devices been disclosed to PTO,
prosecution would not have focused merely on prior art patent that did not have critical "re-
ceive and support" features).
1338. Id.
1339. Id, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
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Dynamics Corp. of America or Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble
Distributing Co. In Braun, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's directed verdict as to the inequitable conduct defense. 3 40
The defendant, Waring, argued that an intent to deceive should be
inferred merely from Braun's failure to disclose material prior art to
the examiner.13 41 The Federal Circuit recognized that an intent to
deceive may be inferred, but held that Waring could not rely solely
on the materiality of the prior art to support such an inference.1342
The court held that materiality and intent to deceive are separate
elements of the inequitable conduct defense, and as such, both must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.13 43
In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., the Fed-
eral Circuit held that K-C was not guilty of inequitable conduct dur-
ing the prosecution of its patent for disposable diapers despite the
failure of K-C's in-house patent counsel to disclose to the PTO the
recent issuance of a relevant P&G patent that also pertained to dis-
posable diapers. 3 44 K-C had already paid the final PTO issue fee
for its application when P&G's patent was issued, which was only six
weeks before K-C's patent was granted.13 45 K-C's in-house counsel
testified that when the issuance of P&G's patent came to his atten-
tion, he did not have sufficient time to study the P&G patent to de-
termine its materiality to K-C's still-pending application.13 46 The
Federal Circuit noted that K-C did disclose the P&G patent to the
PTO in a sibling application to K-C's patent, which was consistent
with a finding of no intent to deceive.'3 47 The Federal Circuit held
that while immediately informing the PTO about the P&G patent
might have been prudent, there was no evidence of an intent to
deceive in permitting the K-C patent to go to issuance without such
1340. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 882, 24 U.S.P.OJ2d (BNA)
1121, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reporting that defendant, Waring, argued that Braun was guilty
of inequitable conduct because Braun withheld material prior art during prosecution of alleg-
edly infringed design patent).
1341. See id. (arguing that Braun committed inequitable conduct because Braun failed to
present its own material prior art to PTO in seeking design patent on its hand-held blender).
Waring relied on Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1562, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1750, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 1989), which held that intent may be found as a
matter of inference. Braun, 975 F.2d at 1562, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. According to
Waring, the prior art was material because it showed that Braun's design was an obvious
evolutionary step, not a patentable advance. Id.
1342. Braun, 975 F.2d at 882, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
1343. Id. The Federal Circuit pointed out that Waring failed to provide clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Braun intended to deceive or mislead the PTO. Id. Waring did not depose
or call as witnesses any individuals who participated in the patent prosecution. Id.
1344. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 918, 23
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1921, 1926-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1345. Id. at 912-13, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922-23.
1346. Id. at 917-18, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926-27.
1347. Id.
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disclosure.1348
C. Patent Misuse
The patent misuse doctrine prevents patentees from using their
patents to obtain a market advantage beyond that which inheres in
the statutorily enforceable patent grant. 1349 In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc.,' 350 the Federal Circuit considered whether a "single
use only" restriction imposed by the patent owner constituted pat-
ent misuse.135 ' Mallinckrodt owned a number of patents relating to
a device for delivering a radioactive or therapeutic material to the
lungs by means of an aerosol mist.1352 Mallinckrodt affixed a label
on each device warning the user that the device was for "single use
only" and instructing purchasers to dispose of the entire unit after
use. 3 5 3 Mallinckrodt sued Medipart for patent infringement and in-
ducement to infringe because Medipart began reconditioning the
devices for reuse by the purchasers in violation of the "single use
only" restriction.1 3 5 4 In granting summary judgment to Medipart,
the district court held that the violation of the "single use only" re-
striction could not be remedied through a suit for patent
infringement. 1355
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case for reconsid-
eration of whether the "single use only" restriction is valid.' 3 56 Not
all restrictions accompanying the sale of a patented article are per se
violations of the doctrine of patent misuse or of the antitrust laws.
Legal conditions on a sale imposed by the patentee and agreed to by
1348. Id.
1349. See generally 5 CHISUM, supra note 977, § 19.04[1], at 19-283 to 19-297 (defining pat-
ent misuse doctrine, describing its historical development, and tracing its use to present day).
1350. 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1351. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1173,
1174 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1352. See id. (observing purchase by hospitals of Mallinckrodt's patented device for use by
patients). The device coats a patient's lungs with a radioactive material, thereby allowing an
image scan to be performed. Id These image scans permit doctors to diagnose and treat
various lung diseases. Id
1353. See id. at 702-03, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175-76 (describing single use only restric-
tion as based on health, safety, efficacy, and liability considerations).
1354. Id. at 703-09, 24 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1175-80.
1355. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113, 1119-21 (N.D. Ill.
1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
1356. Mallinchrodt, 976 F.2d at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. The court observed that
if the district court sustains the single use only restriction on remand, Mallinckrodt must pre-
vail in its assertion that Medipart engaged in impermissible reconstruction as a matter of law.
Id. According to the court, "[i]f the ... device is validly licensed for only a single use, any
reuse is unlicensed and an infringement, and there is no need to choose between repair and
reconstruction." Id The Federal Circuit therefore vacated as moot the district court's hold-
ing that Medipart's activities were permissible repair. Id
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the licensee will be upheld by the courts.13 57 Whether a restriction
is legal depends on whether the restriction is within the scope of
patent grant, or in other words, whether it relates to the subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims. 13-5 8 The court con-
cluded that if the sale is validly conditioned under the applicable law
and if the restriction on reuse is within the scope of the patent grant,
then violations of the "single use only" restriction can be remedied
through an action for patent infringement. 1359
The Federal Circuit held that the district court misinterpreted the
Supreme Court holding in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co. 136 0 In General Talking Pictures, the Supreme Court held
that a purchaser infringed a patent by using a patented device
purchased from a licensee-manufacturer when the purchaser knew
the device's use violated the manufacturer's field of use restriction
in the license. 136 1 The Supreme Court stated, however, that it did
not consider what the rights of the parties would have been had the
defendant purchased directly from a manufacturing patentee. 1362
The district court interpreted this reservation to mean that if the
patentee had manufactured the device, the "single use only" restric-
tion would not be enforceable.136 The Federal Circuit disagreed
with the district court, reasoning that General Talking Pictures did not
require an intervening manufacturing licensee before a patent could
be enforced against a purchaser with notice of the restriction. 136 4
Further, the Federal Circuit characterized the district court's inter-
pretation of Bauer & Oil v. O'Donnel11365 and Motion Picture Patents Co.
1357. Id at 703, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176 (citing E. Bement & Sons v. National Har-
row Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902)).
1358. See id at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (noting that even if there are anticompe-
titive effects extending beyond patentee's statutory right to exclude, restriction is not auto-
matically impeached, and anticompetitive effects that are not per se violations of law are
reviewed under rule of reason standard).
1359. lId
1360. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
1361. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180-83 (1938)
(determining that purchaser of amplifiers infringed patents embodied in amplifiers by leasing
amplifiers for use as talking picture equipment in theaters, because purchaser knew that sale
of amplifiers was outside scope of seller's license and was not under patent).
1362. Id. at 178.
1363. Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119-21.
1364. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177. Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that Medipart did not offer support for the proposition that the enforceabil-
ity of a restriction to a particular use is determined by whether the purchaser acquired the
device from a manufacturing licensee or from a manufacturing patentee. Id. The court also
cited Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977), for the proposition
that such an approach has been denigrated as "formalistic line drawing." Mallinckrodt, 976
F.2d at 705, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
1365. 229 U.S. 1, 25 (1913) (finding that price fixing accompanying sale of patented good
is per se illegal).
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v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 136 6 as too broad. The district
court extrapolated from these cases the principle that all restrictions
accompanying the sale of a patented device were illegal.1 36 7 The
Federal Circuit stated, "[t]hese cases did not hold, and it did not
follow, that all restrictions accompanying the sale of patented goods
were deemed illegal."' 3 68
The district court cited a number of Supreme Court cases in
which the Court held that the unconditioned sale of a patented de-
vice exhausted the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of
the patented device.' 3 69 The Federal Circuit, however, found the
district court's reliance on these cases misplaced. Those cases sim-
ply applied the rule of contract law that a sale may be condi-
tioned.137 0 According to the Federal Circuit, "Adams v. Burke and its
kindred cases do not stand for the proposition that no restriction or
condition may be placed upon the sale of a patented article."' 1371
1366. 243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917) (holding that tying arrangements with patented good
are per se illegal).
1367. Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119-21. The Federal Circuit explained in a
footnote that exceedingly broad language in one case should not be relied on to support
another. Mallinchrodt, 976 F.2d at 708 n.8, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 n.8 (citing Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821), which stated that "[i]t is a maxim not to be discarded, that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used").
1368. Id at 704, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
1369. Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116-19 (citing, as one example, Adams v.
Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873), which held geographic restrictions on patentee's sale of coffin lids
to be invalid against undertaker who bought coffin lids without restriction).
1370. Mallinchrodt, 976 F.2d at 708, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1371. Ide

